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This Article addresses the appropriate reach of the U.S. 
mandatory securities disclosure regime. While disclosure 
obligations are imposed on issuers, they are triggered by 
transactions:- the public offering of, or public trading in, the issuers' 
shares. Share transactions are taking on an increasingly 
transnational character. The barriers to a truly global market for 
equities continue to lessen: financial information is becoming 
increasingly globalized and it is becoming increasingly inexpensive 
and easy to effect share transactions abroad.1 There are 
1. For a detailed discussion of the trend toward a global market for the securities of 
significant issuers, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who 
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Disclosure .in a 
Globalizing Market]. 
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approximately 41,0002.issuers of publicly traded shares in the world. 
For an ever larger portion of these issuers, there will be significant 
numbers of transactions in their shares that have at least one U.S. 
dimension - the investor will be a U.S. resident, the transaction 
will occur in the United States, or the issuer itself will be from the 
United States - thereby generating some kind of claim for the 
United States to apply its disclosure regime. On which of these 
issuers is it in fact in the enlightened best interest of the United 
States to do so? 
In a previous article in this Review, I addressed the question of 
what apportionment of regulatory authority among the countries of 
the world would most enhance global economic welfare.3 The 
concern here is with the practical choices faced by U.S. officials as 
to the reach of their particular country's regime. Building on the 
earlier article, this piece thus extends the inquiry by examining the 
legal and political environment in which these officials operate and 
the impact of their decisions on U.S. economic welfare.4 
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has 
traditionally taken the position that the reach of the U.S. disclosure 
regime should be set so as to protect U.S. resident investors from 
making damaging securities choices due to poor information.s This 
has been the position of most academic commentators as well.6 The 
goal of "investor protection" leads directly to the principle that the 
only transactions associated with an issuer that should trigger 
2. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock 
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1995 was 36,572. See 
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CoRP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FAcrnOOK 1998, at 23 (1998). 
3. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1. 
4. This Article's focus on U.S. economic welfare does not mean that I believe as a general 
matter that U.S. practices with effects abroad should be judged solely by their impact on the 
United States. Rather, it reflects the fact that the U.S. officials making decisions concerning 
the reach of the U.S. regime will be primarily concerned with U.S., not global, welfare. It 
also reflects the fact that the impact of their choices on U.S. welfare is an important 
component in determining the legal constraints under which these officials operate. See infra 
Part II. In any event, as it turns out, there is no real conflict here. A comparison of the 
recommendations of this and the earlier article shows that the U.S. approach to statutory 
reach that most enhances U.S. welfare most enhances global welfare as well. And this is true 
whether or not other countries adopt similar practices. 
5. See infra section I.A.1. 
6. See, e.g., James J. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC 
Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 119 
(1996); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities Laws: The 
Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL Sroo. 431 
(1994). Richard Breeden, a former Chairman of the SEC, takes a similar position. See 
Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic 
Transformation, 11 FORDHAM INTL. LJ. 77, 90 (1994) (symposium). 
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imposition of U.S. disclosure regulation are those involving U.S. 
investors.7 
In 1988, the SEC, in proposing its subsequently adopted 
Regulation S, articulated a different, capital market protection goal 
for the U.S. approach to statutory reach.8 The new goal still seeks 
to protect certain investors from being poorly informed, but 
reformulates the class of persons protected to include all investors, 
wherever resident, but only if they purchase in the U.S. market. 
This change in articulated goal suggests that the place where 
transactions in an issuer's shares occur should be the exclusive 
consideration in deciding whether to apply the U.S. regime. The 
United States should impose its regime on all issuers where a 
significant number of transactions in their shares are effected in the 
United States and on no other issuers. The nationality of the issuer 
and that of the buyers of its shares should be irrelevant.9 
A third possible goal for the U.S. approach to statutory reach 
would be to maximize, to the extent cost effective, the benefits 
enjoyed by U.S. residents from disclosure's capital allocation 
improvement and managerial agency cost reduction effects.10 The 
7. In actual practice, the United States puts some weight as well on the nationality of the 
issuer and the location of the potentially triggering transactions. See infra Part I. Inclusion 
of these additional factors, however, is presumably justified by the idea that they serve as 
proxies for the nationality of buyers, information about which is hard to acquire. Tue fact 
that transactions in an issuer's shares occur in the United States or that the issuer is from the 
United States increases the likelihood that the buyers are in fact U.S. residents. 
8. See Securities Act Release No. 6779, 41 SEC Docket (CCH), at 126, 132 (June 10, 
1988) [hereinafter lNrrrAL PROPOSING RELEASE]; infra section I.A.2. 
9. Transaction location has always played a role in determining the reach of the regime. 
See infra sections I.A.1 and I.B. While the SEC has not yet moved actual U.S. practice 
significantly toward exclusive reliance on this approach, see infra sections I.A.2, I.B.l, I.C, 
the mere articulation of the capital market protection goal puts such exclusive reliance on the 
agenda for discussion and raises the possibility the SEC will make this move in the future. 
Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman have, for example, recently endorsed just 
such exclusive reliance on the transaction location approach. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew 
T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. 
& Bus. 207, 221-23 (1996) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality]; 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a 
Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1894 (1997) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, 
National Laws]. 
10. There has been a growing recognition over the last fifteen years of the importance of 
economic efficiency as a goal for disclosure regulation. Professor Coffee, for example, states: 
"This focus on fairness, rather than efficiency, is not surprising because proponents of a 
mandatory disclosure system have historically stressed the former over the latter. 
Nonetheless, the strongest arguments for a mandatory disclosure system may be efficiency­
based." John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 751 (1984). See also Steven A. Ross, Disclosure 
Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modem Finance Theory and Signaling 
Theory, in IssUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 191 (Franklin Edwards ed., 1979). Tue 
growing importance of efficiency is also illustrated by the recent enactment of Tue National 
Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (to be 
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concern under this goal is the capacity of issuer disclosure to aid in 
the functioning of the real economy in the United States, i.e., in the 
production of goods and services. This goal, we will see, implies 
that U.S. practice should be changed so that we impose the U.S. 
regime only on issuers of U.S. nationality, but do so wherever 
transactions in the issuer's shares are effected and whatever the 
nationality of the buyers. The nationality of an issuer would be 
determined by where the issuer has its center of gravity as a firm.11 
I conclude that this third goal - capital allocation improvement 
and managerial agency cost reduction - is the only viable goal for 
disclosure regulation in a world with a global market for securities. 
I thus recommend that the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime be 
determined by the nationality of the issuer.12 I come to this 
conclusion by using the tools of financial economics to trace out the 
ultimate effects in different countries of the disclosure behavior of 
transnational issuers. The pattern of effects revealed by this 
exercise shows that the issuer nationality approach most enhances 
U.S. economic welfare. Because the adherents of the investor 
residency and transaction location approaches have not traced out 
the ultimate effects in this fashion, they have failed to appreciate 
the superiority of the issuer nationality approach.13 
Two examples help show how this recommended change in 
approach would fundamentally alter current practices. The United 
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which amended the Securities Act of 
1933 to add Section 2(b) providing that: 
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is 
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (b) (emphasis added). The 1996 Act made an essentially identical amend­
ment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the addition of Section 3(f). See 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78c(f). 
11. Important factors would include where the entrepreneurs who formed the enterprise 
reside, where the current headquarters is located, and where the bulk of its operations are 
now conducted. Nationality would not be determined by jurisdiction of incorporation or 
where the issuer's shareholders reside. 
12. For a less theoretical article that takes a position close to the issuer nationality 
approach that I advocate here, see Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. 
Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413 (1995). Some 
economists have favored such an approach also. See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards, Listing 
Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, 5 J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 28 (1993). 
13. See supra note 6. These authors, of course, may have conceived of their projects as 
the development of principles of statutory reach within what they interpret as the bounds 
imposed by existing statutory language and judicial and administrative precedent. While I 
believe that the issuer nationality approach recommended here does fit within these bounds, 
particularly after the recent enactment of the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
of 1996, see infra note 58, I am, as noted, addressing a different question in this article, to wit: 
what approach to statutory reach will maximize U.S. economic welfare? The answer to this 
question is important whether or not its adoption would require legislative change. 
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States, unlike today, would apply the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 even to a U.S. corporation that goes public 
abroad through an offering in the Euroequity market and that 
imposes restrictions on the offering designed to deter its "flowback" 
into the United States. The United States, also unlike today, would 
not apply these requirements to an established French public issuer 
conducting a share offering in the United States to U.S. residents as 
long as the issuer provides, pursuant to the French regime, the same 
disclosure as it would have if it had made a purely domestic public 
offering in France. 
One other alternative should be noted at the outset. If the U.S. 
disclosure regime were made voluntary, the problem of defining its 
reach would disappear.14 A few legal scholars, such as Professors 
Roberta Romano, Stephen Choi, and Andrew Guzman, suggest just 
such a change, in reaction, in part, to the increasing need to define 
the reach of the existing mandatory regime. Under their proposals, 
every issuer, whether U.S. or foreign, could choose whether to 
subject itself to the disclosure obligations of the U.S. regime or the 
regime of one of the fifty states or some other country.15 Whether 
it is desirable to make the U.S. regime voluntary, however, rests 
largely on considerations that are equally present with or without 
globalization. It is thus separate from the question addressed in this 
article: What is the appropriate reach of a mandatory disclosure 
system if we do have one? As a practical matter, since we are likely 
to continue to have a mandatory disclosure system for the 
14. The underlying issues behind statutory reach do not entirely disappear, however. 
Elimination of U.S. mandatory disclosure statutes would represent U.S. policy that issuers 
should not be required to provide disclosure. U.S. officials and courts might still need to take 
a position as to which of the world's issuers this policy applies. The need to take such a 
position could arise as a result of a request made to such an official or court asking it to take 
some action that would assist in the enforcement of the disclosure regime of another country. 
Alternatively, it could arise from U.S. officials needing to decide whether affirmatively to 
take action to dissuade a foreign country from applying the foreign country's regime to a 
particular issuer or group of issuers. 
15. See, e.g, Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). Professors Choi and Guzman also suggest such a 
reform, which they refer to as "portable reciprocity," as a more far reaching alternative to 
their proposed switch to exclusive reliance on the transaction location approach. See 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, S. CAL. L. RE.v. (forthcoming 1998); see also Choi & Guzman, 
Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 231-32. I have written elsewhere an extensive 
critique of the scholarly principles for issuer choice. See Merritt B. Fox, Empowering Issuers 
to Choose Their Own Securities Regimes: A Mistaken Reform (Apr. 9, 1998) (unpublished 
paper presented at the University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Fox, Empowering Issuers]. 
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foreseeable future, this question needs to be answered regardless of 
the other debate.16 
This paper has seven Parts. Parts I and II look at the formal 
legal landscape. Part I reviews existing U.S. practice. Part II 
reviews the extent to which the SEC, the courts, and Congress are 
constrained by law in changing this existing practice and thus gives 
a sense of the scope of the reforms necessary to implement the 
change to the issuer nationality approach recommended here. 
Parts III, IV, and V assess the effects on U.S. economic welfare 
of adopting the issuer nationality approach compared with adopting 
either of the other two approaches or a uniform international 
disclosure regime. Part III shows why the issuer nationality 
approach discriminates more precisely than the investor residency 
approach between those of the world's issuers whose disclosure 
behavior primarily affects the welfare of U.S. residents and those 
whose disclosure behavior primarily affects other countries. When 
a country's issuers disclose at an appropriate level, the disclosure 
can, through its positive effects on managerial motivation and the 
choice of real investment projects, increase the returns generated 
by capital-utilizing productive activity in that country. The 
beneficiaries of these increased returns are the country's 
entrepreneurial talent and labor, not the issuers' investors. Because 
of capital's greater mobility internationally, competitive forces push 
capital toward receiving a single global expected rate of return 
(adjusted for risk) regardless of the disclosure practices of the 
particular issuers involved. The United States thus has a strong 
interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers, even those 
whose shares are sold to or traded among foreigners, but not in that 
of any foreign issuers, even those that are sold to or traded among 
U.S. residents. 
Part IV shows that if issuers have a choice of disclosure regimes, 
they have a preference for picking one requiring less disclosure 
than is socially optimal. The transaction location approach gives 
issuers the capacity to determine which regime governs them. Thus 
it hurts U.S. economic welfare by permitting U.S. issuers to disclose 
at a lower than optimal level. It also reduces the volume of 
16. This Article ultimately does touch upon issues that go to the desirability of a 
voluntary regime because the choice of approach to statutory reach determines whether 
regulatory competition will develop between the United States and other countries. Such 
competition is likely to lower U.S. requirements. One who believes that a mandatory U.S. 
regime is undesirable, but who is faced with its continued existence, is thus likely to favor an 
approach to statutory reach that would promote such competition. These issues are explored 
infra in Parts VI and VII. 
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transactions effected in the United States because the relative 
strictness of the U.S. regime scares issuers away. Part V shows why, 
in terms of U.S. welfare, the disclosure level required by any 
achievable uniform international regime would be inferior to that 
required by the U.S. regime. 
Parts ill-V assume that the choice of approach will not affect 
the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. Part VI relaxes 
this assumption. It shows that under the investor residency and 
transaction location approaches, the increasing globalization of the 
market for securities would lead to increased political pressures to 
lower the U.S. requirements, and that under the issuer nationality 
approach, it would not. 
Part VII shows how these increased pressures are likely to result 
in the U.S. regime requiring too little disclosure. Some 
commentators believe that such regulatory competition would be 
helpful. Their arguments are found unpersuasive, however, in part 
because they do not account for the preference of issuers for 
disclosing too little. Thus the conclusion of Parts III-V that U.S. 
economic welfare would be enhanced by a switch to the issuer 
nationality approach is strengthened, not weakened, by the fact that 
such a switch would avoid these increased pressures to lower U.S. 
requirements that globalization would otherwise bring. 
I. THE CuRRENT U.S. APPROACH TO STATUTORY REACH 
Two basic components of U.S. securities law link transactions in 
securities with regulations requiring issuers to disclose information 
about themselves. First, certain sections of the Securities Act of 
1933 (the "Securities Act")17 regulate the primary market for secur­
ities, imposing a set of disclosure obligations upon the offering and 
sale by the issuer of a new block of securities. Second, certain sec­
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange 
Act")18 regulate the secondary market for securities. Exchange Act 
disclosure obligations are triggered by indices suggesting that al­
ready issued securities of an issuer will be frequently traded: a list­
ing of the issuer's securities on a securities exchange or the 
existence of more than a given number of shareholders. 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1994). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811. 
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A. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Primary Market Transactions 
1. The SEC's Traditional Approach 
Section 5 of the Securities Act by its terms prohibits the offer or 
sale of any security by any person unless the security is registered 
under the Act,19 which requires a complex process of disclosure. 
Section 5 makes no distinctions between foreign offerees and do­
mestic ones, nor between transactions occurring abroad and trans­
actions occurring at home. Its application depends only on the use 
at some point of an instrument of "interstate commerce" in connec­
tion with the transaction.20 Given the global interconnectedness of 
the financial industry today, use of such an instrument can be found 
in connection with almost every public offering in the world, wher­
ever conducted and at whomever aimed. The question is whether 
Section 5 should be interpreted in some narrower fashion to limit 
its reach. 
a. A foreign issuer offering in the United States. While Section 
5 has not, in fact, been construed to cover all public offerings any­
where in the world by any issuer that uses an instrument of inter­
state commerce, the SEC has always interpreted Section 5 to cover 
public offerings in the United States by foreign issuers.21 The tradi-
19. Section 3 of the Act exempts certain securities from this requirement. Section 4 of 
the Act exempts certain transactions from this requirement including most secondary 
transactions. 
20. Interstate commerce is broadly defined under Section 2(7) to include "trade or com­
merce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the sev­
eral States . .. or between any foreign country and any State ... . " 15 U. S.C. § 77b{7). 
21. Traditionally, foreign issuers wishing to publicly offer securities in the United States 
were required to register them on the same Form S-1 that was required of all domestic issuers 
not qualifying for one of the SEC's abridged forms. It was possible for potential issuers to 
obtain variations in the required accounting practices, but only through case by case negotia­
tions with the SEC staff. See HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL, 1980 SECURITIES HANDBOOK 354-57 
(1980). In 1982, the SEC, in an extension of the integrated disclosure system, adopted three 
registration forms exclusively for foreign issuers: Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3. See Securities Act 
Release No. 6437, SEC Docket (CCH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982) [hereinafter Release No. 
6437]. These new forms make a number of concessions to foreign issuers. They need not 
disclose as much information about their various lines of business, their management remu­
neration (which can be reported in aggregate rather than individually), and material transac­
tions into which they have entered. They also may prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with home-country generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as long as 
they discuss material variances from U. S. GAAP and reconcile net income as determined 
under the two methods. See JAMES A. FANTo & ROBERTA S. KARMEL, A REPORT ON THE 
ATTITUDES oF FOREIGN COMPANIES REGARDING A U. S. LISTING 9, 13 (NYSE Working Pa­
per No. 97-101, 1997); Linda C. Quinn, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, in IN­
TERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS: BUSINESS EXPERIENCE ANO 
REGULATORY POLICY 1, 21-27 {A.L.I. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Quinn, BUSINESS EXPERIENCE]. 
In 1985 the Securities Exchange Commission issued a concept release entitled "Facilita­
tion of Multi-National Securities Offerings" in which it first began to consider multi­
jurisdictional disclosure, whereby a foreign issuer would be permitted to engage in a public 
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tional position of the SEC has been that the registration require­
ments of Section 5 are primarily intended to protect United States 
investors,22 and a large portion of the purchasers of any public of­
fering made in the United States would obviously be U.S. investors. 
The SEC's only concern has been - given the public interest in 
attracting foreign issuers to make public offerings in the United 
States market - how much, if any, it should relax the ordinary dis­
closure standards applicable to domestic issuers because of the spe­
cial hardships these ordinary standards create for foreign issuers.23 
b. A U.S. issuer offering abroad. The public offering abroad 
of newly issued securities by a United States issuer presents the 
converse of the transaction discussed above. The traditional inves­
tor protection rationale thus suggests that the United States disclo­
sure regime should not be applied even if an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce has been used. This, in fact, has been the posi­
tion of the SEC for over thirty years. Its policy has been not to take 
action against U.S. issuers for failure to register securities that have 
been distributed abroad to foreign nationals if the distribution is 
effected in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest 
abroad.24 
offering of its securities in the United States based on its home-country registration {with 
certain supplements, perhaps). See Securities Act Release No. 6568, 32 SEC Docket (CCH), 
at 707 (Feb. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Release No. 6568]; see also Linda C. Quinn, International­
ization of the Securities Markets, 743 PLI/CoRP17, 29 (1991) [hereinafter Quinn, Internation­
alization]. The release requested public co=ent on ways the SEC could facilitate 
multinational security offerings and streamline both the securities distribution systems and 
prospectus disclosure standards of the United States and other countries. See Release No. 
6568, supra. The SEC then' utilized that public co=ent to formulate a proposal creating an 
initial multi-jurisdictional disclosure system between the United States and the Canadian 
provinces of Ontario and Quebec. See Securities Act Release No. 6841, 44 SEC Docket 
( CCH), at 56-57 (July 24, 1989); Quinn, Internationalization, supra. Thus the United States in 
essence adopted the issuer nationality approach with respect to issuers from these two prov­
inces. The SEC amended that system on October 10, 1990. See Securities Act Release No. 
33-6879, 47 SEC Docket (CCH), at 526-27 (Oct. 22, 1990); Quinn, Internationalization, supra, 
at 34. In the succeeding eight years, however, no other foreign jurisdiction has qualified for 
such special treatment. See Securities Act Release No. 6902, 49 SEC Docket (CCH), at 260 
(June 21, 1991); Securities Act Release No. 6902A, 51 SEC Docket (CCH), at 66 (Mar. 23, 
1992) [hereinafter Release No. 6902A]; International Securities Markets, 961 PRAcr. L. INST. 
77, 96-97 (1996). 
22. See Securities Act Release No. 4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 1361, at 1362 (July 9, 
1964) [hereinafter Release No. 4708]. 
23. See Release No. 6437, supra note 21; Fanto, supra note 6; see also supra note 21. 
24. The Commission's rationale is as follows: 
[T]he Commission has traditionally taken the position that the registration requirements 
of Section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect American investors .... [I]t is 
i=aterial whether the offering originates from within or outside of the United States, 
whether domestic or foreign broker-dealers are involved and whether the actual 
mechanics of the distribution are effected within the United States. 
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2. Regulation S 
In 1988, the SEC issued a release first proposing its subse­
quently adopted Regulation S rules concerning Securities Act regis­
tration exemptions for offers and sales abroad. In this release, the 
SEC articulated a shift in goal concerning the appropriate reach of 
the entire U.S. disclosure regime. The Commission states: 
[T]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital 
markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S. 
or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and reasonable expectations 
of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable 
in jurisdictions outside the United States to define disclosure require­
ments for transactions effected offshore. As investors choose their 
markets, they would choose the disclosure requirements applicable to 
such markets. 25 
Thus concern with where the transaction is effected, which in the 
past had been simply a proxy for the likely residency of the person 
buying the security, becomes an end in itself. 
How far the SEC will go in carrying out this articulated change 
in goal, however, is not clear. So far, there has not been a major 
change in practice. The SEC's immediate impetus for proposing 
Regulation S - its desire to lay out clearer, more coherent stan­
dards for exempting both U.S. and foreign issuers when they make 
public offerings arguably only to the public abroad - was much 
narrower than the fundamental shift in rationale suggested by the 
release. Reflecting this, the rules actually adopted do not provide a 
wholesale exemption for every transaction effected abroad. 
Rather, the focus is on two concerns. The first is preventing di­
rected selling efforts in the United States of unregistered shares 
nominally only offered abroad. The second is preventing the 
"flowback" into the United States of unregistered shares initially 
sold abroad, particularly where the issuer is also not providing peri­
odic disclosure under the U.S. regime.26 
Release No. 4708, supra note 22, at 1362 (emphasis added). The SEC mentions offerings 
directed toward United States servicemen abroad and, because of their close connection with 
United States exchanges, offerings through the facilities of Canadian stock exchanges as ones 
not free from the registration requirements. See John H. Ehrlich, Comment, International­
ization of Stock Markets: Potential Problems for United States Shareholders, 7 Nw. J. INTL. L. 
& Bus. 532, 540 (1986). 
25. INmAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 89,128. 
26. Regulation S was proposed by the SEC in June 1988. See INmAL PROPOSING RE­
LEASE, supra note 8. It was reproposed in 1989. See Securities Act Release No. 6838, (1989 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ( C CH) 'll 84, at 426 (July 11, 1989), 43 SEC Docket 
(CCH), at 2008 (1989) (hereinafter REG S REPROPOSING RELEASE]. The Commission 
adopted Regulation S on April 24, 1990. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, (1989-90 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 84, at 524, 46 SEC Docket (C CH), at 52 {Apr. 
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The Regulation S rules cover both U.S. issuers and foreign issu­
ers. Rule 901 provides for an exemption from the Section S regis­
tration process for "offers and sales that occur outside the United 
States."27 Rule 903, a safe harbor, deems offers and sales by issu­
ers, underwriters, and dealers meeting certain stated requirements 
to be ones occurring "outside the United States."28 To qualify for 
this safe harbor exemption, the offer must be made only to persons 
outside the United States,29 it must be reasonably believed that the 
purchasers are outside the United States when they place their or­
ders,30 and there must be no directed selling efforts in the United 
States.31 Qualification may also require meeting additional condi­
tions designed to discourage flowback to the United States. The 
need to meet these additional conditions and their severity depends 
on factors suggesting the likelihood of such flowback and the extent 
of its damage if it does occur. Such factors include the nationality 
of the issuer, the nature of the security, whether the issuer's cur­
rently outstanding securities trade in the United States, . and 
whether the issuer currently provides periodic disclosure under the 
Exchange Act.32 
a. U.S. issuers. Under Regulation S, a U.S. issuer that scru­
pulously offers its shares only to persons residing abroad and lists 
the shares only on a foreign stock exchange will ultimately still have 
difficulty avoiding compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements. 
This is true even though purchasers of its shares, both primary and 
secondary, would have chosen to acquire their shares in a market 
24, 1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1998)) [hereinafter REG S ADOPTING 
RELEASE]. 
For an overall description and analysis of Regulation S, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET 
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 519-21, 1594-612 (7th ed. 1992); 
Louis Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 792 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996); 
Don Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Impact of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNATL. 
LAW. 575 (1990); John Regis Coogan & Thomas C. Kimbrough, Regulation S Safe Harbors 
for Offshore Offers, Sales and Resales, 4 INsrmrrs (P-H) 3 (No. 8, Aug. 1990); Samuel Wolff, 
Offshore Distributions Under the Securities Act of 1993: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23 L. & 
POLY. INTL. Bus. 101 (1991-92). 
27. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901. 
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903. 
29. See SEC Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a); 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(i)(l)(i). 
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a); 17 C.F.R. § 902(i)(l)(ii). 
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b). 
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c). Where factors suggest that the likelihood of flowback is 
significant, an issuer that currently provides periodic disclosure under the Exchange Act does 
not need to impose as severe measures to prevent flowback as one that does not provide such 
disclosure. Compare Rule 903(c)(2) and Rule 903(c)(3). The theory is that in the case of the 
issuer currently providing Exchange Act periodic disclosure, any flowback that does occur 
causes less damage. 
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outside the United States and hence, according to the newly articu­
lated goal of mai:ket protection, have chosen foreign disclosure re­
quirements as well. For such an issuer, the conditions imposed to 
prevent flowback to the United States would make it difficult or 
impossible to construct a practical scheme to market its shares 
abroad. And even if the issuer succeeded at that, its victory would 
likely be Pyrrhic: soon after, it would probably have to provide the 
same information under the 1934 Act periodic disclosure 
requirements. 33 
b. Foreign issuers. A foreign issuer that offers its securities 
only to persons residing abroad is likely to avoid the need to com­
ply witJ;i U.S. disclosure requirements. To start, the foreign issuer 
will find it easier to qualify for an exemption under Regulation S 
from disclosure at the time of offering. The only tricky question 
here is whether it will be considered to have engaged in a directed 
selling effort in the United States if it creates publicity abroad that 
ends up reaching not only investors abroad, but investors in the 
33. Consider first a privately held issuer whose operations and management are predomi­
nantly in the United States and whose initial shareholders are primarily U.S. residents. It 
decides to go public only abroad. Even if the issuer is incorporated (or reincorporated) 
abroad, such an issuer would not qualify as a "foreign issuer" under Regulation S Rule 902{f) 
because, at the time of the offering, more than 50% of its shares would be U.S. held and it 
would have a U.S. economic center of gravity. Thus the only safe harbor from new issue 
registration for which the issuer could qualify would be Rule 903(c)(3), which imposes the 
most severe conditions to prevent flowback to the United States. See supra note 32. Under 
Rule 903(c)(3), the offering must be constructed in such a way that the purchasers are non­
U.S. residents who for a year agree to resell only to other non-U.S. residents who themselves 
agree to similar restrictions. This prevents the shares for a year from being listed to trade in 
an ordinary fashion even on a foreign stock exchange. Because of the consequent reduction 
in liquidity, these conditions greatly reduce the marketability of the shares. Moreover, even 
if this previously privately held issuer were able and willing to market its securities to the 
non-U.S. public under these difficult circumstances, it would still not escape for long the U.S. 
regime's periodic disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act, unless the offering re­
sulted in a majority of its shares being held by non-U.S. residents. See infra notes 36-39 and 
accompanying text (discussing periodic disclosure). 
Now consider an issuer with the same U.S. connections that is already publicly traded in 
the United States. It would already be providing Exchange Act periodic disclosure. Because 
of this, it could qualify for the Rule 903(c)(2) safe harbor. The conditions designed to dis­
courage fiowback under Rule 903(c)(2) would not create the same roadblocks to the shares 
being traded on a foreign exchange immediately after the offering. But ultimately the al­
ready publicly traded U.S. issuer would find it even harder than the previously privately held 
one to avoid continued imposition of the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements. 
This would be so even if the offering were so large that it led to a majority of the issuers' 
shares being held by non-U.S. residents. There are only two exemptions from 1934 Act peri­
odic disclosure based on an issuer's foreign aspects: Rule 12g3-2(a) and Rule 12g3-2(b). See 
infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Neither is likely to be available to the issuer con­
sidered here. A Rule 12g3-2(a) exemption would be unavailable since the issuer would still 
presumably have more than 300 U.S. resident shareholders. A Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption 
would be unavailable because of Rule 12g3-2(d)(l), which denies the exemption to issuers 
whose shares are already Exchange Act registered. 
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United States - something happening with ever greater frequency 
as the financial media become increasingly intemational.34 As long 
as it avoids this problem, a foreign issuer that does not have any 
securities currently publicly traded in the United States can engage 
in a public offering abroad and qualify for an exemption under Reg­
ulation S from Securities Act disclosure without having to meet any 
additional conditions designed to prevent flowback.35 And, as dis­
cussed below, the issuer will also not likely be subsequently re­
quired to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure as long as it 
does not subsequently list its shares on a U.S. stock exchange or 
NASDAQ. 
Thus, the U.S. practice with respect to foreign issuers conforms 
much more closely to the SEC's market protection goal. When pur­
chasers, including U.S. purchasers, decide to acquire the shares of a 
foreign issuer offered or traded only abroad, the purchasers, in their 
34. For offers and sales to be within the "safe harbor" provisions of Rule 903 that deem 
them as "occur[ ring] outside the United States," there must be inter alia, "no directed selling 
efforts . . .  made in the United States." Rule 903(b). "Directed selling efforts" are in tum 
defined in Rule 902(b)(l) as "any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could rea­
sonably be expected to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any 
of the securities being offered" (emphasis added). "Conditioning" is a term of art with re­
gard to Section 5. The SEC has stated that 
[T]he publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made 
in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, 
may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the 
issuer . . .  in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact 
part of the selling effort. 
Securities Act Release No. 3844, 17 Fed. Reg., at 835 (Oct. 4, 1957). The SEC gave as an 
example of such conditioning a speech by an executive of a prospective issuer before a securi­
ties analysts meeting in which projections of sales and profits were provided. See id. In a 
subsequent enforcement decision, the SEC found a press release provided to the New York 
press by an underwriter concerning the future operations of a prospective issuer to be an 
"offer" in violation of Section S(a) by both the underwriter and the issuer, stating that it "is 
equally applicable whether or not the issuer or the surrounding circumstances have . . .  news 
value." Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959). 
The SEC, in its statements concerning the impact of news conferences on the availability 
of a Regulation S exemption, has indicated, however, that it may not be as strict in its inter­
pretation of the term "conditioning" here as it has been in the purely domestic context. In 
Preliminary Note 7, it states that nothing in the Regulation "precludes access by journalists 
for publications with a general circulation in the United States to offshore press conferences, 
press releases and meetings with company press spokespersons . . .  provided that the infor­
mation . . .  is not intended to induce purchases of securities by persons in the United States" 
(emphasis added). The text of the initial release proposing Regulation used similar language, 
but makes clear that, at least at that earlier point, the SEC remarks concerned only corporate 
news of foreign issuers. See lNrrrAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 'll 89,132. 
The SEC recently adopted a safe harbor relating to this question under a new Securities 
Act Rule 135e. See Securities Act Release No. 33-7470, 65 SEC Docket (CCH), at 1543 
(Oct. 10, 1997). The Rule provides that for foreign issuers, the invitation to a U.S. journalist 
to participate in an off-shore press activity in connection with an offering does not generally 
constitute a "directed selling effort" under Regulation S. 
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(l). 
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decision to acquire shares in a market outside the United States, are 
in fact choosing foreign disclosure requirements as well. 
B. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Secondary Market Transactions 
Issuers, both U.S. and foreign, can also become subject to the 
U.S. disclosure regime pursuant to the Exchange Act's periodic dis­
closure requirements. This is true whether or not they have ever 
engaged in a public offering registered under Section 5 of the Secur­
ities Act.36 The United States, in determining the transnational 
reach of these requirements, again puts some weight on each of the 
three national dimensions of trades in an issuer's shares: investor 
residency, issuer nationality, and the place of the transaction. Con­
sistent with the traditional investor protection approach, however, 
issuer nationality and the place of the transaction appear to be 
taken into account largely because they serve as proxies of the like­
lihood that a significant number of U.S. investors are trading in the 
issuer's stock. While the articulated goal of market protection set 
forth in the SEC Release originally proposing Regulation S appears 
at least as applicable to periodic disclosure as to new issue disclo­
sure, the SEC has not attempted any maj or reworking, akin to Reg­
ulation S, of the rules governing the reach of the periodic disclosure 
requirements. 
1. Foreign Issuers 
Foreign and U.S. issuers alike that wish their securities to be 
listed on a U.S. stock exchange, need, pursuant to Exchange Act 
Section 12(a), to register these securities with the SEC and thereby 
36. Sections 12(b) and 12(g) of the Exchange Act set forth requirements for the registra­
tion of the securities of certain issuers. Exchange Act Section 13(a) requires issuers regis­
tered under Section 12 to file, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the 
SEC, annual reports and current information that follow up on the original Section 12 regis­
tration application or statement. An issuer that has engaged in an offering registered under 
Section 5 of the Securities Act must, pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(d), provide on a 
continuing basis the same annual reports and current information. 
Since the SEC's adoption of its integrated disclosure reforms in the early 1980s, the infor­
mation concerning the issuer's management, operations, prospects, and financial status 
sought under the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure requirements (Form 10-K for domestic 
issuers and Form 20-F for foreign issuers) and under the Securities Act's new issue disclosure 
requirements {Form S-1 for domestic issuers and Form F-1 for foreign issuers) is largely the 
same. Tue Exchange Act forms and the Securities Act forms each incorporate by reference 
the same items in Regulations S-K and S-X. Tue threat of private actions for damages is less 
of a deterrent for violations of the Exchange Act's requirements, however. Because the Ex­
change Act has no equivalent to the Securities Act Sections 11 and 12, such a violation is 
much less likely to lead to substantial private damages awards being imposed against the 
issuer or persons such as underwriters or directors contractually related to the issuer. For a 
more extensive review of this subject, see Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Dis­
closure, and Undenvriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005 (1984). 
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automatically become subject to the Exchange Act's periodic dis­
closure regime.37 
The rules for publicly traded foreign issuers not wishing their 
shares to be listed on a U.S. exchange are more complicated. Ex­
change Act Section 12(g)(1) requires any issuer having assets of 
more than $10 million and a class of equity securities held of record 
by 500 or more persons to register such securities under the Act.38 
The statute makes no distinction between domestic and foreign in 
terms of the issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation, the residency of 
its shareholders, the location of its assets, or the place where its 
shares are primarily traded.39 The SEC has, however, pursuant to 
its rule-making power, exempted from these requirements any is­
suer that has certain specified foreign characteristics40 and that (i) 
has no class of equity with more than 300 holders resident in the 
United States,41 or (ii) furnishes the SEC with the disclosure infor­
mation required by its home country's regime (this second basis not 
being available for issuers first listed on NASDAQ after October 
1983).42 Thus, the SEC imposes the U.S. disclosure regime on for-
37. Section 12(a) prohibits any member, broker, or dealer from effecting on a national 
securities exchange any transaction in "any security" not registered on such an exchange in 
accordance with the provisions of the Exchange Act. 
38. More specifically, Section 12(g)(l) requires every issuer that is engaged in interstate 
commerce or whose securities are traded by use of any means of interstate commerce, and 
that has total assets exceeding $1 million and a class of equity security held of record by 750 
or more shareholders, to register such securities with the SEC, whereby the issuer provides 
information comparable to that required by a Section 12(b) registration. Rule 12g-3, how­
ever, exempts from these requirements issuers with less than $10 million in total assets. 
39. Tue text of subsection 12(g) as a whole, which was added by amendment to Section 12 
in 1964, clearly suggests that 12(g)(l) is to apply to foreign issuers as well as domestic ones 
because there is an explicit provision in 12(g)(3) for the SEC by rule or regulation to exempt 
any security of a foreign issuer. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history of 
the amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 11 (1964). 
40. To qualify, the issuer must be a "foreign private issuer," as that is defined under 
Exchange Act Rule 3(b)-4. This requires the issuer to be organized under the laws of a 
foreign country and, if its operations are sufficiently connected with the United States, to 
have no more than 50% of its voting securities held by U.S. residents. 
41. See Rule 12g3-2(a). 
42. See Rule 12g3-2(b). The SEC in 1983 amended the Rule to eliminate the availability 
of the 12g3-2(b) exemption for all foreign issuers quoted on the automated quotation system 
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NA SDAQ") unless the issuer was already 
quoted on NA SDAQ prior to the date of the amendment and was and continues to be in 
compliance with the requirements of the exemption. The reasoning behind eliminating the 
exemption was that "trading on NA SDAQ is substantially the same as trading on an ex­
change and therefore the information available . . .  should be essentially the same .. .. "
Exchange Act Release No. 20264, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter Release No. 
20264). Tue "grandfathering" of what for the foreseeable future was the vast bulk of 
NA SDAQ-quoted foreign issuers is inconsistent with that reasoning. Tue stated fear of the 
SEC, however, was the possibility that without grandfathering, a large number of NA SDAQ­
quoted foreign issuers, in order to avoid registration, would withdraw from NA SDAQ, which 
would injure United States investors who purchased their securities when they were still 
quoted. See Release No. 20264, supra, at 46,737. 
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eign issuers wishing to commence listing of their securities on a na­
tional securities exchange or NASDAQ. For all others, it in essence 
accepts as adequate the disclosure regime of their home countries.43 
Foreign issuers that do end up subject to the Exchange Act's 
disclosure regime are permitted under the applicable Form 20-F to 
provide somewhat less information than are U.S. issuers on matters 
such as the results of their separate lines of business, management 
compensation, and material transactions. They are also allowed to 
prepare their accounting statements based on home country gener­
ally accepted accounting practices ( GAAP) with less reconciliation 
to U.S. GAAP than is required of foreign issuers registering under 
the Securities Act to issue new equity.44 
2. U.S. Issuers 
For the typical U.S. issuer with shares that are traded or held 
abroad, domestic trading or holdings in the United States are by 
themselves sufficient to trigger imposition of the Exchange Act pe­
riodic disclosure regime. Thus, the question of whether the foreign 
trading and holdings would by themselves be sufficient to trigger 
the regime need not be faced. The question cannot be avoided, 
however, where, perhaps in an attempt to avoid United States dis-
The same amendment also eliminated, with a two-year phase in, the availability of the 
exemption for all Canadian issuers regardless of previous status. The fact that the SEC de­
cided not to grandfather Canadian issuers undermines its rationale for grandfathering issuers 
of all other foreign countries. The two-year grace period that the SEC granted Canadian 
issuers appears to have been a reasonably effective alternative method of protecting U.S. 
investors from being hurt by issuer withdrawal from NASDAQ since it provided a period of 
continued liquidity in U.S. markets during which those investors who needed such liquidity 
could sell to investors who did not - those better positioned to trade in foreign markets. 
Thus the fact that the SEC chose the grandfathering rather than the grace period approach 
for non-Canadian foreign issuers suggests that it did not want to face the larger implications 
of trying to impose its regime on the bulk of NASDAQ foreign issuers: the reduced opportu­
nity for Americans to buy as well as sell these shares, the corresponding reduction in business 
for U.S. brokers and dealers, and the diplomatic pressures from foreign governments. 
43. This acceptance of the disclosure system of the issuer's domicile has been strongly 
criticized by Professor Buxbaum. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the 
Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study in the Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54 
CORNELL L. REv. 358 {1969). Some co=entators have pointed out more recently that the 
securities of many issues that qualify for the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemptions are traded within the 
United States via "pink sheets." See HAL S. Scorr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 50 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing J. 
COCHRANE ET AL, FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INvEsTORS: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRI· 
ERS AND SEPARATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND, 11-13 (NYSE Working Paper No. 95-04, 1995)). 
Pink sheets are stock quotations published twice daily by the National Quotation Bureau that 
include the names and telephone numbers of market makers. See id. In 1994, over 7,600 
foreign securities, and 440 ADRs, traded through pink sheets. See id. These trades averaged 
$136.2 million in daily dollar value. See id. 
44. See Securities Act Release No. 6360, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,511 (Dec. 2, 1981) [hereinafter 
Release No. 6360). See generally FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 9, 13-14. 
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closure rules, a United States issuer with a majority of its assets and 
management in this country chooses to become a public company 
but to do so abroad, i.e., by engaging in no domestic public offer­
ings and by facilitating the trading of its securities only abroad.45 
Section 12(a) is not a problem for such an issuer since its regis­
tration requirements would only be triggered by a listing of the is­
suer's shares on a U.S. stock exchange.46 Section 12(g) would be a 
problem, however. Wherever most of the issuer's shareholders re­
side the simple fact that it has gone public is enough to trigger im­
position of the regime, at least as long as it remains incorporated in 
the United States.47 If the issuer reincorporates abroad, it might 
45. Research reveals at least one previously nonpublic United States company, Interna­
tional Signal and Control Group, that listed and offered its shares on the London Stock 
Exchange in order to avoid United States disclosure. See Ehrlich, supra note 24, at 550. 
46. A listing on a foreign stock exchange would not under Section 12(a) trigger a need for 
such an issuer to register its securities, because Section 12( a) applies only to transactions on a 
"national securities exchange." No foreign exchange is currently registered as a "national 
securities exchange." See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 21,310.10, at 15,705 (1989). 
No foreign exchange would appear to be required to so register. Given the purposes of 
the sections of the Exchange Act relating to the regnlation of "national securities exchanges" 
and their legislative history, registration of a foreign exchange would appear to be outside the 
contemplation of the regulatory scheme. Exchange Act Section 5 deals specifically with the 
legality of trading on unregistered exchanges "within or subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States" if that exchange is not otherwise exempted. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1994). 
And while the legislative history dealing specifically with that phrase is sparse and uninform­
ative, § 30(b) of the Exchange Act sheds some light on Congress's desire to keep the extra­
territorial reach of the Exchange Act's regulation of the securities business to a minimum. 
Section 30(b) provides that the Act "shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a 
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .  " 15 U.S.C. § 78dd. 
This clause suggests that Congress intended to distinguish between those exchanges located 
within the United States and those exchanges located without.' See Douglas B. Spoors, Com­
ment, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Regulations: Territorialism in the Wake of 
the October 1987 Market Crash, 1 TRANSNATL. LAW. 307, 317 (1988). 
The SEC's Division of Market Regulation, however, in response to a letter of inquiry 
concerning proposed activities of a client, has suggested the possibility that a representative 
in the United States of a foreign exchange that distributes quotes to subscribers in the United 
States and receives and transmits orders for the purchase and sale of securities might have to 
register as a national exchange under Section 6 of the Exchange Act. See Irving Marmer, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation, ['72-'73 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 79,283, at 82,810 (1973). Even if that is the case, however, it 
would be difficult to argue that an issuer listed on the foreign exchange is, by the act of that 
representative, listed on the registered exchange as well, especially if the arrangement by the 
representative were set up after the issuer listed on the foreign exchange. Such an argument 
would be equally applicable to all the foreign issuers listed on that exchange and would sug­
gest that all would need to register under the Exchange Act. 
47. This assumes that the issuer is not so insignificant that it has less than $10 million in 
assets and that after going public it has a class of equity securities with more than 500 holders 
located somewhere in the world. In that case, Section 12(g)(l) would appear to require the 
issuer to register its securities. Section 12(g)(l), as we have seen, makes no distinction be­
tween foreign and domestic security holders. Because foreign issuers are covered unless ex­
empted pursuant to a rule or regulation, see supra note 39 an issuer, being from the United 
States, surely would, absent such an exemption, be covered as well, even if most of its share­
holders are abroad. No exemption is available for this issuer. Rule 12g3-2 is the only exemp­
tion that concerns the foreign characteristics of securities potentially subject to Exchange Act 
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escape the U.S. disclosure regime, but the requirements for doing 
so are strict. Any public offering of its securities must be made ex­
clusively abroad, and, from the moment it becomes a public com­
pany - whether through a public offering or by its share ownership 
growing in some other fashion to 500 or more holders - a majority 
of its shares must be held by persons residing abroad.48 If the issuer 
meets these requirements, it would be entitled to an exemption on 
the same basis as a foreign issuer.49 
registration. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. Neither branch of the rule would 
provide an exemption because both require the issuer to be a "foreign private issuer." See 
supra note 40. A corporation, to be a "foreign private issuer," must, under Rule 3b·4, be 
incorporated under the laws of a foreign country. 
At least four issuers that are incorporated in the United States but have fewer than 300 
United States resident shareholders have applied, however, pursuant to Exchange Act Sec­
tion 12{h), for an order of the Commission exempting them from registration under Section 
12(g). Section 12{h) is a catch-all provision that provides for such exemptions where "the 
Commission finds, by reason of the number of public investors, amount of trading interest in 
the securities, the nature and extent of the activities of the issuer, income or assets of the 
issuer, or otherwise, that such action is not inconsistent with the public interest or the protec­
tion of investors." In each case, the issuer's argument for an exemption is that the policy 
enunciated in Release No. 4708, supra note 22 and accompanying text, - that the primary 
purpose of the Securities Act registration requirements is to protect United States investors 
- should apply to the Exchange Act registration requirements as well. In each case, the 
Commission appears not to have issued the requested order, but the staff of the Division of 
Corporate Finance stated that it would not raise any objection if the issuers did not register 
their securities under Section 12{g). See Equitable American Property Company, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246608 (Dec. 19, 1989); Paribas Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1988 WL 233751 {Feb. 29, 1988); States Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 
WL 108725 (Nov. 30, 1987); Petrogen Petroleum, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 
108480 (Oct. 12, 1987). 
As of January 1987, there were 14 United States companies traded on the London Un­
listed Securities Market. For most of them, however, the reported attraction of London was 
the lower costs of an initial public offering rather than avoidance of United States disclosure 
rules. See Philip Coggan, Low costs attract, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1987 {Survey), at vi. Since 
that time, the London Stock Exchange has closed the Unlisted Securities Market {USM) to 
make way for its new creation, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). See Christopher 
Price, Opportunities for Investors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997. Most of the companies previ­
ously listed on the USM have found their way to AIM which now has 259 listed issuers. See 
id. At least one company, however, moved to NASDAQ. See LBMS to Opt for American 
Listing, THE TIMES OF LoNDoN, Sept. 29, 1995. 
48. An issuer that is incorporated abroad and meets these requirements is, under Ex­
change Act Rule 3b-4(b ), a "foreign issuer" despite having a majority of its assets and man­
agement in the United States. It can be exempt from registration under Rule 12g3-2 if it has 
no more than 300 holders resident in the U.S. or if it furnishes the SEC with the disclosure 
information required by authorities abroad, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, but 
only if it qualifies under Rule 3b-4(c) as a "foreign private issuer." That requires not only 
foreign incorporation, but also that no more than 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting 
securities be held by United States residents. This might or might not be true of a corpora­
tion that was originally owned by its founders, private offering investors, and employees and 
that subsequently goes public abroad. 
49. See Rule 36-4(c). 
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C. Conclusion 
In summary, U.S. practice currently works as follows. Issuers 
that I categorize as U.S. nationals - those with their economic 
center of gravity in the United States - are generally subject to the 
U.S. regime. Potential escape is available, but only to those who 
can pass through the "eye of a needle": (i) they must be incorpo­
rated abroad, (ii) public offerings of their securities must be made 
exclusively abroad, and (iii) from the moment they become a public 
company, a majority of their shares must be held by persons resid­
ing abroad. For those that pass through the eye, actual escape de­
pends on the same factors as apply to foreign issuers. 
Foreign issuers will be subject to the U.S. disclosure regime if 
they offer their shares in the United States or list them on a U.S. 
stock exchange or NASDAQ. Otherwise they can probably escape 
the U.S. regime. 
Thus, where an issuer's nationality is U.S., the issuer is very 
likely to need to comply with the U.S. regime. Where a significant 
number of transactions in an issuer's shares are effected in the 
United States, it is fairly likely that the U.S. regime will be applied 
as well, even if the issuer is foreign. Where a significant number of 
purchasers of an issuer's shares are U.S. residents but the issuer is 
foreign and the shares are neither offered in the United States nor 
listed on a stock exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. regime will proba­
bly not be applied. 
II. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SEC, THE COURTS, AND 
CONGRESS IN DECIDING ISSUES OF STATUTORY REACH 
The SEC, the courts, and Congress each play a role in determin­
ing the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime. The primary focus of 
this Article is on what approach would maximize U.S. economic 
welfare. Its main function, therefore, is to guide these institutions 
as to what constitutes good policy. Before undertaking this analy­
sis, however, it is helpful to take a brief look at the existing legal 
constraints on each of them in deciding issues of statutory reach. 
This look will give us a sense of the scope and practicality of the 
reforms necessary to implement the recommended changes. 
The SEC, the courts, and Congress, it will be seen, each cur­
rently enjoys broad discretion to decide the reach of the U.S. disclo­
sure regime. There do not appear to be serious constraints that 
would prevent any of them from adopting the issuer nationality ap­
proach to statutory reach recommended here, given, as the rest of 
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the Article shows, its superior ability to discriminate between issu­
ers whose disclosure behavior primarily affects U.S. welfare and is­
suers whose disclosure behavior primarily affects the welfare of 
other countries. 
A. The SEC 
The SEC determines in the first instance which of the world's 
issuers are covered by the U.S. disclosure regime and which are not. 
It does so through its power to make rules, issue interpretations, 
create exemptions, and take enforcement actions.50 Its power to act 
in any of these ways must, as a doctrinal matter, be exercised within 
the confines of what is authorized by statute. A number of factors, 
however, make this a very loose constraint when it comes to SEC 
decisions concerning statutory reach. 
First, the SEC is an expert agency. Because of this status, its 
interpretation of what the securities laws cover is given considera­
ble deference by the courts.51 This deference includes SEC deter­
minations concerning the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime,52 
since the courts consider the question of statutory reach to be a 
matter of statutory interpretation.53 
Second, Congress has explicitly given the SEC broad powers of 
exemption relevant to the reach of the whole U.S. disclosure re­
gime, the exercise of which should be given even greater judicial 
deference.54 Until 1996, the SEC had these explicit powers only 
with respect to Exchange Act section 12(g)(l), which imposes the 
Act's ongoing, periodic disclosure requirements on all publicly held 
issuers not traded on a national stock exchange. Under these pow­
ers, set out in section 12(g)(3) and 12(h),  the SEC may grant such 
an issuer an exemption from the requirements of Section 12(g)(l) if 
50. For a review of the SEC's actions in this regard, see supra Part I. 
51. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984) (stating that a court should not substitute its construction of a statute for a reason­
able interpretation of an administrative agency); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 
439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1978); 10 Loms Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 
4812-15 (3d ed. 1996). 
52. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 {2d Cir. 1975), cert. de­
nied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Judge Friendly states that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws apply to many transnational transactions not within the registration require­
ments. He takes as his starting point for this statement the SEC's own interpretation of the 
reach of the registration requirements as articulated in Release No. 4708, supra note 22. 
53. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. 
54. In Chevron, the Court held that agency regulations promulgated pursuant to explicit 
gaps left for the agency to fill should be "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
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the SEC finds that doing so is not inconsistent with the public inter­
est or the protection of investors.ss 
Part III of this Article establishes that compliance by an issuer 
with the U.S. disclosure requirements is not necessary for the prices 
at which U.S. investors purchase the issuer's shares to be fair.s6 Ex­
empting all such foreign issuers from these requirements is thus not 
inconsistent with the protection of investors. The Article as a 
whole shows as well that applying the U.S. regime only to U.S. issu­
ers is the approach to statutory reach that most enhances U.S. eco­
nomic welfare. Such an exemption is thus also not inconsistent with 
the public interest.57 Thus, under sections 12(g)(3) and 12(h) the 
SEC has ha:d for some time a sufficient basis to exempt from its 
periodic disclosure requirements all foreign issuers not traded on a 
national stock exchange, if it wishes to do so. 
In 1996, Congress explicitly gave the SEC further exemptive 
powers relevant, among other things, to the reach of the rest of the 
U.S. disclosure regime, i.e, Securities Act new issue disclosure and 
Exchange Act periodic disclosure imposed on issuers whose shares 
are traded on a national stock exchange.58 The criteria for granting 
55. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 12{g){l) and 
the exemptions thereunder currently granted by the SEC. Under Exchange Act Section 
12{g)(3), the SEC has the power to exempt from the requirements of Section 12{g){l) any 
foreign issuer where the SEC "finds that such exemption is in the public interest and is con­
sistent with the protection of investors." More generally, under Exchange Act Section 12(h), 
the SEC has the power to exempt from the requirements of Section 12{g){l) any issuer, 
foreign or domestic, where the SEC finds "by reason of the number of public investors, 
amount of trading interest in the securities, the nature and extent of the activities of the 
issuer, income or assets of the issuer or otherwise, that such action is not inconsistent with the 
public interest or the protection of investors." The inclusion of the catch-all phrase "or 
otherwise" in the list of reasons suggests that, as with Section 12{g)(3), the SEC's main focus 
should be on the exemption not being inconsistent with the public interest and the protection 
of investors. 
56. See infra section 111.A.1. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Fox, Dis­
closure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2533-39. 
57. The argument that an exemption for all foreign issuers would be available under Sec­
tion 12(h) is reinforced by the fact that "the nature and extent of the activities of the issuer" 
is listed as one of the reasons to grant the exemption. See supra note 55. As shown in Part 
III infra, differences between U.S. and foreign issuers in terms of "the nature and extent of 
[their] activities" is a primary reason why it would be welfare enhancing to treat them 
differently. 
58. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 amended the Securities 
Act of 1933 to add Section 28, providing that: 
The Commission by rule or regulation, may . . .  exempt . . .  any class or classes of per­
sons, securities, transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title . . .  to the 
extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is con­
sistent with protection of investors, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-3 {1997), and to add Section 2{b) providing that: 
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is re­
quired to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of in­
vestors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
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such exemptions are just affirmatively stated versions of the criteria 
discussed above - the protection of investors and the public inter­
est.59 Thus, now the SEC has, under explicit powers, a sufficient 
basis to exempt all foreign issuers from the whole regime, if it so 
wishes. The argument is given added force by a new statutory ad­
monition that the SEC, in deciding whether to grant exemptions, 
"shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, 
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. "60 
The final reason the SEC has broad discretion is that, as a prac­
tical matter, it is usually the final arbiter of the reach of the statute 
it administers. There is only a small chance that any SEC determi­
nation concerning the reach of its disclosure requirements will be 
subject to a court review. Where an issuer is granted an exemption, 
it will not want the determination upset. Where an issuer is not 
granted an exemption, it will likely find a challenge not worth­
while.61 Significantly, research does not reveal a single published 
opinion with a holding relating to the reach of the U.S. disclosure 
regime.62 
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (emphasis added). The 1996 Act made essentially identical amend­
ments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the addition of Sections 36 and 3{f). See 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f); 80a-2(c). 
59. See supra note 58. 
60. See supra note 58. 
61. With regard to new issue disclosure, where the SEC has made a determination that an 
issuer wishing to engage in a public offering of securities is covered by Section 5 of the Secur­
ities Act, the issuer wants its financing at the time it determines it needs the funds, not after 
several years of litigation. Thus, rather than contest the SEC determination, the issuer will 
decide either that the advantages of having a public offering are worth the costs of registra­
tion or that it will seek the funds some other way. Where the SEC has determined that an 
issuer is not covered by the new issue disclosure regime, there is generally no one to com­
plain. There is, however, the possibility that if the stock price goes down significantly after 
the offering, the legitimacy of the SEC determination could be challenged in a private suit for 
recisionary damages under Securities Act Section 12{a)(l). The plaintiffs theory would be 
that, contrary to the SEC's determination, the issuer was not exempt and hence its failure to 
file a registration statement was a violation of Section 5. 
With regard to periodic disclosure, in cases where the SEC has determined that an issuer 
is covered, the issuer is not under the same time pressures as with a primary issue. The issuer 
would have to weigh, however, whether the costs of protracted litigation concerning a matter 
to which the court will give the SEC determination great weight, see supra note 54, is worth 
the benefit of avoiding the U.S. disclosure regime. In cases where the SEC has determined 
that an issuer is not covered, the issuer is not going to complain. And there is no one else 
available to complain because there appears to be no private right of action available to 
private litigants where an issuer fails to make periodic disclosure filings that it is legally re­
quired to make. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 51, at 4301 n.262. 
62. There are reported cases with holdings concerning the reach of the antifraud provi­
sions of the securities laws, but they explicitly provide that they are not reliable guides as to 
the reach of the disclosure regime. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields v. Minoroco, S.A., 871 
F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1989). 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 721 
B. The Courts 
Should a court be asked to review or enforce an SEC action 
involving the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime, it would treat the 
question as a matter of statutory interpretation.63 The same would 
be true should the court need to make a decision concerning such a 
question arising in a litigation between private parties. Given that 
there is no explicit statutory language or clear legislative history 
concerning the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime,64 congressional 
intent is difficult to discem.65 We can get some idea of how a court 
would deal with the issue, however, from decisions concerning the 
reach of other statutes where Congress has similarly made no signs 
concerning their reach. The starting point is a presumption that un-
There is one reported case involving statutory reach issues in which the SEC sought a 
preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver pendente lite based on a complaint 
that the defendant violated Securities Act Sections 5(a) and 5(c) (the mandatory disclosure 
provisions), Securities Act Section 17(a) (the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act), and 
Exchange Act Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 (the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act). 
See SEC v. United Fm. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1973). The district 
court granted the relief and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The allegations suggest that several 
related issuers incorporated abroad and controlled by the defendant engaged in public offer­
ings that were primarily aimed at persons abroad but to which at least a few Americans 
responded (perhaps as a result of reading ads in overseas editions of American newsweeklies 
while the U.S. purchasers were temporarily abroad). While the Ninth Circuit found that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under both the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act, it based this conclusion on a finding that a prima facie case of the probable existence of 
fraud had been demonstrated due to misleading statements and omissions in the offering 
prospectuses. See United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d at 358. The court of appeals does not mention 
any showing of a failure to file registration statements for the offerings, see United Fin. 
Group, 474 F.2d at 358 n.9, which would be the essence of a Section 5 violation and would be 
beyond factual dispute. This suggests that the court did not confront the question of whether 
there was subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the Section 5 part of the complaint. 
Given the court's finding on the fraud aspect of the case, such a determination was not neces­
sary in order to affirm the district court's injunction and appointment of a receiver. 
63. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Steele v. Bulova 
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952)). 
64. A partial exception to this statement is necessary with respect to the requirement, 
under Exchange Act Section 12(g)(l), for ongoing, periodic disclosure imposed on publicly 
held issuers that are not traded on a national stock exchange. The structure of the Act and 
legislative history suggest that Congress intended 12(g)(l) to be imposed on every such is­
suer, regardless of nationality, unless the SEC exempted it. See supra notes 38-39 and accom­
panying text. 
65. Judge Friendly, faced with making a determination under similar circumstances con­
cerning the reach of the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions under Section lO(b) and Rule 
lOb-5, gave the following candid description of the process that he followed: 
We freely acknowledge that if we were again asked to point to language in the statutes, 
or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable 
to respond. The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the 
midst of the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of 
off-shore funds thirty years later . . . .  Our conclusions rest on case law and co=entary 
concerning the application of the securities laws and other statutes to situations with 
foreign elements and on our best judgment as to what Congress would have wished if 
these problems had occurred to it. 
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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less the contrary intent appears, Congress intends its statutes to 
govern only behavior occurring within the United States.66 There 
are two important exceptions to this presumption. One is where 
regulation of behavior occurring abroad is necessary to effect the 
basic purposes of the statute. 67 The other is where the behavior 
abroad is intended to, and has, significant effects in the United 
States.68 
The presumption that statutes govern only conduct in the U.S. 
and its two major exceptions combine to give the courts a great deal 
of discretion with respect to the regulation of transnational transac­
tions. There is often ambiguity as to whether the most significant 
behavior potentially subject to regulation occurred at home or 
abroad. And in a case in which such behavior clearly did occur 
abroad but that involves significant U.S. elements, a case can usu­
ally easily be made both for and against the application of each of 
the exceptions. 
This apparent discretion might appear at least somewhat limited 
by a further presumption that absent explicit language to the con­
trary, Congress does not intend the reach of the statute to exceed 
what is permitted under international law.69 As discussed immedi­
ately below, however, this presumption would not pose a significant 
constraint on a court trying to decide issues of the reach of the U.S. 
disclosure regime on the basis of the criteria set out in this article -
what would maximize U.S. economic welfare, and whether the is­
suer's disclosure behavior affects primarily the welfare of U.S. resi­
dents or the welfare of residents of some other country. In 
particular, it certainly would not constrain a court from interpreting 
the statute as incorporating the issuer nationality approach recom­
mended here. 
C. Congress and Its Constraints Under International Law 
Congress, through statutory language, can explicitly specify the 
reach of its statutes. It should not, however, extend a statute to 
reach conduct beyond what international law permits, i.e., conduct 
outside of United States "jurisdiction to prescribe." The brief re­
view below suggests that the issuer nationality approach recom­
mended here produces results that are clearly fully within U.S. 
66. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). 
67. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
68. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
69. See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 443. Cf. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. 
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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jurisdiction to prescribe.70 The investor residence and location of 
transaction approaches, however, call for regulation in some cases 
where the presence of jurisdiction to prescribe is only arguable. 
The conduct that is the subject of this Article generally involves 
some person's affirmative action relating to an issuer's shares com­
bined with the issuer's disclosure or non-disclosure of certain infor­
mation. The United States regulates the conduct by forbidding the 
person from undertaking the affirmative action unless the issuer 
discloses the information. The question of the transnational reach 
of U.S. disclosure regulation arises because at least one dimension 
of the situation - the residency of a share buyer, the location of a 
share transaction, or the nationality of the issuer - involves the 
United States and at least one other dimension involves another 
country. 
The process of determining whether the United States has juris­
diction to prescribe regulation of any given kind of conduct involves 
two steps. The first step is to assess whether the United States has 
prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. The United States has prima 
facie jurisdiction to prescribe several categories of conduct that are 
defined in terms of the conduct's various national dimensions. If 
the conduct in question does not fall into any of these categories, 
the United States has no jurisdiction to prescribe. If it does fall into 
one or more of the categories, we go on to the second step: assess­
ing how great an interest the United States has in the conduct and 
how that compares with any other state's interest in the United 
States not regulating the conduct. The first step is relatively 
mechanical and the second step more nuanced. The nature of the 
inquiry called for by the second step is briefly described in this Part, 
70. This review is based primarily on the REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA· 
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter REsrATEMENT]. A full examination 
of the constraints imposed by international law on the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime is 
outside the scope of this Article and would need to go well beyond the REsrATEMENT. The 
REsrATEMENT, however, is considered an authoritative statement of the general U.S. view of 
international law. Its provisions concerning jurisdiction to prescribe provide a useful way of 
structuring a discussion of the underlying issues involved in this limit on the reach of the U.S. 
disclosure regime. 
· 
The Restatement contains three sections of particular relevance. Section 402 sets out sev­
eral kinds of conduct with respect to which a state has prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe 
regulations. Section 403 prohibits exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe on any of these prima 
facie bases if (1) such exercise is unreasonable (an evaluation of which can, in part, be made 
by consideration of a stated list of factors) or (2) such exercise is reasonable, but another 
state has a conflicting prescription and the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction is 
clearly greater. Section 416 applies the general principles set out in 402 and 403 to the reach 
of the U.S. securities laws. It lists situations in which exercise of jurisdiction is, in essence, 
per se reasonable and lists a set of factors to determine reasonableness for situations outside 
that list. 
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but much of the . rest of this Article helps provide answers to the 
questions that such an inquiry poses. 
1. Bases for Prima Facie Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
a. Conduct occurring within the territory of the regulating 
state. One basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct occurring 
within the territory of the state seeking to regulate it.71 This basis 
would cover the disclosure behavior of many, but not all, of the 
issuers that the transaction location approach calls for reaching. 
The United States would, for example, have prima facie jurisdiction 
on this basis to prohibit a foreign issuer from offering or selling its 
shares in the United States, or promoting their secondary trading 
here, unless the issuer provided the required disclosure. This is be­
cause such activities - offers and sales of the issuer's shares and 
promotion of their trading - each inevitably would require the is­
suer (or someone contractually related to the issuer) to undertake 
conduct within the United States. Presumably permission to under­
take these activities could be conditioned not only on providing dis­
closure at the time of the offer, sale, or promotion of trading, but 
also on the provision of ongoing, periodic disclosure thereafter. 
This first basis would not cover one situation that the location of 
transaction approach calls for reaching: where neither the issuer 
nor anyone contractually related to it offered, sold, or promoted the 
trading of its shares in the United States, but organized trading in 
its shares nevertheless developed in the United States. In that situ­
ation, the issuer has undertaken no conduct occurring within the 
United States. 
b. Conduct occurring outside the regulating state that has a 
substantial effect within its territory. A second basis for prima facie 
jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct that occurs outside of the state 
seeking to regulate it, but that has a substantial effect \vithin such 
state.72 This category would cover many of the issuers that the in-
71. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, at §§ 402{l)(a), 416{1){b). This basis is sometimes 
referred to as the "territorial principle" and involves "determining jurisdiction by reference 
to the place where the offen[s]e is committed." Research in International Law: Drafts of 
Conventions Prepared for the Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J. INTL. L. 1, 445 
(Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Research in International Law]. The territorial principle "is every­
where regarded as of primary importance and of fundamental character." Id. 
72. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, at §§ 402{1)(c), 416{1)(c). As briefly reviewed in 
Comment d and Reporter's Note 2 to Restatement § 402, the "effects principle" has given rise 
to some controversy in large part because of European reaction to the extraterritorial appli­
cation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Ultimately, though, the "effects principle," just like the 
"conduct within territory" principle, is simply a way of identifying categories of conduct that 
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vestor residency approach calls for reaching. The United States 
would, for example, have prim.a facie jurisdiction on this basis to 
prohibit a foreign issuer from offering or selling its shares or pro­
moting their secondary trading, even though its actions are under­
taken outside the United States, if, as a result, a significant number 
of investors in the United States are reasonably expected to be buy­
ers. The United States could condition such an offer, sale, or pro­
motion of trading sales upon the issuer providing the required 
disclosure. The rationale would be that if the issuer undertakes 
such a sale, offer, or promotion of trading, the conduct will have a 
substantial effect in the United States. Again, presumably the con­
dition for allowing such activities could include not only providing 
disclosure at the time of the offering, sale, or promotion, but also 
providing ongoing, periodic disclosure thereafter. 
This second basis would also provide a prim.a facie jurisdiction 
for regulating an issuer that offered, sold, or promoted organized 
trading of its shares only outside the United States, but where, as a 
predictable result of one or more of these actions, organized trading 
developed in the United States. Thus, the second basis covers a 
situation that the transaction location approach calls for reaching 
but for which the first basis does not provide U.S. prim.a facie juris­
diction to prescribe. 
The more difficult cases even under this second basis are where 
an issuer sold, offered, or promoted the organized trading of its 
shares only outside the United States at some time in the past when 
the issuer could not have reasonably expected that a significant 
number of U.S. investors would later be buyers of its shares in the 
secondary market or that organized trading in its shares might later 
develop in the United States. Now, one or both of these things has 
happened. The investor residency approach, where U.S. investors 
later become buyers, and the transaction location approach, where 
organized trading in the United States later develops, would each 
may sufficiently involve the political, social, or economic processes of a particular state as to 
justify that state imposing its general regulatory scheme on the conduct. The real issue at 
stake with the effects principle is the reasonableness of its application. 
More recently, both Germany and the EC seem to have also adopted some form of the 
"effects principle" with regard to their own antitrust laws, as evidenced by the "wood pulp" 
decision. See Case 89/85, Osakeyhtio v. EC Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5233, Comm. Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) 'l! 14,491. This, at least, is the U.S. view of the case. See, e.g., Charles F. Rule, 
U.S. Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, in 
EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANrrrn.uST AND TRADE LAw 1-1, 1-14 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989) 
(stating, "Nevertheless . . .  the [wood pulp] decision is very close to, if not indistinguishable 
from, the so called 'effects' test as applied by U.S. courts"). 
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call for the issuer to start providing ongoing disclosure. 73 Here all 
the issuer is doing (absent regulation) is not providing the U.S. level 
of disclosure once U.S. investors start to become buyers or organ­
ized trading starts to develop in the United States. The earlier of­
fer, sale, or promotion of trading could not realistically be called 
part of the conduct being regulated. 
For the United States to have prima facie jurisdiction to impose 
its disclosure regime on such an issuer, inaction standing by itself ­
not providing the U.S. level of disclosure - would have to be con­
sidered the "conduct" subject to regulation. The rationale for 
granting the U.S. jurisdiction would be that if the issuer instead pro­
vided the disclosure, it would have a substantial effect in the United 
States.74 Broadly applied, such an approach to the substantial ef­
fects basis for jurisdiction to prescribe would permit the United 
States to command a foreign national anywhere in the world to un­
dertake an action he would not otherwise undertake simply because 
the action would have a significant beneficial effect in the United 
States. The United States could tell every wealthy foreign national 
around the world, for example, to send the U.S. Treasury one mil­
lion dollars. While I believe it is possible to develop a more refined 
theory that could justify imposing the U.S. disclosure regime on 
some such issuers without also justifying the other obviously unac­
ceptable results, the case for jurisdiction to prescribe is much less 
clear cut here than in other situations.75 Yet supporters of the in-
73. While these approaches would call for imposing the U.S. regime on such an issuer, the 
SEC does not in fact currently require it to disclose the information ordinarily required 
under the U.S. regime. It is, however, required to file with the SEC under Rule 12(g)(3)-2(b) 
the information that it must provide its own authorities. See supra note 42 and accompanying 
text. 
74. Doing so would go beyond the examples of effects based justifications for jurisdiction 
to prescribe given by authorities on the subject. The examples typically involve some act of 
commission in one state which, performed the way it was, had a more negative effect on 
another state than if the act had not been performed at all: the intentional or negligent 
shooting of a gun in one state where the bullet crosses a state line and injures someone in 
another state, see REsTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 402, cmt. d, or delivery of money in one 
state solely because of misrepresentations made in another state, see Leasco Data Processing 
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972). 
75. I argue elsewhere that among such issuers, one can probably justify imposing the U.S. 
regime on those that the investor residency approach calls for reaching, but that doing so 
requires breaking new ground and going beyond the conventional understanding of what is 
covered by the substantial effects basis for jurisdiction to prescribe. See Merritt B. Fox, Reg­
ulating Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market 82-100 (Apr. 1992) (unpublished paper 
presented at the University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, on file with author). 
The argument involves a recognition that purely domestic laws often usefully impose require­
ments on persons simply because their status suggests that they are in a good position to do 
something that is beneficial to someone else. In a world with increasing transnational eco· 
nomic interactions, such a regulation should be able to be extended transnationally in situa­
tions where it appears that the state seeking the extension is primarily motivated by an 
honest and reasonable belief that the regulation's benefits outweigh its costs, not by the regu· 
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vestor residency and transaction location approaches do not ad­
dress these problems.76 
c. Conduct undertaken by a national of the regulating state. A 
third basis for prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct by a 
U.S. national, whether undertaken outside or inside that state.77 
This basis would cover all of the issuers that the issuer nationality 
approach calls for reaching. The United States would, for example, 
have prima facie jurisdiction on this basis to prohibit a U.S. issuer 
from offering or selling its shares, or promoting their secondary 
trading, anywhere in the world - inside or outside the United 
States - unless the issuer provided the required disclosure. 
d. Indirect methods of acquiring prima facie jurisdiction. The 
foregoing analysis suggests that there are foreign issuers that the 
investor residency or transaction location approach call for reaching 
but for whose conduct there is no clear prima facie jurisdiction to 
prescribe direct regulation. Another way of shaping the disclosure 
behavior of such issuers is for the United States to prohibit its resi­
dents from purchasing their shares and prohibit securities profes­
sionals in the United States from taking orders for such shares or 
lation's capacity to work a unilateral wealth transfer. This argument would not justify impos­
ing the U.S. regime on those among such issuers that only the transaction location protection 
approach calls for reaching. This is probably not a practical concern, however, since it is hard 
to imagine an issuer for whose shares organized trading develops in the United States, but for 
which there are not a significant number of U.S. buyers. 
76. The Reporters' Note 4 to Restatement § 416, for example, states "[f]oreign issuers of 
equity securities initially sold only outside the United States are also generally required to 
make [the disclosures called for by the U.S. regime] if the securities are held by a specified 
minimum number of United States residents." See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70. The inclu­
sion of this statement implies that the Reporters believe that imposing the U.S. disclosure 
regime on these issuers is within the U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe, but the Note provides no 
explanation of why this is so. 
The SEC, in its justification of the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime under the transac­
tion location approach, makes the simple undifferentiated statement that the approach is 
based on a territorial approach and that "[t]erritoriality is a fundamental basis under both 
international law . . .  and the foreign relations law of the United States." See lNmAL PRO­
POSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 89, 128 n.60. It cites Section 402 of the Restatement with­
out indicating which basis it is invoking or how inaction in one state, standing alone, justifies 
regulation by another state. 
Admittedly, Regulation S, the proposal of which was the occasion for the SEC to articu­
late the transaction location approach, only imposes the U.S. regime on foreign issuers en­
gaging in primary offerings of securities where a significant number of U.S. investors can be 
expected to respond. We have just seen that this can easily be justified on the substantial 
effects basis. The transaction location approach's underlying goal of market protection is 
equally applicable to periodic disclosure, however. See supra section l.A.2 and l.B. 
77. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, § 402(2). This basis is sometimes referred to as the 
"nationality principle" and involves "determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality 
or national character of the person committing the offense." Research in International Law, 
supra note 71, at 445. It is described by commentators as "universally accepted." See id. 
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participating in their organized trading.78 The United States would 
have clear prima facie jurisdiction to do so under one or more of 
the three bases. Such prohibitions would induce at least some issu­
ers to comply with the U.S. regime in order to have a U.S. market 
for their shares. 
The effectiveness and enforceability of such an arrangement 
may be a problem, however. U.S. investors could try to evade the 
ban by placing their orders with brokers abroad, thereby making 
the orders difficult to monitor. Also, a regulation that would im­
pose sanctions for its violation on the persons it is supposed to pro­
tect is likely to engender particularly little voluntary compliance 
and particularly intense political opposition. 
2. Limitations on Actual Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Considering 
the Intensity of U.S. Interest and That of 
Other Countries 
These bases provide only prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. 
According to the ALI's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela­
tions Law of the United States, even when one of these bases is pres­
ent, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe if (1) its 
exercise is unreasonable, or (2) its exercise is reasonable, but an­
other state has a conflicting prescription and the other state's inter­
est in exercising jurisdiction is clearly greater.79 As suggested 
earlier, these constraints are really where the more important issues 
lie in jurisdiction to prescribe.80 While the constraints are articu-
78. Such an indirect method of shaping issuer disclosure behavior is in fact how the Ex­
change Act's periodic disclosure requirements work for issuers traded on a national stock 
exchange. Section 12(a) does not address issuers directly. Instead, it prohibits exchange 
members, brokers, and dealers from effecting transactions on such an exchange in the shares 
of issuers that have not registered under Section 12(b ). See supra note 25. On the other 
hand, the new issue disclosure regulations under Section 5 of the Securities Act are effec­
tively imposed directly on issuers and on others who might be involved in the distribution 
process. Under Section 12(g)(l) of the Exchange Act, the periodic disclosure requirements 
for publicly held issuers not traded on a national stock exchange are also imposed directly on 
issuers. 
79. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403. 
80. The authors of a leading casebook on international transactions say of the bases for 
prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe just reviewed here: 
To the extent that such principles permit clearer analysis and comprehension of 
problems of legislative reach, they serve a useful purpose. To the extent that they divert 
attention from underlying considerations to the mere (mechanical or conclusory) classi­
fication of particular legislation as expressing one or another principle, they do not . . .  
[11he fact that the transnational reach of a statute can be brought within an existing 
"principle" does not of itself argue for or justify that reach . . . .  
To resolve these questions . . .  [a] more particular and searching inquiry into statutory 
purposes, private expectations, and the policies or interests of the concerned govern­
ments may be called for . . .  [O]ne must identify the various national policies or interests 
at issue in a given case and face the problem of resolving any conflicts among them. 
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lated in rather vague terms, they have their origins in identifiable 
prior practice. They reflect long held notions of comity in interna­
tional law.81 They reflect as well recent examples of U.S. courts 
determining the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws based not just on 
the immediate interests of the United States in regulating the par­
ticular conduct involved, but also on considerations about the inter­
ests of other countries and the international system.82 Under the 
Restatement, determining whether one of these constraints applies 
when the United States seeks to apply its regulations to conduct 
having foreign elements depends on a variety of factors. These fac­
tors are indicators of the importance of the conduct to the United 
States and of the likelihood and extent of conflict with the interests 
of another state that U.S. regulation of the conduct would 
engender.s3 
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 847-48 (1994). 
81. Rules of comity have been variously regarded as practices that are "followed not as a 
matter of obligation but of courtesy, convenience and neighborly accommodation," I. 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1970); l.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TREATISE 33 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955), as "neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other," Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), and, at least in the case of rules of comity relating to 
concurrent jurisdiction, as part of the rules of international law that bind nations, see RE­
STATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403. 1\vo components of Section 403 incorporate the comity 
concept of balancing state interests as the basis, in whole or in part, of rules requiring states 
to refrain from exercising jurisdiction to prescribe. First, section 403(3) provides that when 
more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person or activity 
"but the prescriptions conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the 
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors . . .  [and] 
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater." In addition, Section 
403(2) lists the relevant factors to be evaluated in determining whether the exercise of juris­
diction is reasonable. A number of these measure the interest of the state in regulating the 
activity, but one is "the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity." Section 403(1) prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction when it would be un­
reasonable. See also id. § 403 cmt. a. 
If one takes a sociological approach to questions of international law, as I do, whether 
practices of restraint in such situations of conflicting interest, typically attributed to comity, 
do or do not constitute rules of international law appears a rather sterile debate. Under such 
an approach, one would ask whether there exists an expectation on the part of participants in 
the international legal system that nations should follow these practices and, if so, whether 
failure to follow them will result in any sanctions. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. 
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 1, 8 (1959). Even co=entators who insist on the distinction between comity and 
law, such as Lauterpracht and Oppenheim, would answer both these questions affirmatively. 
They clearly view rules of comity as ongoing practices. The existence of an ongoing practice 
of restraint on the part of most states when confronted with certain situations of concurrent 
jurisdiction will certainly lead over time to the expectation that the practice should be fol­
lowed. States which do not follow the practice are likely to be subject to a reciprocal lack of 
courtesy, a response suggested by the references to "neighborliness" in the traditional formu­
lation of comity. Thus there are sanctions for failure to follow the practice. 
82. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979); 
Tlillberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
83. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403(2)-(3). 
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These concerns correspond closely to the criteria suggested here 
for choosing the best approach to statutory reach: the approach's 
ability to enhance U.S. economic welfare generally - counting in 
the calculation of U.S. welfare the effect on the United States of the 
reaction of other countries - and, in particular, the approach's 
ability to discriminate between issuers whose disclosure behavior 
primarily affects U.S. welfare and issuers whose disclosure behavior 
primarily affects some other state. The economic analysis of the 
transnational distribution of the effects of issuer disclosure behavior 
undertaken in this Article demonstrates, according to these criteria, 
the superiority of the issuer nationality approach. Thus if the 
United States adopted this approach, it would clearly appear to be 
acting within the constraints imposed by international law. 
Ill. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH 
OVER THE INVESTOR REsIDENCY APPROACH 
In these next three Parts, I consider how the choice of approach 
affects U.S. economic welfare through the selection of which of the 
world's issuers will fall within the reach of the U.S. regime. The 
issuer nationality approach is clearly superior to the investor resi­
dency approach in this regard. The United States, it will be seen, 
has a strong interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers. 
This includes even those whose shares are only publicly sold to or 
traded among foreign investors, the group reached by the issuer na­
tionality approach but not by the investor residency approach. In 
contrast, the United States has at best only a subsidiary interest in 
the disclosure behavior of foreign issuers. This includes even those 
whose shares are publicly sold to or traded among U.S. residents, 
the group reached by the investor residency approach but not 
reached by the issuer nationality approach. 
The issuer nationality approach is also clearly superior to the 
transaction location approach as well. No U.S. interest in determin­
ing the disclosure behavior of any issuer is affected by the country 
in which transactions in their shares takes place. The transaction 
location approach thus utilizes as its criterion for selecting issuers to 
which to apply U.S. law a factor wholly unrelated to U.S. interests. 
It would thereby arbitrarily cut out from U.S. application some issu­
ers whose disclosure behavior is of strong interest to the United 
States - U.S. issuers whose shares are publicly sold or traded only 
abroad. In fact, it would create an incentive for U.S. issuers to put 
themselves in this group. At the same time, it would arbitrarily in­
clude others whose disclosure behavior is at most of subsidiary in-
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terest to the United States - foreign issuers whose shares are sold 
or traded in the United States. Furthermore, it will diminish the 
volume of transactions effected in the United States. 
Nationally based regulation utilizing the issuer nationality ap­
proach is, it will be seen, also superior to any achievable uniform 
international regime. 
There is an implicit assumption behind the normative conclu­
sions that issuer nationality is superior to the other two approaches 
or any achievable international disclosure regime. This is the as­
sumption that for entirely domestic U.S. issuers - those whose en­
trepreneurs, operations, and shareholders exist exclusively in the 
U.S. and whose shares are exclusively sold or traded there - the 
U.S. regime's current required disclosure level is closer to what 
would maximize U.S. economic welfare than is the required disclo­
sure level of any other country's regime. This assumption is exten­
sively explored in Part VII. Its use at this point, however, is 
sufficiently justified by the observation that compared to foreign 
officials, U.S. officials have greater expertise about the tradeoff be­
tween the costs and benefits of the disclosure behavior of entirely 
domestic U.S. issuers and are the officials politically responsible to 
the persons most affected by such behavior. These three parts can 
therefore be seen as identifying for which of the world's other issu­
ers U.S. officials are similarly the superior regulators. The answer is 
that U.S. officials are the best regulators for all remaining U.S. issu­
ers - those that are not entirely domestic - and no foreign issuers. 
The argument is laid out as follows. In Part III, I show why 
applying the U.S. regime to the set of issuers selected under the 
issuer nationality approach enhances U.S. economic welfare more 
than would applying the U.S. regime to the set of issuers selected 
under the investor residency approach. This is so even if other 
countries do not adopt the same approach.84 In Part IV, I show 
84. This recommendation involves identification of policies that are in the economic long­
term best interests of the United States and is not intended to address what policy constitutes 
the best strategic bargaining position in the short term. In this regard, there is a parallel 
between the policy recommended here and the policy, recommended by classical trade the­
ory adherents, that the United States is better off engaging in free trade even if other coun­
tries do not. See RICHARD E. CAVES & RONALD W. JoNES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: 
AN lNTRooucnoN 12-19 (1985). In both the disclosure regulation case and the trade one, 
the United States would be even better off if other countries too adopted the recommended 
policy, and the other countries would be worse off if the United States does not. Therefore, 
strategic bargaining considerations may call for the United States temporarily not to adopt 
the recommended policy - even though adopting it would make the United States better off 
- in order to pressure the other countries to act in a way - adoption of the recommended 
approach - that would make the United States even better off than it would be by adopting 
the policy alone. 
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why the issuer nationality approach has the same superiority com­
pared to the transaction location approach. In Part V, I show why 
adopting the issuer nationality approach enhances U.S. welfare 
more than adopting any achievable international regime. In all 
three Parts, I assume that the choice of approach will have no effect 
on the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. The implica­
tions of relaxing this assumption will be explored in Parts VI and 
VIII. 
A. The United States Has a Strong Interest in Determining the 
Disclosure Behavior of U.S. Issuers Even When Their 
Shares Are Publicly Sold to and Traded 
Among Only Foreign Investors 
1. The Basis of the U.S. Interest 
Greater disclosure can, through its positive effects on manage­
rial motivation and the choice of real investment projects, increase 
the returns generated by capital-utilizing productive activity.as 
Three groups share in the overall returns generated by such activity: 
the public suppliers of capital, the original suppliers of en­
trepreneurial talent, and the suppliers of the other factors of pro­
duction - primarily labor. Publicly supplied capital, however, is 
much more mobile transnationally than entrepreneurial talent or 
labor. As a result, competitive forces push capital toward receiving 
a single global expected rate of return (adjusted for risk) regardless 
of the disclosure practices of the particular issuers involved.86 The 
85. The benefits of greater issuer disclosure are discussed infra in section 111.D.1.b.i. 
86. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the price at which an issuer's shares 
trade will be unbiased whether there is a great deal of information available about the issuer 
or very little. By "unbiased," I mean that the price is on average equal to the share's actual 
value, i.e., what the future income stream accruing to the holder of the share - its dividends 
and other distributions - turns out to be, discounted to present value. Speculators - the 
persons whose actions in the market set prices - assess what this future income stream will 
be based not only on what information is available about the issuer but also on what is not. 
The empirical literature testing the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the inferences 
that speculators draw from issuer disclosures are in fact unbiased. Since there is no reason to 
believe that their inferences from issuer absences of comment are any more likely to be 
biased than their inferences from issuer disclosures, this literature suggests as well that the 
inferences they draw from issuer absences of comment are also unbiased. I discuss these 
points in considerably more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, 
supra note 1, at 2533-39. If share prices are unbiased and the world's investors have a global 
set of issuers to choose from, each investor will receive the same risk-adjusted expected rate 
of return whatever issuer's shares she purchases, whether the issuer discloses at a high level 
or a low one. Professors Choi and Guzman and Professor Romano agree. They suggest that 
an issuer's share price will reflect a market discount for the applicable disclosure regime. See 
Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 220-21; Romano, supra note 
15, at 2366. 
The efficient market hypothesis has been attacked by adherents of noise theory. The 
noise theorists believe that share prices are affected by the irrational expectations of naive 
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increase in returns resulting from greater issuer disclosure therefore 
largely accrues to the latter two groups.s7 
A typical issuer, even if labeled "multinational," will still have a 
distinct nationality, an identifiable economic center of gravity in a 
single country where its original entrepreneurial talent and the larg­
est portion of its management and workers are concentrated.ss 
Thus most of the gains from greater disclosure will be enjoyed in an 
issuer's home country, regardless of where in the world its public 
shareholders reside. 
Greater disclosure also has costs that must be weighed against 
its capacity to increase the returns generated by capital utilizing ac­
tivity. Again, because of capital's greater mobility, the costs of dis­
closure, too, will fall largely on the latter two groups. 
Thus the gains and costs of the disclosure behavior of U.S. issu­
ers are concentrated among U.S. residents. U.S. economic welfare 
is maximized when the level of disclosure for issuers of U.S. nation-
speculative traders, who are activated by fads, fashions, and irrational psychological predis­
positions. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). Since noise is as likely to 
cause prices to be too low as too high, the proposition that share prices on average equal 
actual value stiJJ holds even if the noise theorists' description of the world is correct. For a 
more extensive discussion of why noise theory does not undermine the argument that the 
issuer's home country has the greatest interest in its disclosure level, see Fox, Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2536-37 & n.76, 2555 n.103. 
87. If a country's issuers represent only a small portion of all equities available to inves­
tors in the world, investors would share in none of these gains. Tue country would be analo­
gous to a single small firm in a perfectly competitive industry. Such a firm's level of 
production has no effect on price. Following this analogy, what the country produces is in­
vestment opportunities - dollars of future expected cash flow - just like the firm produces 
products. A disclosure improvement's positive effects on managerial motivation and choice 
of real investment projects will increase the number of dollars of future expected cash flow 
that the country's issuers have to sell. This benefits both the entrepreneurs, who are selling 
the cash flow, and labor, who gain from the overall increase in the country's economic effi­
ciency. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2561-69. Because the 
country is like a small firm, however, the increase in the amount supplied is not great enough 
to lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold. Thus there is no 
benefit to investors, the "buyers" of these dollars of expected future cash flow. 
If a country's issuers represent a substantial portion of all equities available to investors in 
the world, as is the case with the United States, investors will share in some of these gains. A 
disclosure improvement's increase in the number of dollars of future expected cash flow that 
the country has to offer would be great enough to lower the price at which a dollar of future 
expected cash flow is sold, at least slightly. Thus investors would gain from the improvement. 
This is equally true of foreign investors as U.S. iµvestors, however, and foreign investors own 
almost two-thirds of all the shares of publicly traded issuers in the world. See id. at 2525 n.51. 
Moreover, it is equally true of disclosure improvements of U.S. issuers whose shares are 
primarily sold to, or traded among, only foreign investors as it is of U.S. issuers with primar-
ily U.S. shareholders. 
· 
88. In 1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about 
one-sixth of all corporate profits. See 72 SURv. CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1992, at 14 (NIPA Table 
6.16c). In 1989, overseas assets of even U.S. corporations designated as "multinational" were 
only about one-fifth of their total assets. See J. Lowe & R. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct Invest­
ment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey Results, 71 SURv. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1991, at 29 
(data from Table 1). 
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ality, wherever their shareholders reside, is set at the point where 
the marginal social costs of additional disclosure equals the margi­
nal increase in returns generated by that disclosure.89 
Market forces are not likely to lead firms to disclose at a level 
this high,9° hence the need for a government to consider regula­
tion.91 The question for this study is which government. The bene­
ficiaries when U.S. issuers disclose at the socially optimal level -
their entrepreneurs and workers - are concentrated in the United 
States and U.S. officials have the greatest familiarity with U.S. firm 
governance structures. U.S. officials, therefore, have both greater 
motivation and greater expertise than do officials of any other 
country to decide whether disclosure regulation is called for and, if 
so, what the optimal level is. This is just as true of U.S. issuers 
whose shares are publicly sold to, or traded among, only foreign 
investors - issuers not reached by the investor residency approach 
- as it is of U.S. issuers with only U.S. shareholders. And the U.S. 
residents' stakes in the regulators getting the required level of dis­
closure right are equally great for both types of firms. 
89. The proposition that the United States has a strong interest in the disclosure behavior 
of all U.S. issuers, regardless of where in the world their shareholders reside, holds whether 
or not the text's simplifying assumption of a single global expected rate of return on capital is 
correct. A country whose issuers disclose at the optimal level of disclosure will have capital 
utilizing enterprises that produce higher returns net of costs of disclosure. If the single rate 
assumption is correct, th� gains from getting the disclosure level right will primarily be en­
joyed by the less mobile claimants on these returns, domestic entrepreneurs and labor, not by 
the suppliers of capital, who, wherever in the world they live, will at best enjoy a slight in­
crease in the overall global expected return on capital. See supra note 87. If the assumption 
is incorrect, the reason would be that each country's investors still have a degree of bias 
against issuers from other countries. In that event, U.S. investors, for example, might share 
disproportionately in the gains from moving the U.S. issuer disclosure level toward its opti­
mal level. The bias of foreign investors against U.S. issuers would mean that the increase in 
the number of expected dollars of future cash flow resulting from the change in required 
disclosure would be offered to a somewhat.restricted market and push the price for them 
down more for U.S. investors than for other investors. See supra note 87. To the extent that a 
U.S. issuer has U.S. shareholders, the fact that U.S. investors will share disproportionately in 
the gains from optimal disclosure simply creates an additional U.S. interest in the level of the 
issuer's disclosure. As for U.S. issuers whose shares are sold to and traded among only for­
eign investors, entrepreneurs and labor in the United States would, just as if there were a 
single global expected rate of return on capital, enjoy most of the gains from optimal disclo­
sure. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2561-69. Thus, the United 
States interest in the disclosure behavior of this second set of issuers would be as strong as it 
is shown to be under the assumption in the text. 
90. This market failure is discussed extensively infra in section IV.A.2. 
91. After consideration, a government might conclude that despite this market failure, 
disclosure regulation would nevertheless on balance be undesirable. Again, the question is, 
for any given issuer, which government should decide this question. 
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2. Foreign Relations � 
The conclusion that it is in the best interests of the United States 
to extend the reach of its regime even to U.S. issuers whose shares 
are only publicly sold to or tradec;l among foreign investors is not a 
parochial one that ignores U.S. foreign relations. -Extending the 
statute's reach in this fashion would not threaten the legitimate in­
terests of any other country. Foreign shareholders of U.S. issuers 
will receive the saine global expected rate of return (adjusted for 
risk) regardless of the level at which U.S. issuers disclose92 and so 
foreign concerns about U.S. issuer expected returns cannot form a 
sound basis for objections to U.S. regulation. It is U.S. residents, 
not those of any other country, who enjoy the increased project re­
turns from greater disclosure by U.S. issuers and who pay its extra 
cost. 
For less than fully diversified foreign investors, the risk in hold­
ing shares in U.S. issuers is affected by these issuers' level of disclo­
sure.93 The U.S. regime's level of disclosure, however, has a 
positive effect on the welfare of these investors. The U.S. regime is 
the most rigorous in the world,94 and so its imposition is a cost-free 
benefit to these foreign investors. Thus, effect on risk is also not a 
sound basis for a foreign country to complain about the United 
States applying its regime to U.S. issuers whose shares are sold to or 
traded among the foreign country's investors. 
92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
93. While the amount of information available in the public domain about an issuer does 
not affect the proposition that the issuer's share price will be unbiased, see supra note 89 and 
accompanying text, it is related to the accuracy of the issuer's share price. A share price can 
be unbiased - no more likely to be above than below the share's actual value - but still 
have a low expected accuracy in the sense that there is a significant likelihood that there is a 
substantial difference one way or the other between the price and actual value. 
With less information about a U.S. issuer, speculators will have greater uncertainty about 
its future and, as a consequence, the issuer's shares will have lower expected price accuracy. 
Put another way, with less information the issuer's shares will have greater total risk associ­
ated with them because there is a greater likelihood that what an investor receives from 
holding such a share - distributions and price at resale (both discounted to present value) -
will deviate substantially, one way or the other, from what she pays for it This increased risk 
means that any investor holding shares of the issuer, unless she is fully diversified (by also 
holding shares of a substantial number of other issuers) will have a more risky portfolio than 
would have been the case if more information were available about the issuer. Some portion 
of all the foreign buyers of the U.S. issuer's shares will in fact be Jess than fully diversified 
and consequently, with lower disclosure, suffer lower expected utility - assuming, as the 
capital asset pricing model suggests, that the issuer's shares will be priced in such a fashion 
that its expected return is unaffected by the greater company specific risk resulting from a 
low level of disclosure. Again, I have considered these points in more detail elsewhere. See 
Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2540-44. 
94. See infra notes 103 and 149. 
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The only foreign groups who would be injured by extending 
U.S. disclosure requirements to U.S. issuers whose shares are sold 
to or traded among only foreign investors are those who profit from 
the volume of securities transactions effected in their home coun­
tries. With the issuer nationality approach, U.S. issuers will no 
longer have an incentive to evade U.S. disclosure rules by offering 
and promoting the trade of their shares abroad. Thus the proposed 
switch in approach would diminish the volume of U.S. issuer trans­
actions in other countries. But this injury is not a legitimate basis 
for other countries to protest the proposed extension. Between 
countries, volume is a zero-sum game. It should be won or lost 
based on the cost and quality of the transactional services available 
in each country, not on the ability of one country to offer a way to 
evade regulations of another country aimed at behavior that pri­
marily affects the welfare of residents of the country whose regula­
tions are being evaded. 
B. The U.S. Has, at Best, Only a Weak Interest in Determining 
the Disclosure Behavior of Foreign Issuers Even When Their 
Shares Are Publicly Sold to or Traded Among U.S. Investors 
1. The Basis of the Interest 
As shown by the discussion above, the expected rate of return 
that U.S. residents receive from investments in the shares of a for­
eign issuer will be capital's overall global expected rate of return 
(adjusted for risk). It will be largely unaffected by the issuer's level 
of disclosure. Thus, notwithstanding the traditional concern of the 
SEC and many commentators with investor protection,95 expected 
return considerations cannot constitute a serious basis for applying 
the U.S. disclosure regime to a foreign issuer.96 
95. See supra notes 19-24. 
96. See supra section III.A.1. If there were an overall improvement in disclosure in the 
sense that issuers around the world all moved closer to their respective optimal levels of 
disclosure, investors would share in some of the resulting gains. This is because the increase 
in the number of dollars of future expected cash flow offered to the global market of inves­
tors would lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold. See supra 
note 87. This fact, however, does not create a special U.S. stake in the disclosure behavior of 
foreign issuers. To start, foreign investors would enjoy this decrease in the price of a dollar of 
expected cash flow as much as would U.S. investors, and foreign investors own almost two­
thirds of all the shares of publicly traded issuers in the world. See Fox, Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2525 n.51. Moreover, for reasons parallel to those set 
out in section III.A.1 concerning the strong U.S. interest in the disclosure of U.S. issuers, 
each other country does have a special stake in the disclosure behavior of its issuers because 
of the effect of such disclosure on entrepreneurs and labor concentrated in its country. Offi­
cials of each other country also have superior expertise on what would be the socially optimal 
disclosure level for its issuers, which is likely to differ substantially from one country to the 
next. See infra sections V.A and V.B. This creates a presumption that extending the U.S. 
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Greater disclosure will benefit less than fully diversified U.S. in­
vestors holding such shares by reducing the unsystematic risk in 
their portfolios.97 This potential for reducing U.S. investors' risk is, 
however, the basis for only, at best, a weak U.S. interest in applying 
its regime to foreign issuers. Unlike the benefits U.S. residents re­
alize from greater issuer disclosure by U.S. issuers (discussed just 
above), greater disclosure by foreign issuers provides benefits to 
U.S. residents achievable in other ways. There is no obvious alter­
native for achieving the benefits to U.S. residents from greater U.S. 
issuer disclosure - the increased returns to capital utilizing activi­
ties from more accurate price induced better project choice and im­
proved managerial motivation. In contrast, the benefit from foreign 
issuer disclosure - the reduction of unsystematic risk - can be 
achieved by another strategy: a program of educational and institu­
tional reform that will encourage U.S. investors to diversify. If an 
investor is fully diversified, the greater unsystematic risk associated 
with her having in her portfolio shares of a foreign issuer that dis­
closes less than the U.S. level will not have a negative impact on her 
welfare. Given the availability of this alternative strategy, the U.S. 
ability to regulate foreign issuer disclosure is less vital. 
2. Countervailing Domestic Considerations 
Furthermore, the full effect on U.S. investor welfare of imposing 
the U.S. regime on foreign issuers cannot be ascertained by consid­
ering its risk reduction impact in isolation. Investors are made bet­
ter off when shares of additional issuers are made available, even if 
regime to these issuers would move their disclosure away from, not toward, the optimal level 
for them. 
The proposition in the text again does not depend on the text's simplifying assumption of 
a single global expected rate of return on capital. If the assumption is incorrect, the reason 
would be that each country's investors still have a substantial degree of bias in favor of their 
country's issuers. See supra note 89. That means that the impact of improved foreign issuer 
disclosure on U.S. investors will be even smaller. The increased supply of expected future 
dollars would lower their price less for U.S. investors since U.S. investors are buyers in a 
market that behaves, because of the bias, as if the availability of this increased supply were 
partially restricted. 
A special situation exists with Canada. U.S. investors feel significantly more comfortable 
purchasing shares of Canadian issuers than purchasing shares of other foreign issuers, and 
the United States has a much larger pool of investors than does Canada. This, however, 
suggests a situation of sufficiently intense interaction between these two economies that dis­
closure regulation would, and as a practical matter can, best be handled by bilateral agree­
ments establishing a joint regime, rather than by general rules parceling out authority 
between the two countries as to which national regime should govern. The United States and 
Canada are working toward such an arrangement by undertaking a degree of coordination of 
their two regimes and then providing for reciprocal recognition for qualified issuers that reg­
ister under the other country's regime. See supra notes 21, 24. 
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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these additional issuers only disclose at a very low level.98 If the 
U.S. policy imposes its regime on all foreign issuers whose shares 
are publicly sold to or traded among U.S. investors, many foreign 
issuers will seek to avoid the U.S. regime by making their shares 
unavailable to U.S. investors. The loss in U.S. investor utility from 
reduced availability of foreign issuers' shares may be greater than 
the gain in investor utility from the increased disclosure by the for­
eign issuers that do make their shares available. U.S. investors can 
therefore actually be made worse off if the U.S. regime is applied to 
foreign issuers. 
3. Foreign Relations 
When U.S. foreign relations are taken into account, the U.S. in­
terest in applying its regime to foreign issuers becomes even more 
problematic. Imposition of the U.S. regime requires the issuer to 
disclose more than officials in the issuer's own country have deter­
mined is cost effective. At least in the eyes of these foreign offi­
cials, the higher level of disclosure required by the United States 
costs more than it is worth and thus reduces the net returns to capi­
tal utilizing productive activities in their own country. The imposi­
tion of the U.S. regime damages the issuer country's entrepreneurs, 
suppliers of labor, and, if the issuer has previously gone public at 
home, suppliers of capital. 
This foreign relations problem is going to be severely exacer­
bated by the growing globalization of financial information and the 
declining difficulty and expense of effecting share transactions 
abroad. There will be increasingly large numbers of foreign issuers 
whose shares will be publicly sold to and traded among U.S. inves­
tors. Under the investor residency approach, the U.S. regime 
would thus apply to foreign issuers with greater and greater fre­
quency. Each additional application is objectionable to the issuer's 
home country since its residents suffer the welfare loss when the 
issuer discloses more than is socially optimal. This is particularly so 
since the U.S. regime is imposed to cure the purely domestic U.S. 
problem of inadequate investor diversification. 
98. Whatever level of disclosure is imposed on the issuer, each additional investment op­
portunity available to investors that a share value maximizing firm finds worth selling into a 
market with unbiased pricing represents an increase in demand for savings. It therefore mar­
ginally raises the overall market expected rate of return available to investors. Also, each 
additional investment opportunity has a future return generated by a probability distribution 
with somewhat different variance-covariance characteristics than any existing opportunity 
and therefore permits investors to compose portfolios with more favorable tradeoffs between 
risk and return than otherwise would have been available. For a more formal elaboration of 
these points, see Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2542-44. 
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This foreign relations problem is not ameliorated in any rational 
way by making a distinction between foreign issuers that take vol­
untary steps to make their shares available to U.S. investors, for 
example by listing them on a U.S. stock exchange, and those that 
have done nothing to promote the availability of their shares.99 The 
investor protection rationale calls just as strongly for application of 
the U.S. regime to both, since the impact of low disclosure on the 
riskiness of the portfolios of less than fully diversified investors is 
the same whether or not the issuer has promoted its shares' availa­
bility. And the imposition of the U.S. regime should be equally 
unpalatable to the foreign issuer's country in either case. The fact 
that a foreign issuer voluntarily takes steps to promote U.S. availa­
bility may rhetorically strengthen the argument for imposing the 
U.S. regime, but it does not strengthen the argument on substantive 
economic grounds. The taking of voluntary steps does not affect 
the strong presumption that an issuer's home country requirements 
are closer to the issuer's particular socially optimal disclosure level 
than are the U.S. requirements. It simply means that the issuer's 
gains from having a U.S. market for its shares exceed the extra 
costs, not that the extra costs are justified. Thus, whether or not a 
foreign issuer has done anything affirmative to promote the availa­
bility of its shares to U.S. investors, it is objectionable to the issuer's 
home country that its residents suffer a welfare loss from the issuer 
disclosing more than what its government believes is socially 
optimal. 
4. Qualifications for IPOs and Foreign Issuers Trading in 
Immature Markets 
The recommended switch to the issuer nationality approach 
should be qualified in the case of an initial public offering (IPO) by 
a previously privately held foreign company. There is an extensive 
literature about the pricing of U.S. issuer IPOs in the United States, 
99. The SEC has long held to the principle that a distinction should be made between 
foreign issuers that voluntarily enter the United States securities markets and those whose 
securities are traded in the U.S. market without their encouragement. See, e.g., Release No. 
6360, supra note 44, at 58,512. This principle is at least partially reflected in practice - for 
example, the distinction for Exchange Act periodic disclosure purposes between foreign issu­
ers whose shares are listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ and issuers whose shares are not, 
see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text, and the distinction for Securities Act new offer­
ing disclosure between foreign issuers that engage in selling efforts directed at the United 
States and those that do not, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
While, as argued in the text, such distinctions do not in any rational way reduce the dam­
age to other countries from an investor protection approach, they do keep the United States 
on stronger ground in terms of making the formal claim of prima facie jurisdiction to pre­
scribe. See supra section II.C.1.b. 
740 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:696 
some of which &uggests that shares purchased in such offerings are 
priced inefficiently high.10° Certainly the mechanisms needed to 
100. A large number of studies show that initial public offerings {IPOs) are offered at a 
"discount" in the sense that there is on average a significant jump from the offering price to 
the price at which the shares trade in the initial days or weeks after the offering. See James 
R. Booth & Lena Chua, Ownership dispersion, costly information, and !PO underpricing, 41 
J. Fm. EcoN. 291, 306-07 (1995) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and 
testing possible explanations); Roger G. Ibbotson et al. Initial Public Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED 
CoRP. Fm. 37 (1988) {similar survey); Roger G. Ibbotson & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Of­
ferings, in NORTH-HOLLAND HANDBOOKS OF OPERATIONS REsEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE: FINANCE (RA. Jarrow et al. eds., 1992) {showing underpricing in other countries). 
The fact that on average IPO prices are discounted relative to the prices at which the 
shares initially trade does not necessarily mean, however, that they are discounted relative to 
their actual value. The studies are more mixed on this latter question. Ibbotson, in perhaps 
the most frequently cited study establishing the existence of the discount relative to initial 
trading price, looked as well at prices thereafter for various periods up to five years and 
found returns on a risk adjusted basis were normal, thereby suggesting that the initial trading 
price was efficient and that the offering price was discounted relative to actual value. See 
Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. Fm. EcoN. 235, 
250-58, 265; see also Seha M. Tmic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 
J. Fm. 789, 815 {1988). Loughran and Ritter recently came to a different conclusion. In a 
study that matched a large number of firms doing IPOs with comparable firms that were 
already publicly traded and had made no offering in several years, they found that it would 
on average require a 44% larger investment in the IPO at its initial trading price to end up 
with the same wealth five years later as with investing in the non-offering matching firm. See 
Trm Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 32 (1995). This inferior 
return swamped the initial discount of the offering price relative to the initial trading price so 
that one would still have to make a 30% larger investment in the IPO at the offering price to 
end up with as much wealth in five years. See id. The Loughran and Ritter study thus sug­
gests that relative to actual value, IPOs are not offered at a discount but at a large premium. 
See id.; see also Hans R. Stoll & Anthony J. Curley, Small Business and the New Issues Mar­
ket for Equities, 5 J. Fm. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 309 (1970). Stoll and Curley studied 
issuers registering very small offerings under the SEC's Regulation A - at the time $300,000 
or less - and found that the offering prices were on average discounted relative to initial 
trading prices, but that over the longer run, investments in these shares at the offering price 
underperformed, even without risk adjustment, a portfolio of larger stocks. See id; see also 
George Stigler, Comment, 37 J. Bus. 414, 421 (1964). Stigler compares, for new issues of­
fered in the periods 1923-1927 (before the Securities Act) and 1949-1955 (after passage of the 
Act), the average ratio of the price of the new issue shares five years after an offering to 
market prices generally. He finds that the ratio for the post-Act period is not statistically 
significantly better than for the pre-Act period. He uses this result to argue that the Act led 
to no improvements. He also finds, however, without comment or a test for statistical signifi­
cance, that in both periods the new issues, five years out, had underperformed the market as 
a whole, again even without risk adjustment. 
The possibility, raised by these studies, that IPOs are offered at prices in excess of actual 
value suggests the existence of a market inefficiency that is systematically working to the 
advantage of issuers and to the disadvantage of investors. Without a better understanding of 
why such an inefficiency has arisen, if in fact it has, and why the market has not realized it 
and corrected for it, we cannot tell whether the level of disclosure affects the extent of the 
problem and, if so, which way. It must also be kept in mind that these findings may represent 
the pricing of an as yet unidentified risk factor that is less prevalent with firms offering new 
issues than with comparable ones that do not, rather than an unfairness-creating market inef­
ficiency. In addition, for the last three years of the Loughran and Ritter study (1988-1990), 
the wealth shortfall from investing in new issues disappears. This could be consistent with 
the market having "caught on" and corrected for the inefficiency, although the authors feel 
that given the particular features of these three years, this period is too short to reach such a 
conclusion. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 49. In sum, the studies are simply reason for 
more caution in changing IPO disclosure policy than other disclosure policies. 
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generate price efficiency in the market for IPOs a'.ie more compli­
cated, and their existence less well established empirically, than the 
mechanisms that appear to generate price efficiency in secondary 
markets. Caution, therefore, may suggest that contrary to the gen­
eral recommendation here, the United States should not, at least 
initially, switch to the issuer nationality approach in the case of for­
eign issuer IPOs. On the other hand, a new share offering by an 
established public foreign issuer does not involve the same 
problems since the offering's price will be determined primarily by 
the prevailing price in the secondary market for the issuer's already 
outstanding shares. Like the secondary market in the United 
States, the secondary market abroad for this issuer's shares can be 
assumed efficient, at least in the case of other developed capitalist 
economies.1°1 
The recommended switch to the issuer nationality approach 
should also be qualified for both new issue and periodic disclosure 
in the case of foreign issuers whose shares trade primarily in the 
more immature secondary markets found in developing countries 
and newly emerging economies. While there is evidence that many 
foreign secondary markets display the same kind of efficiency that 
U.S. ones do, the testing of this proposition, especially with respect 
to markets outside Europe, is certainly not as extensive as with U.S. 
markets.102 We cannot be sure that the more immature markets 
found in developing countries and newly emerging economies have 
the same level of efficiency as markets in the United States and 
Europe. Moreover, the mechanisms that appear to generate price 
efficiency in the United States and Europe are not as firmly in place 
in such markets. Caution again suggests that at least initially the 
issuer nationality approach not be extended to these issuers. 
101. See Gabriel Hawawini, European Equity Markets: A Review of the Evidence on 
Price Behavior and Efficiency, in EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS 3 (Gabriel A. Hawawini & 
Pierre A. Michel eds., 1984); see also William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant 
Regulation of Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in KENNETH LEHN & 
ROBERT KAMPHUis JR., MooERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION 35-51 (1992) (collect­
ing studies showing the efficiency of a variety of foreign secondary markets). 
102. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 101. 
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C. The Analysis of U.S. Interests Does Not Depend on Other 
Countries Also Adopting the Issuer 
Nationality Approach 
1. Why There Is No Need for the Foreign Issuer's Home Country 
to Switch 
My analysis above still holds true even if other countries con­
tinue to adhere to the investor residency approach to statutory 
reach. Consider first the proposition that the U.S. has a strong in­
terest in applying its regime to all U.S. issuers, including those 
whose shares are only publicly sold to, or traded among, foreign 
investors. The whole argument in support of this proposition is 
based on the idea that there is an optimal level of disclosure for 
such an issuer and that U.S. officials have both greater motivation 
and greater expertise than do officials of any other country in ascer­
taining what that optimal level is. When the United States, in ac­
cordance with the issuer nationality approach, imposes its regime 
on a U.S. issuer, the issuer will in fact be disclosing at what in the 
U.S. judgment is the optimal level, whatever any other country 
does. If another country, in continued adherence to the investor 
residency approach, imposes its regime on the U.S. issuer as well, 
there is unlikely to be a material effect on the issuer's disclosure 
behavior since the U.S. disclosure requirements, with which the is­
suer is already complying, are the most comprehensive in the 
world.103 
103. This statement reflects a reasonable approximation of reality. See generally 
MICHAEL BoWE, EUROBONDS 115 (1988) ("[T]he US has what are generally considered to be 
the most extensive disclosure and regulatory requirements of any major capital market."); 
FREDERICK G. FISCHER III, THE EURODOLLAR BOND MARKET 86 (1979) (describing the 
SEC's registration requirements as involving "a degree of disclosure of both the issuer's busi· 
ness and its financial position, well beyond what is customary in the Euromarkets"); see also 
infra note 149. For imposition of the foreign regime to have absolutely no effect, all the 
information required by the foreign regime must be a subset of what is required by the U.S. 
regime. This condition that the U.S. and foreign regime be in a linear relationship is not 
literally satisfied. While most of the information sought by the foreign regime typically 
would be information sought by the U.S. regime, it might need to be presented in a some­
what different form. And some of the information sought by the foreign regime would in fact 
not be sought by the U.S. regime. Thus if the foreign regime as well as the U.S. regime is 
imposed on a U.S. issuer, the issuer will be forced to disclose more than what the U.S. calcu­
lation of costs and benefits would deem justified. 
Nevertheless, linearity is an acceptable working assumption. Most U.S. issuers that are 
already subject to the U.S. regime and decide to sell securities in the Eurobond or Euro­
equity market find that preparation of the necessary disclosure documents for the foreign 
authorities largely involves a simple markup of their U.S. disclosure documents. See, e.g., 
Accounting for Global Stocks, THE EXCHANGE, Jan. 1996, at 6 ("American companies listing 
in overseas markets rarely have to make major adjustments in their reporting because other 
countries usually accept it as satisfying their requirements."). Foreign country officials are 
aware of the greater rigor of the U.S. regime. They have motivations to be flexible about 
what is required of U.S. issuers so as not to put impediments in the way of having U.S. issuers 
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The second proposition - that the U.S. has at ·best only a weak 
interest in applying its regime to foreign issuers whose shares are 
publicly sold to or traded among U.S. residents - also does not 
depend on other countries adopting the issuer nationality approach. 
Consider the bases of the argument supporting this second proposi­
tion: that a foreign issuer's level of disclosure will not affect the 
expected return available to U.S. investors; that greater disclosure's 
risk reduction can also be achieved through greater investor diversi­
fication; that applying the U.S. regime to foreign issuers may on 
balance actually hurt U.S. investors by reducing the number of for­
eign issuers whose shares are available to them; and that applying 
the U.S. regime to foreign issuers may harm U.S. relationships with 
other countries by forcing their issuers to disclose more than their 
home countries believe is optimal. Each of these is true even if the 
foreign issuers are not subject to the disclosure regimes of their 
home country and is certainly unrelated to whether the foreign 
country imposes its regime on U.S. issuers. 
2. Qualifications 
Two qualifications are in order here as well. First, while diversi­
fication is more potent than imposition of the U.S. regime for re­
ducing the risk to U.S. investors associated with holding a foreign 
issuer's shares (and this is true whether or not the issuer is subject 
to its home country's disclosure regime), some U.S. investors, either 
not understanding this fact or choosing to ignore it, will still not 
fully diversify. These investors will suffer a greater increase in risk 
if the U.S. stops applying its regime even to issuers not subject tq 
their home country regimes, than they will if it stops applying its 
regime only to those that are still subject to their home country 
regimes. Where the issuer is not subject to the home country re­
gime, the U.S. switch from the investor residency to the issuer na­
tionality approach means a switch from a higher level of mandated 
disclosure to none, rather than from a higher level to a lower one. 
The second qualification is that while another country may re­
sent application of the U.S. regime to those of its issuers that are 
complying with its own regime, it may appreciate the application of 
the U.S. regime to those that are not. The resentment where the 
issuers are complying with the home country regime is based on its 
shares offered to, and traded among, their residents. Tuey do not want such impediments 
because, if their actions do keep such shares out of their country's market, their investors lose 
additional investment opportunities and their securities industry loses business. See Choi & 
Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 238-39. 
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issuers being forced to disclose at a higher level than the home 
country has determined is cost effective. But where the issuers are 
not complying with the home country regime and the U.S. fails to 
apply its regime as well, the issuers are likely to be disclosing at a 
level lower than the home country officials would determine is cost 
effective in terms of home country welfare. The under-disclosure 
when the U.S. regime is not imposed may represent a greater devia­
tion from what is optimal than the over-disclosure when the U.S. 
regime is imposed. Furthermore, officials of the other country 
might also be unhappy because imposing neither regime on foreign 
issuers whose shares are only offered and traded in the United 
States is likely to result in a loss of transactions in the home coun­
try. Its issuers will seek to evade its regime by promoting transac­
tions in the U.S. instead. These concerns of foreign officials 
however, will be at most transitory for any country. The only time 
when foreign officials will be concerned about the under-disclosure 
and volume loss resulting from the United States not applying its 
regime would be when they understand the rationale behind the 
issuer nationality approach but are prevented from S\vitching to it 
themselves by actors in the larger political environment who still 
adhere to an investor protection goal for mandatory disclosure. 
These two qualifications suggest that the U.S., in adopting the 
issuer nationality approach, may wish to condition removal of U.S. 
disclosure requirements from foreign issuers on their compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of their home countries. Imposing 
this condition would not much alter the overall impact of the 
United States switching to the issuer nationality approach. As far 
as the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements are con­
cerned, most foreign issuers, even from countries continuing to ad­
here to the investor residency approach, would meet this condition 
because there is a public market for their shares at home that would 
continue even if their shares started to trade in the United States.104 
As far as Securities Act primary offering disclosure is concerned, 
although compliance with the home regime may not be compelled 
by an issuer's home country - for example in the case of an issuer 
from an investor residency country making a primary market public 
offering entirely abroad - presumably nothing stops the issuer 
from voluntarily submitting itself to the home country regime in 
order to avoid regulation under the more onerous U.S. regime. 
Also, I have already suggested that the issuer nationality approach 
104. See infra note 172. 
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to statutory reach not be applied to foreign issuer IPOs, at least for 
now. 
JV. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY OVER THE 
TRANSACTION LOCATION APPROACH 
The discussion so far has concluded that U.S. residents have a 
strong interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers, even 
those with no U.S. investors, and at best only a weak interest in the 
disclosure behavior of all foreign issuers, even those with U.S. in­
vestors. These conclusions point to the superiority of the issuer na­
tionality approach to statutory reach over the investor residency 
approach. We have yet, however, to evaluate the transaction loca­
tion approach. While this approach plays a substantial role in cur­
rent U.S. practice10s and some commentators believe it should play 
an even larger role,106 the analysis below suggests that its use is 
misguided. 
The transaction location approach has three disadvantages com­
pared to the issuer nationality approach. First, it imposes the U.S. 
regime on foreign issuers whose shares are offered or traded in the 
United States. The impact of this has already been fully discussed 
above.107 That analysis shows that U.S. residents have at most only 
a weak interest in the disclosure practices of foreign issuers. In fact, 
when we factor in the resulting reduction in the availability of for­
eign securities and foreign relations problems, the practice of im­
posing the U.S. regime on such foreign issuers will in all likelihood 
be contrary to U.S. interests. 
Second, the transaction location approach removes some U.S. 
issuers from the reach of the U.S. regime. The analysis above 
shows that U.S. entrepreneurs and the U.S. resident suppliers of 
non-capital factors of production have a strong interest in the level 
at which each U.S. issuer discloses. Under the transaction location 
approach, a U.S. issuer's decision where to offer, sell, and promote 
trading of its shares will determine which country's disclosure re­
gime governs its disclosure. The approach thus gives U.S. issuers a 
degree of control over the level at which they disclose. We will see 
105. See supra Part II. 
106. The SEC, for example, in its release first proposing Regulation S, advocated that 
"laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States [should] define disclosure require­
ments for transactions effected offshore." lNmAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 
89,128. Similarly, Professor Choi and Guzman argue against what they refer to as the "extra­
territorial" application of U.S. securities law including its disclosure rules. See Choi & Guz­
man, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 221-23. 
107. See supra section 111.B. 
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that they have incentives to choose regimes that require less disclo­
sure than is in the best interests of these U.S. residents. 
Finally, use of the transaction location approach negatively in­
fluences the volume of transactions effected in the United States. 
Issuers, in deciding whether to offer, sell, or promote trading of 
their shares in the United States, know that doing so would result in 
imposition of the U.S. regime, the strictest in the world, and many 
do not want this. Reduced volume will have a negative impact on 
the one group of U.S. residents whose interests we have not yet 
considered, persons directly or indirectly associated with the securi­
ties industry or securities exchanges, since their rents depend on 
this volume. 
A. The Transaction Location Approach Gives U.S. Issuers 
Increasing Freedom to Choose Which Country's Regime Governs 
Them and Their Preference Is for a Regime Requiring Less 
Disclosure Than Is Socially Optimal 
1. The Issuer's Increasing Freedom to Choose Its 
Disclosure Regime 
Under the transaction location approach to statutory reach, a 
U.S. issuer's choice of where to offer, sell, and promote the trading 
of its securities will determine the disclosure regime under which it 
operates. Admittedly, other factors also influence this choice be­
sides its effect on what disclosure regime governs the issuer. Tradi­
tionally, for the typical U.S. issuer, U.S. residents have been their 
most likely potential investors. Moreover, U.S. residents have been 
significantly more likely to purchase shares that are offered and 
traded in the United States than those that are not. Combined, 
these two other factors have almost required such an issuer to have 
its shares offered and traded in the United States, however much 
the issuer is required to disclose as a result. The importance of 
these other factors is weakening, however. Financial information is 
becoming increasingly diffused globally, enlarging a U.S. issuer's 
pool of likely potential investors to include many foreigners. And 
the cost and difficulty of effecting orders abroad is going down, di­
minishing the bias of U.S. investors against shares not available in 
the U.S. market. As a result, a U.S. issuer's preference concerning 
its governing disclosure regime will, in the future, be of relatively 
greater importance in its choice of where to have its shares offered 
and traded than it is today.ms 
108. These changes are discussed in more detail infra in Part VI. 
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2. Market Failure: The Issuer's Preference for a Socially 
Suboptimal Disclosure Regime109 
747 
An issuer's entrepreneurs or managers are the individuals who 
actually choose where an issuer's shares are offered, sold, and 
traded. Consequently, under a transaction location approach, they 
choose which country's disclosure regime applies. It is their prefer­
ences on which we must focus. Greater disclosure involves both 
added costs and added benefits to them. Their preference will be 
for the regime that requires the issuer to disclose closest to the level 
at which the marginal increase in cost to them (the issuer's private 
marginal cost or PMC) equals the marginal increase in benefit to 
them (the issuer's private marginal benefit or PivIB). This point -
the issuer's "privately optimal level of disclosure" - will be below 
the issuer's socially optimal level of disclosure. This is because, as I 
show below, over the whole range of levels at which an issuer could 
disclose, the social marginal cost of the issuer's disclosure (SMC) is 
below its private marginal cost, and its social marginal benefit 
(SivIB) is above its private marginal benefit (PivIB).110 Tb.us, given 
the choice, the issuer's entrepreneurs or managers would prefer the 
issuer to be bound by a disclosure regime requiring less disclosure 
than is socially optimal. 
109. I discuss the matters considered in this subsection more extensively in Fox, 
Empowering Issuers, supra note 15. 
110. Over this whole range both SMC and PMC are assumed to be increasing and SMB 
and PMB are assumed to be decreasing. This somewhat stylized model thus involves the 
issuer disclosure level being measured cardinally and having associated with it a rising margi­
nal cost curve and a falling marginal benefit curve. This is a reasonable depiction of what in 
fact likely happens. The issuer first releases the piece of information that is most beneficial 
relative to its cost, then the piece of information that is next most beneficial relative to its 
cost, and so on. This corresponds to a situation where marginal private benefit is decreasing 
and marginal cost is increasing. Since there is no reason to believe that the differences be­
tween the marginal social benefit and marginal private benefit, or between the marginal so­
cial cost and marginal private cost, would increase substantially as an issuer discloses more, 






level of disclosure 
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PMB 
Socially optimal 
level of disclosure 
Level of disclosure 
a. Costs. For each individual U.S. issuer, a disclosure involves 
two different kinds of costs, "operational" costs and "interfirm" 
costs. Operational costs are the out of pocket expenses and diver­
sions of management and staff time that issuers suffer to provide 
the mandated information. Interfirm costs arise from the fact that 
the information provided can put the issuer at a disadvantage rela­
tive to its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers.111 
Operational costs are both private and social costs. Interfirm costs 
are only private costs. They are not social costs because the in­
terfirm disadvantages to the issuer from the disclosure are counter­
balanced by the advantages it confers on the other firms. An 
issuer's private marginal cost will therefore exceed its social margi­
nal cost at all levels of disclosure.112 Thus even managers who com-
111. A review of SEC Regulation S-K, which provides the questions that are incorpo­
rated by reference into its forms 10-K (periodic disclosure) and S-1 (initial public offering 
disclosure), shows that it calls for a wide variety of information the disclosure of which on the 
one hand would be useful for predicting an issuer's future cash flows, but on the other would 
hurt the issuer because of the advantages it confers on other firms. Examples include profits 
and sales of each significant individual line of business conducted by the issuer, future capital 
spending plans, research and development spending, cost ratios, liquidity constraints, and 
information on backlogs, inventories, and sources of supply. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 
CFR § 220.10l(a)(2)(iii)(B)(2); § 220.lOl(c)(l)(vi); § 229.lOl(b); § 229.lOl(c)(l)(iii); 
§ 229.lOl(c)(l)(viii); § 229.lOl(c)(l)(xi); § 229.303(a)(l); § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (1998). 
112. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); Coffee, supra 
note 10; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of 
Investors, 10 VA. L. REv. 669, 684-85 (1984); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of 
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763 (1995). 
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pletely identify with existing shareholders - managers for whom 
costs to the shareholders are equivalent to costs to them - would, 
if they were free to choose the disclosure level at which to bind the 
issuer, choose a level below the social optimum. 
This divergence between private cost and social cost becomes 
accentuated by the fact that disclosure increases the threat of a hos­
tile tender offer if managers do not act to maximize share value. 
This is because more disclosure makes a takeover less risky for po­
tential acquirors.113 This consequence of disclosure is not a cost to 
the issuer in terms of shareholder welfare; quite to the contrary. It 
is, however, a cost to an issuer's entrepreneurs or managers - its 
actual disclosure level decisionmakers - who would prefer to pur­
sue their personal goals under fewer constraints.114 
b. Benefits. The market failure associated with this diver­
gence between social and marginal cost is compounded on the ben­
efit side of the equation. The private marginal benefit associated 
with an issuer's disclosure will not equal its social marginal benefit 
unless (i) the social benefits of the level chosen are fully reflected in 
the issuer's share price, and (ii) this share price improvement is 
fully enjoyed by the persons making the choice - the issuer's en­
trepreneurs or managers. Under many circumstances one or both 
of these conditions will not be met and the private marginal benefit 
associated with an issuer's disclosure will be below the social margi­
nal benefit. 
Disclosure results in two major social benefits, improved choice 
of capital projects and reduced agency costs of management. 
i. Improved project choice. How disclosure improves choice 
among proposed new investment projects in the economy can be 
seen most easily in a simplified world in which each new investment 
project is undertaken by a new issuer that raises the necessary funds 
through an IPO. Ideally, society would want to implement all pro-
Professor Romano, who favors a system under which issuers can choose the regime by 
which they are bound, dismisses the importance of this difference between private and social 
costs, suggesting that it is "a tenuous rationale for securities regulation." See Romano, supra 
note 15, at 2426. 
113. See MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND lNouSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC 
ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PouCY 84-91 (1987). 
114. Greater managerial discipline would have a positive influence on share price. Ai; my 
discussion of private benefits immediately below indicates, however, while this share price 
improvement may derivatively be enjoyed by the entrepreneur or managers, in many cases 
this benefit would not be sufficient to cancel out the cost to them of having to work under 
greater discipline. See infra section IV.2.b.iii. 
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posed projects in rank order of their risk-adjusted expected returns 
- based on all available information including what is known by 
the entrepreneurs proposing each project. The marginal project 
that just exhausts society's scarce savings for investment would set 
the risk-adjusted expected return on capital. Whichever issuer's 
shares an investor purchased, she would receive a risk-adjusted ex­
pected return just equal to that of the marginal project. 
This ideal will not be achieved in the real world because some of 
the information possessed by the entrepreneurs proposing each 
project will not be public and hence not reflected in share price. 
Some projects inferior to what in the ideal world is the marginal 
project will be implemented because their issuers' share prices are 
inaccurately high. Likewise, some projects superior to the ideal 
world's marginal project will not be implemented because their is­
suers' share prices are inaccurately low. With these projects, a pub­
lic offering of even all of the issuer's equity would not produce 
sufficient cash to fund the project. 
An increase by all issuers in their disclosure would increase the 
accuracy of all of their prices. The resulting reduction in the 
number of such misallocations would be a social gain. The question 
for us, however, is what kind of incentives exist for the entrepre­
neurs of each individual issuer to produce the disclosure that is 
needed to achieve this social gain. In essence, to what extent is the 
social gain produced by a single issuer's increased disclosure re­
flected in its share price? 
If we were to pick one issuer at random and command an in­
crease in the amount of disclosure it provides, its entrepreneurs 
would not on averag� enjoy any perceptible gain. Its share price 
without the increased disclosure would be an unbiased estimate of 
the future cash returns to the shareholder and so would the share 
price with the increased disclosure.115 If, however, we were to ob­
serve an issuer self-selecting to provide more disclosure than other 
issuers provide, we would expect the issuer's share price to go up 
and its entrepreneurs to enjoy a greater entrepreneurial surplus. 
Market participants would reason that because the issuer's entre­
preneurs choose to reveal more, the issuer probably has better 
prospects relative to issuers disclosing less. 
Thus it is the fact that an issuer chooses to disclose, not disclo­
sure itself, that leads to the association between greater disclosure 
115. The issuer's increased disclosure may result in better capital allocation and hence 
influence the overall expected rate of return on capital at which this cash flow is discounted, 
but in a large economy with many proposed projects this price effect would be imperceptible. 
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and higher share price. This concept is the basis of signaling theory: 
issuers that have good news signal this fact by disclosing their news 
and those that do not have good news signal this fact by their inabil­
ity to make comparable disclosures.116 
While the signaling phenomenon means that the market will be 
better informed in a system of voluntary disclosure than might first 
appear, it will not be as well informed as if all issuers were com­
pelled to disclose at the higher level that some issuers choose volun­
tarily. Silence is not a complete substitute for disclosure because 
the market knows that there are reasons why an issuer will not dis­
close besides lack of good news.117 As we have seen, an issuer may 
choose not to disclose because revealing the information might put 
it in an inferior position vis a vis competitor, major supplier, or ma­
jor customer. 
Projects therefore are not as well chosen in a signaling world ­
where issuers are free to disclose or not and the market draws infer­
ences from the decision of the issuers that do not - as in a world 
where all issuers disclose at a high level. Moving from the first 
world to the second produces social benefits because the list of 
projects implemented would be closer to the ideal. The entrepre­
neurs that do not disclose at a high level in the first world would 
not, through higher prices, fully capture these social benefits from 
their increased disclosure in the second world. Part of the benefits 
would instead accrue to the entrepreneurs who disclose at a high 
level in both worlds, because the improved allocation of capital 
would mean a higher percentage of their projects would be imple­
mented. In essence, to price each IPO properly, the market needs 
information about all potential projects so that it can make the rele­
vant comparisons accurately. 
This public-goods aspect of issuer disclosure does not end here. 
There are other ways in which information disclosed by one issuer 
about itself can be useful in analyzing other issuers. It could, for 
example, reveal something about possible industry-wide trends.118 
Again, these are social benefits that the issuer disclosing the infor­
mation cannot appropriate through higher share price. 
116. Signaling theory is the theory of self-induced disclosure in the context of an IPO. No 
one has offered any other plausible argument as to why voluntary disclosure alone could be 
sufficient. The classic statement of signaling theory is found in Ross, supra note 10. 
117. See Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 112, at 687-88. 
118. See id. at 685. 
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ii. Reduced agency costs of management. A second benefit of 
issuer disclosure is a reduction in the extent to which managers of 
public corporations place their own interests above those of their 
shareholders. Here I am talking primarily not about disclosure at 
the time of an initial public offering but about what is provided pe­
riodically thereafter. Greater ongoing disclosure increases the ef­
fectiveness of the hostile takeover threat as a deterrent to such 
behavior.119 Disclosure also assists in the effective exercise of the 
shareholder franchise and in shareholder enforcement of :fiduciary 
duties. 
In determining the extent to which an issuer's entrepreneurs 
and managers will be able to capture the social benefits from its 
ongoing, post-IPO disclosure, we should start by observing that, 
like IPO disclosure, this information too has "public goods" as­
pects. It will aid both in the analysis of the prospects of issuers just 
going public with IPOs and in the disciplining of managers of other 
established public issuers through its assistance in the functioning of 
the takeover threat against them and of their share price based 
compensation incentives. These benefits will not be captured in the 
price of the individual issuer making the disclosure. 
In contrast, an issuer's share price should reflect the social bene­
fit arising from its disclosure's disciplining effect on its own manag­
ers. For private benefit to equal social benefit, however, the issuer's 
entrepreneurs or managers must fully capture this price improve­
ment. This can only happen if the issuer can bind itself at the time 
of its IPO in an ironclad way to provide periodic disclosure at a 
given level for the life of the finii. The higher the promised level, 
the less the market would expect management decisionmaking to 
deviate from what is in the shareholder's best interests and the 
higher, net of the costs of this disclosure, the market price for the 
issuer's initial offering. The entrepreneurs would capture this price 
improvement through its resulting dollar-for-dollar increase in the 
size of the entrepreneurial surplus.120 
Issuers operating under a transaction location system of statu­
tory reach, however, are not able to provide this kind of commit­
ment. Thus, the internalization of the benefits from the disciplinary 
effects of disclosure will not be complete because the market will 
not be confident that the issuer is totally bound to disclose at the 
119. The reduction in managerial discretion is, as discussed above, a direct cost to manag­
ers even though it produces social gains through better resource allocation. The question 
here is the extent to which entrepreneurs and managers feel these social gains. 
120. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 112, at 684. 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 753 
chosen level forever.121 The market knows that managers will be 
subsequently tempted to switch to a lower disclosure regime and, 
by switching where their shares trade, have the capability of doing 
so. This temptation arises because lower disclosure's reduction in 
the risk of takeover provides managers with room to make more 
decisions that satisfy their own objective functions at the expense of 
the interests of shareholders. 
Admittedly, when the managers switch to a lower disclosure re­
gime, the share price in the secondary market will decline because 
of the expected decline in managerial discipline. The managers, 
however, will often find the added takeover protection worth the 
share price decline.122 After all, their biggest concern with secon­
dary market share price is often the takeover threat. The switch 
would also increase the issuer's cost of seeking additional capital 
through new share issues. Many established firms, however, never 
raise new capital in this fashion. Even for those that do, the cost of 
the lower share price will largely or wholly be borne by the existing 
public shareholders, not the managers. 
3. Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that the transac­
tion location approach creates a potential market failure. The ap­
proach permits U.S. issuers to exercise their preferences as to which 
disclosure regime they wish to be governed by. Over time they will 
be increasingly likely to exercise this preference and, to the extent 
that they do, they will choose regimes requiring them to disclose 
less than is socially optimal. In essence, the same reasons that call 
for the maintenance of a mandatory disclosure regime in the first 
place call for its statutory reach not to be determined on a transac­
tion location basis. Assuming that U.S. officials attempt to act in 
the best interests of the United States in setting the level of re­
quired disclosure,123 this market failure means that the transaction 
121. As a result, the case for signaling theory is inherently harder to make for periodic 
disclosure than IPO disclosure. Steven Ross, in his classic exposition of the theory, assumes 
that managers are a dollar better off for every dollar they increase the value of the firm. See 
Ross, supra note 10, at 185. Any story as to why this might be so in the case of periodic 
disclosure is much more complicated than in the case of an IPO, since, unlike the IPO, the 
entrepreneurs are not in essence selling a portion of the equity of the company previously 
belonging to them. 
122. Managerial share ownership and stock options can ameliorate, but not eliminate, 
this problem. Since such holdings constitute only a fraction of the issuer's outstanding shares 
- in most cases a small fraction - most of the reduction in share value from non-share­
value maximizing decisions is externalized onto other persons. 
123. This is a reasonable and conventional assumption in a study of the regulation of 
behavior with transnational effects. Even if U.S. officials have a bias toward requiring too 
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location approach will, compared to the issuer nationality approach, 
lower U.S. welfare. 
B. The Transaction Location Approach Will Reduce the Volume 
of Share Transactions Effected in the United States 
1. The Transaction Location Approach Will Discourage Issuers 
With Privately Optimal Disclosure Levels Below What Is Required 
by the U.S. Regime from Entering the U.S. Market 
The United States has the strictest disclosure regime in the 
world.124 A transaction location approach to the reach of this re­
gime would, compared to the issuer nationality approach, reduce 
the volume of share transactions effected in the United States and 
thus lower the welfare of U.S. residents whose rents depend on this 
volume. The transaction location approach determines whether an 
issuer is subject to the U.S. disclosure regime based on whether or 
not the issuer's shares are offered, sold, or traded in the United 
States. Such a policy will discourage the entrepreneurs or managers 
of any issuer having a privately optimal disclosure level below U.S. 
requirements from establishing a U.S. market for its shares. The 
additional disclosure to meet U.S. requirements would involve 
more costs than benefits to them. 
The typical foreign issuer is going to fall into that group. The 
starting point for seeing why is the fact, just established, that every 
issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure is lower than its socially 
optimal level. The next step is that the socially optimal level of 
disclosure of the typical foreign issuer is, in turn, lower than the 
socially optimal level of the typical U.S. issuer. This is because issu­
ers from different countries, as discussed in more detail in Part V, 
show significant divergences in terms of both their internal decision 
structures and external environments. These divergences suggest 
differences in the extent to which disclosure will be effective in 
helping to align managerial and shareholder interests and to assure 
the best choice of proposed real investment projects. For a variety 
of reasons, disclosure is likely to be less effective in these regards 
high a level of disclosure, as might be predicted by public choice theory, the transaction 
location approach will still lower U.S. welfare unless the bias is so strong that the required 
level is more suboptimally high than the level chosen by issuers is suboptimally low. These 
points are discussed in more detail infra in Part VII. 
124. See supra note 103 and infra note 149. 
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with foreign issuers than with U.S. issuers, and so the socially opti­
mal level of disclosure will be lower for the typical foreign issuer.125 
The last step is that each country can appropriately be assumed 
to regulate in its own best interest. Thus the level of disclosure re­
quired by the U.S. regime will be an unbiased estimate of what is 
socially optimal for the typical U.S. issuer. We will examine this 
assumption in more detail in Part VII, where I argue that it is the 
reasonable and conventional one to make in a study of the regula­
tion of behavior with transnational effects. Moreover, as we will 
see, to the extent that this assumption has been subject to criticism, 
it is that the U.S. required level is too high, not too low. Thus it is 
safe to say that the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime is 
at or above the socially optimal level for the typical U.S. issuer. 
In sum, a substantial majority of foreign issuers will be discour­
aged from making their shares available in the U.S. market under 
the transaction location approach. This is because the typical for­
eign issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure is well below what 
is required by the U.S. regime. Its private level is below its socially 
optimal level, which is below the socially optimal level for the typi­
cal U.S. firm, which, in turn, is at or below the U.S. requirements. 
Under the transaction location approach, a significant number 
of U.S. issuers will be discouraged from having a U.S. market for 
their shares as well. The reason for that discouragement closely re­
sembles the reason for foreign issuers. Every U.S. issuer will have a 
privately optimal disclosure level that is below its socially optimal 
one. The level required by the U.S. regime will be at or above the 
socially optimal level of the typical U.S. issuer. Thus the typical 
U.S. issuer would prefer to be bound by a disclosure regime requir­
ing less than the level required by the U.S. regime. Under the 
transaction location approach, the impact of this preference on an 
issuer's choice of where to offer, sell, and promote the trading of its 
securities may not be great today, but, as discussed above, it will 
grow.126 This is because of a likely weakening over time of the 
other factors that influence this choice, as financial information be­
comes increasingly diffused globally and the cost and difficulty of 
effecting orders abroad goes down. 
125. There is no reason to believe that the typical foreign issuer's costs would be compa­
rably lower as well, and so social marginal cost should equal social marginal benefit at a 
lower level of disclosure than with the typical U.S. issuer. 
126. See supra section IV.A.1 and infra Part VI. 
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2. Issuers Having Privately Optimal Disclosure Levels at or 
Above What Is Required by the U.S. Regime Will Not Be 
Attracted to the U.S. Market by the Transaction Location 
Approach 
Most of the world's issuers of any significance would want to 
have their shares offered and traded in the United States absent 
such transactions triggering imposition of the U.S. regime. This is 
because United States markets provide better access to U.S. resi­
dents, the biggest single pool of investors in the world. U.S. ex­
changes also provide superior execution to that of their foreign 
counterparts.127 Consequently, issuers with privately optimal dis­
closure levels at or above the level required by the U.S. regime 
would have their shares offered and traded in the U.S. market 
whether or not that resulted in imposition of the U.S. regime. Thus 
the transaction location approach does nothing to attract such issu­
ers, because they will be in the U.S. market regardless. 
The approach fails to attract such issuers for another reason as 
well. At least as far as periodic Exchange Act disclosure is con­
cerned, nothing appears to prevent such issuers from registering 
their shares, and hence gaining the advantages of binding them­
selves to the world's strictest regime, whether or not their shares 
trade in the United States.128 
3. Conclusion 
The transaction location approach to statutory reach reduces 
the volume of share transactions effected in the United States and 
thus the welfare of U.S. residents whose rents depend on such vol­
ume (those associated with the securities industry and the ex­
changes ) .  The approach discourages all issuers whose 
entrepreneurs or managers find that their costs of compliance with 
the U.S. regime are greater than their benefits, a group that proba­
bly includes a substantial majority of all the world's issuers. And it 
127. Tue total costs of executing a trade (including the effect of the order itself on the 
price) is significantly lower on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ than on foreign 
markets. See Amar Bhide, Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance, HARV. Bus. RE.v., Nov.­
Dec. 1994, at 129; Joel Chernoff, London Trading Costs Rise, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 
25, 1994, at 20; 
128. Professors Choi and Guzman argue that an issuer having its shares trade in the 
United States would, under the transaction location approach, econoinically communicate to 
the market that the issuer is disclosing at the U.S. level. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous 
Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 229-30. This is true. However, the mere fact of registra­
tion alone econoinically communicates the same thing and, under the efficient market hy­
pothesis, should be fully reflected in share price even if not all market participants are aware 
of it. 
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does nothing to attract issuers for whom the benefits from compli­
ance do equal or exceed the costs. This second group of issuers is 
likely to have their shares trade in the United States whatever ap­
proach to statutory reach the United States adopts. In any event, 
members of this second group can register their shares under the 
Exchange Act and obtain the benefits of compliance without having 
their shares trade in the United States. 
V. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH 
OVER ANY ACHIEVABLE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
A. National Differences in Issuer Decision Structures 
There are likely to be important differences among issuers 
worldwide in terms of the level of disclosure that will maximize the 
returns (net the costs of this disclosure) that their capital utilizing 
productive activities generate. These differences in their socially 
optimal disclosure levels are significantly related to the nationalities 
of the issuers involved. 
The operating and project choice decisions of an issuer that is 
publicly held or is seeking public financing are the product of both 
the internal decision making structure of the issuer and the external 
environment that provides the inputs that make this structure func­
tion - most important for our concerns, shareholder votes and new 
capital. The internal decision making structure arises out of a com­
bination of the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation and the is­
suer country's traditional business customs and practices.129 The 
129. For a classic survey of the differences among countries in terms of these internal 
decisionmaking structures, see Al.FRED F. CONARD, CoRPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
See also MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1976). The statutory differences among countries are obvious, but differences in traditional 
business customs and practices are also important in determining these internal decisionmak­
ing structures. 
The influence of traditional business customs and practices is reflected in part in differ­
ences among countries in their corporations' typical basic constitutive documents (their arti­
cles of incorporation or equivalent). Large, publicly held corporations of a given country are 
likely to have constitutive documents that have more in co=on with each other than with 
those of corporations of other countries. This is in part because the "network externalities" 
associated with hay;.ng sinillar constitutive documents are stronger domestically than transna­
tionally. There is a degree of path dependency in the development of typical terms for any 
given country, and the factors that determine the starting point have chance qualities that will 
vary from one country to another. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995). 
The influence of traditional business customs and practices are reflected as well in the 
behavior that occurs within the legal structure set up by statute and the basic constitutive 
documents. Thus, for example, the board of directors of the typical U.S. public corporation is 
given the power to manage the corporation and direct its policy, but traditionally the board 
has done neither. This is in part because of the limited amount of time that outside directors 
have expected to devote to the job, the limited amount of information they have expected to 
receive and review, and their reluctance to meet separately from full-time management. See 
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external environment is determined by a number of factors includ­
ing the degree of concentration of share ownership, the nature of 
the holders of any such concentrated blocks, the rules and practices 
under which these holders use their voting power singly and in co­
operation with others, the extent to which the legal system and sup­
pliers of finance facilitate or hinder hostile takeovers, and the 
relative availability of financing in different forms (equity versus 
debt) and from different sources (private versus public markets). 
Comparative corporate governance has become an important 
subject for legal and financial scholars in recent years and the re­
sulting studies show significant contrasts among countries in both 
internal decision structures and external environments.130 These 
contrasts suggest differences in the extent to which disclosure will 
be effective in helping to align managerial and shareholder interests 
and in assuring the best choice of real investment projects. That, in 
turn, suggests that the optimal level of disclosure, where the social 
marginal benefits just equal the social marginal costs, may be higher 
in one country than in another. 
By way of illustration, a set of rough contrasts can be made be­
tween, on the one hand, the United States and Canada (and, to a 
lesser extent, the United Kingdom), which have relatively strict dis­
closure regimes, and, on the other, Germany and Japan, which have 
more lax ones.131 These contrasts suggest significant differences in 
the value of disclosure. Voting power in U.S. issuers is less concen­
trated, and institutional investors in U.S. issuers are less inclined, 
separately or together, to exercise their voting power to influence 
JOHN c. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 12-18 {1945); EISENBERG, supra, at 139-
48; ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LAROE CORPORATION 79-146 {2d 
ed. 1961); MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY {1971); Bayless Manning, The 
Business Judgment Rule and The Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 
1477 {1984). Starting in the early 1990s, however, some boards have begun to take a more 
aggressive stance, as indicated by the firing of some prominent chief executives. See, e.g., 
Brett D. Fromson, American Express: Anatomy of a Coup, WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1993, at 
Al; Doron P. Levin, Stempel Quits Job As Top G.M. Officer in Rift with Board, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Steve Lohr, Big Business in Turmoil: Upheavals at I.B.M., Sears and 
Elsewhere Underline Fundamental Shifts in Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al; Steve 
Lohr, I.B.M. to Replace Its Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al. While increased 
pressure by institutional investors is an important factor in this shift, it appears to reflect as 
well an underlying change in business culture as directors reconceptualize their role and 
change their expectations concerning the time they devote to the job, the information they 
receive, and their overall separateness from their companies' full-time managers. 
130. See, e.g., MARK J. RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
RooTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE {1994); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 
1997 (1994). 
131. See infra note 149. 
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corporate decisions.132 Debt/equity ratios are lower133 and there is 
more use of publicly offered equity as a source of finance,134 partic­
ularly by relatively new companies financing major projects. Hos­
tile tender offers are more frequent, as are solicitations of public 
shareholders in proxy fights.135 In contrast, in Germany and Japan, 
132. See, e.g., RoE, supra note 130, at 22, 169-70. 
133. See, e.g., F.X. Browne, Corporate finance: stylized facts and tentative explanations, 26 
APPLIED EcoN. 485, 488 (1994) ("[Non-financial f]inns in securities-based financial systems 
{the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada . . .  ) have quite low debt/equity ratios 
compared to those in the bank-based systems of Japan, Germany and France."). 
134. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 133, at 494 (stating that internal funding is significantly 
greater in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada than in Japan and continental 
Europe). 
135. With respect to Germany, for example, see RoE, supra note 130, at 172. According 
to Roe, a concentration of voting power in the hands of banks makes an American style 
proxy fight nearly impossible. German banks maintain control over stock in three ways: (1) 
they own the stock themselves; (2) they control mutual funds, which own stock; and, most 
importantly, (3) they possess authority to vote stock that the bank's brokerage customers 
own, but deposit with the bank. See also Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Take­
overs: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 
FORDHAM L. REv. 161, 181 (1992); Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy 
Machinery in Germany, Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of 
American Corporate Finance, 58 U. Pm. L. REv. 145, 181-82 (1996). 
The difficulty of conducting a hostile takeover offer in Germany is illustrated by Pirelli's 
well publicized 1991 attempt to take over the German tire company Continental, the only 
attempt to take over a major German firm in recent memory. Continental recruited Ger­
many's largest co=ercial bank to mount its takeover defense and persuaded other German 
companies, such as Daimler-Benz, to purchase large quantities of its stock. When sharehold­
ers repealed a five percent cap on individual shareholder voting, Continental successfully 
challenged the action in the German courts. Pirelli reportedly spent $290 million in connec­
tion with the failed merger. See Ferdinand Protzman, Costly German Lesson: Pirelli's Failed 
Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at D2; Mark R. Wmgerson & Christopher H. Dom, 
Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 
1992 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 250; Tire Maker Calls Off Merger Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
1991, at D5. 
The absence of hostile takeovers in Japan has been noted by many co=entators. A 
number of writers point out that because of a complex network of inter-corporate and bank 
equity holdings, it is exceedingly difficult for outside companies to acquire controlling blocks 
of shares in a target company. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management 
Buyouts, 65 TUI.. L. REv. 57, 83 n.74 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: 
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1299-300 (1991); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions 
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 328 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corpo­
rate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 81, 100 (1995); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the 
Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INrL. L. 423, 
437-38 (1994). 
It is a matter of debate whether these hostile takeover defeating stockholding arrange­
ments represent a mechanism for self-serving management entrenchment, as some of these 
co=entators imply, or an efficient response to the complex problem of corporate govern­
ance. Mark Ramseyer has argued that the lack of hostile takeovers in Japan might illustrate 
some of the inefficiencies inherent in the hostile takeover mechanism. Ramseyer argues that 
hostile takeovers, by allowing shareholders to renege on implicit bargains struck with man­
agement, allow shareholders to capture any organizational rent the firm earns. Moreover, 
Ramseyer suggests that in reducing the levels of future managerial compensation, hostile 
takeovers reduce the incentives for managers to make firm-specific investments. See J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. 
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institutional investors play a larger role both in monitoring manage­
rial behavior136 and in supplying finance, mostly debt.137 
B. National Practice Reflects Resulting Differences in Optimal 
Disclosure Levels 
The picture painted here suggests that the socially optimal level 
of disclosure for U.S. issuers would be higher than for German and 
Japanese ones. U.S. institutional investors monitor less carefully 
the way managers of U.S. issuers make both operating and project 
choice decisions. They collect, analyze, and act on less information 
(both public and non-public) concerning these matters. Thus, more 
of the work of aligning managerial and shareholder interests with 
respect to these decisions falls to the hostile takeover threat and 
share price based managerial compensation, both of which are as­
sisted by greater public disclosure. Greater disclosure and its en­
hancement of share price accuracy is also of more assistance to 
good project choice in the United States because of the greater reli­
ance by U.S. "start-up" companies on the public equity markets.138 
The choice of required disclosure levels by these different countries 
conforms with what this rough illustration calls for. The United 
States and Canada require the most, Germany and Japan the least, 
with the United Kingdom somewhere in between.139 
C. Implications for the Likelihood of an International Regime 
The preceding discussion suggests that there are different opti­
mal levels of disclosure for issuers of different countries and that 
countries have recognized and acted on these differences. This 
makes unlikely the adoption of an international regime imposing a 
REv. 1 (1987); see also Corrine A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corpora­
tions: ls Bank Monitoring the Answer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 292 (1993) (sug­
gesting that Japan may not need hostile takeovers since greater bank involvement in 
corporate management is more efficient than the takeover market discipline system of the 
United States). 
136. See RoE, supra note 130, at 169 (noting that senior managers in Germany and Japan 
share power with active intermediaries who control large blocks of a company's stock). 
137. Japanese firms borrow $5.33 from banks for every dollar they raise in the capital 
markets, German firms $4.20, and American firms $0.85. See Macey & Miller, supra note 
135, at 85, 89. 
138. Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black show that the prospect of a vibrant market for 
initial public offerings in the United States for issuers that have shown a certain degree of 
success greatly facilitates the earlier provision of venture capital to get them off the ground in 
the first place. This, they argue, explains why there is so much more venture capital available 
in the United States. See Ronald Gilson & Bernard Black, Venture Capital and the Structure 
of Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcoN. 243 (1998). 
139. See supra note 103; infra note 149. 
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uniform level of disclosure for all issuers around the world: 
whatever level might be proposed, it will, for most countries, be 
inferior - either too high or too low - compared to the level 
called for by their current regimes. Most countries would therefore 
be disinclined to agree to adoption of the regime. For some of 
them, there would be some attractions as well to having a uniform 
international regime, but, as discussed below, these attractions 
would, for now, in most cases appear insufficient to overcome their 
likely opposition. 
1. Administrative Convenience 
The primary attraction of a uniform international regime cited 
by commentators is administrative convenience: issuers would be 
saved from having to comply with multiple national regimes.14o 
This problem is also avoided, however, by a nationally based system 
of disclosure regulation as long as the countries use the issuer na­
tionality approach to statutory reach advocated here. In fact, a na­
tionally based system using the issuer nationality approach would 
be significantly more convenient administratively than an interna­
tional regime since dealings between the entrepreneurs or manag­
ers of the issuers and the officials regulating them would be 
between persons who share a common culture and understanding 
of business practices.141 
2. Common Language 
A second possible attraction of an international regime would 
be the creation of a common language and format used by all issu­
ers around the world in their mandated disclosure. Having a group 
of issuers use the same language and format facilitates comparisons 
and makes communicating at any given level of precision more eco­
nomical for both the sender and receiver. Indeed, this is one ration-
140. See, e.g., Release No. 6568, supra note 21 (suggesting agreement among several 
countries on a single prospectus format and co=on disclosure standards as one possible 
approach to facilitating multinational offerings); see also John M. Fontecchio, The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services: Is It the Answer to Creating a Harmonized Global Securities 
System?, 20 N.C. J. lNn.. LAW & CoM. REG. 115, 123 (1994) (suggesting that GATS be con­
sidered as a means to pull the governments of the world toward a harmonized global securi­
ties market); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The 
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HAR.v. !Nn.. L.J. 185, 187 (1990). 
141. Professors Panto and Karmel conducted a survey of foreign issuers that had regis­
tered their shares with the SEC. Their results provide an example of this kind of problem. 
Some of the surveyed issuers complained that the SEC staff was unfamiliar with the business, 
accounting and legal practices in their countries, thereby generating more lawyer involve­
ment and expense. See PANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 32-35. 
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ale for mandatory disclosure in the first place.142 Without any 
regulation, each of the tens of thousands of public issuers around 
the world would be speaking its own language. Already today with 
national regulation, however, this babel is being largely reduced to 
"languages" associated respectively with the regimes of the rela­
tively small number of major capitalist countries. A major portion 
of the capitalized value of the world's publicly traded equities is 
issued by issuers subject to these regimes.143 There is evidence that 
a sufficient number of speculators are "multilingual" that share 
price accuracy for these issuers will not be significantly enhanced by 
further movement to the single language of an international disclo­
sure regime.144 
3. Transborder Externalities 
The third possible attraction to a global regime arises from posi­
tive transborder externalities in a nationally based system produced 
by the disclosures of each country's issuers. These externalities, 
which would be eliminated under a global regime, bias each coun-
142. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 112, at 685-87. They argue that while stan­
dardized information fosters comparison across investments, no firm will offer such informa­
tion on its own because the benefits of comparison spill over to the firm's competitors. They 
suggest that mandatory disclosure rules promulgated by the government are one form of 
collective action available to solve this problem. 
143. At year-end 1994, seven countries-the United States, Canada, the United King­
dom, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany-together accounted for 75% of the world's total 
market capitalization of nearly $15.2 trillion. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 
EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 1995, at 15 (1995). 





















See id. (based on data presented in the Developed Markets capitalization chart). 
144. One way to test this proposition is to compare, for foreign issuers listed on a U.S. 
exchange, the response of their share prices when they originally announce their earnings 
prepared on the basis of home country conventions, with the response of their share prices 
when they subsequently announce these earnings reconciled with U.S. GAAP. Gary Meek 
performed such a test and found that the price response to the first announcement suggests it 
has considerable information value, while the price response to the second announcement 
suggests that it does not add anything significant. See Gary K. Meek, U.S. Securities Market 
Responses to Alternate Earnings Disclosures of Non-U.S. Multinational Corporations, THE 
Acer. REv., Apr. 1983, at 394. 
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try's decision concerning its level of required disclosure toward a 
level lower than what is optimal from a global welfare perspective. 
While real, this attraction is probably not sufficient to overcome the 
obstacles to a uniform regime. 
a. The trarzsborder externality bias. To understand the bias in­
duced by transborder externalities, recall from Part IV that for each 
individual issuer, disclosure involves two different kinds of costs, 
"interfirm" costs and "operational costs."145 Interfirm costs arise 
from the fact that the information provided can put the issuer at a 
disadvantage relative to its competitors, major suppliers, and major 
customers. They are not, in general, social costs because the disad­
vantage to the issuer is counterbalanced by the advantages con­
ferred on the other firms. For the typical issuer, as long as it and its 
competitors, major suppliers, and customers are all subject to the 
same regime, the existence of a mandatory disclosure regime in­
volves a wash in terms of these interfirm disadvantages and advan­
tages. Where this is the case for all issuers subject to regulation, 
national officials, in determining what level of disclosure will maxi­
mize national welfare, can ignore interfi.rm costs and focus on the 
tradeoff between greater disclosure's efficiency gains from better 
management and project choice, on the one hand, and its higher 
operational costs, on the other. 
In a world with international trade and multinational corporate 
operations, however, some of an issuer's competitors and major 
suppliers and customers may not share the issuer's nationality and 
so will not be subject to the same disclosure regime as the issuer is. 
This problem biases a national government downward when it sets 
its required disclosure level because it knows that its issuers will 
suffer all of the interfirm costs, but receive only part of the interfirm 
advantages, from the disclosures it mandates. Thus, in calculating 
the optimal level of disclosure in terms of the welfare of its resi­
dents, it will consider not only its operational costs but also the 
cross-border portion of interfirm costs. 
The cross-border interfirm costs that national governments con­
sider in their calculations are not, however, social costs from a 
global welfare point of view. Each issuer's interfi.rm disadvantages 
from disclosing information will be fully counterbalanced by advan­
tages to its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers, once 
foreign as well as domestic firms are included in the calculation. 
145. See supra section IV.A.2.a. 
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Thus global welfare would be enhanced if the officials determining 
required disclosure levels did not consider cross-border interfi.rm 
costs. 
b. The improbability of a single, uniform regime solution. 
Creation of a single, uniform international regime would eliminate 
consideration of all interfi.rm costs. Each of the world's issuers 
would then be subject to the same regime as all of its competitors, 
major suppliers, and major customers.146 Thus the same officials 
would determine the required disclosure level for all of them, and 
the decision setting their level of disclosure would be subject to no 
externalities.147 
There is good reason to believe, however, that this third attrac­
tion of a uniform regime, while the most real, will be insufficient to 
gain the agreement of all parties. To start, the gain from eliminat­
ing externalities is probably less than the problem with a uniform 
international regime that led to our skepticism about its adoptabil­
ity in the first place. An indication that these externalities are not a 
matter of intense concern is the fact that large U.S. corporations 
146. This problem could theoretically be solved without scrapping the world's current 
nationally based system of regulation. An international agreement could provide that each 
country would receive a subsidy for the interfirm advantages abroad arising from its chosen 
level of mandatory disclosure. This would eliminate the bias toward underdisclosure, while 
preserving the capacity to tailor mandated disclosure levels to reflect national differences 
among the world's issuers. Like any global welfare enhancing proposal, such an agreement is 
potentially attractive to all parties because, at least in theory, it is possible to split up the 
consequent wealth gain in a way that leaves every country better off. Such an ngreement 
seems very unlikely, however. Just as a threshold matter, it is hard to imagine a consensus 
forming on a way of measuring extraterritorial interfirm advantages. 
147. The elimination of the externalities results from the fact that the regime is interna· 
tional, not that it is uniform. My colleague James Krier has made the point in the context of 
federal versus state environmental regulation that the United States could have federal regu· 
lation but with non-uniform standards. This would eliminate externalities while permitting 
rules to be tailored to the particular regulatory costs and benefits of each area. See James E. 
Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA 
L. REv. 323, 328-30 (1974); James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental 
Standards in a Federal System - and Why it Matters, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1226, 1236-37 (1995). 
In theory, the same could be said about international versus national regulation of disclo· 
sure, but some critical differences render the idea inapplicable here. Compared to federal 
officials assessing the environmental situation in the states, international officials are likely to 
be at a much greater distance - physically, culturally, linguistically, and experientially -
from the particular features in each country that lead to differences in regulatory costs and 
benefits of disclosure regulation. Also, these distances matter more since the national differ· 
ences in the disclosure area are entirely institutional whereas in the state, differences in the 
environmental area are, to some extent, physical and more describable in generally accepted 
technical terms. Most importantly, there is no overarching world governmental organization 
that would enhance the political accountability of international disclosure regulation officials 
in a way comparable to the role of the federal government in the lives of federal environmen­
tal regulators. This kind of accountability would be essential in a system where the officials 
were making decisions about differential treatment based on different national needs and 
transborder effects. 
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have voiced almost no opposition to propqsals by the New York 
Stock Exchange to permit the listing of major foreign issuers with­
out reconciling their :financials to U.S. generally accepted account­
ing practices.148 
Assume for argument, however, that the externality problem, 
which a uniform regime eliminates, is in fact more serious than the 
untailored disclosure level problem that a uniform regime creates, 
so that a uniform regime would lead to a global wealth gain. Even 
then, adoption is unlikely. Many countries - the ones whose cur­
rent required disclosure levels are lower than the uniform level of 
the international regime - would still in fact lose, not gain, from 
elimination of the externality. Issuers from these countries would 
be hurt two ways. First, their increased disclosure would increase 
the harm they suffer as a result of competitors, major customers, 
and major suppliers abroad finding out additional things about 
them. Second, they would find out less about their competitors, 
major suppliers, and major customers that are from countries whose 
current required disclosure levels are higher than the uniform one. 
Admittedly, with a global wealth gain, the winning countries' gains 
would more than match the losing countries' losses. And so, in the­
ory, transfers could be arranged from the winners to the losers that 
would leave every country better off. Effecting such transfers 
would be difficult as a practical matter, however. Unlike a trade 
pact, for example, adoption of a uniform regime would not involve 
a complex of terms each of which has its own distinct pattern of 
impacts on the necessary parties, so that every party can be given 
enough points of particular importance to it to find the agreement 
as a whole worthwhile. 
148. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) are negotiating a proposal that would allow foreign issuers to 
list their shares on U.S. exchanges by following international rather than U.S. accounting 
standards. The New York Stock Exchange has been instrumental in moving the proposal 
forward. It has found a sympathetic ear with Congress, which provided in the National Se­
curities Market Improvement Act of 1996 that the SEC prepare within one year a report "on 
progress in the development of international accounting standards and the outlook for suc­
cessful completion of a set of international standards that would be acceptable to the Com­
mission for offerings and listings by foreign corporations in United States markets." Pub. L. 
No. 104-290, § 509, 110 stat. 3416, 3449 (1996). The SEC staff, however, has stated that the 
Commission will not accept international accounting standards which depart significantly 
from the philosophy, coverage, and specificity of U.S. standards. See Richard Leftwich, Ob­
stacles to Global Accounting Deal, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1997 (Mastering Fmance Supple­
ment), at 2. A search of the popular press reveals no opposition from large U.S. corporations 
to the Exchange-backed plan despite the fact that foreign issuers would be required to dis­
close Jess than U.S. corporations must. The New York Stock Exchange does note objection 
by U.S. accountants and foreign issuers already using U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles. See Jim Kelly, World Accounting Wins More Converts, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 1997, 
at 4. 
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VI. How GLOBALIZATION INCREASES POLITICAL PRESSURE TO 
LOWER U.S. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS UNDER THE INVESTOR 
RESIDENCY AND LOCATION OF TRADE APPROACHES BUT NOT 
UNDER THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH 
We have just seen that the issuer nationality approach to select­
ing issuers covered by the U.S. regime will result in a higher level of 
U.S. economic welfare than will the investor residency or location 
of trade approaches, at least under the simplifying assumption in 
Parts III-V that the choice of approach will not affect the future 
content of that regime. In fact, though, the choice of approach will 
affect the regime's future content. Thus, the welfare implications of 
the choice of approach are more complex than they have been por­
trayed so far. Consideration of this more complex picture, how­
ever, ultimately reinforces the conclusion that issuer nationality is 
the superior approach to statutory reach. 
The United States has the strictest mandatory disclosure regime 
of all the major capitalist states.149 In these last two parts of the 
149. The United Kingdom is a critical country for comparison with the United States. 
The United Kingdom is the home of the International Stock Exchange (formerly the London 
Stock Exchange), which, along with the New York Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, is one of the world's three major stock exchanges. The United Kingdom is consid­
ered by the SEC to have disclosure requirements that are closer to those of the United States 
than those of other countries (except Canada). See Release No. 6568, supra note 21. Never­
theless, a detailed comparison between the disclosure requirements of the United States and 
the United Kingdom for companies that issue equity securities reveals that the U.S. requires 
significantly more information. Differences in requirements include the amount of detail that 
must be provided describing the nature of the issuer's business, the need to provide data 
concerning the results of the different lines of business in which the issuer participates, the 
need to discuss trends that management identifies as affecting the issuer's future liquidity, 
capital needs or operating results, and the need to provide information about management 
compensation and share ownership. See SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities 
Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. 
J. lNTL. L. & PoL. 457, 459-68 (1987); see also GEORGE BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
D1scLosuRE IN 1HE UK AND 1HE USA 20-21, 37 {1976); Report of the Staff of the U.S. Secur­
ities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban 
Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the Internationalization of the 
Securities Market III-91 (1987) [hereinafter SEC Internationalization Report]. European 
countries in general put much less emphasis on full disclosure. See Peter Widmer, The U.S. 
Securities Laws - Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant), 1 J. 
CoMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978). Japan, the home of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has a 
securities statute that closely parallels the Securities Act and the Exchange Act of the United 
States. However, the staff responsible for promulgating and implementing regulations and 
enforcement is very small compared to that of the SEC, and many provisions of the statute 
are treated as inoperative. The emphasis is on de facto screening of issuers by regulatory 
authorities rather than full disclosure. See Kunio Hamada & Keiji Matsumoto, Securities 
Transaction Law in General, in 5 DoING BusINESs IN JAPAN VIII 1-1, §§ 1.02[1] and 1.02[4] 
{Zenturo Kitagawa ed., 1987); SEC Internationalization Report, supra, at III-127. 
The United States, in addition to having a set of regulations and an administrative appara­
tus that solicit more information from issuers than those of other countries, has a liability 
system as well that prods more information out of issuers. Under Section 11 of the Securities 
Act, the issuer is absolutely liable for materially false or Inisleading statements in the regis­
tration statement. The underwriter is liable as well unless it sustains the burden of proof that 
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paper, I show that in the face of increasing globalization, a relaxa­
tion of this regime is likely if the United States stays on its current 
path of determining statutory reach in significant part on the basis 
of residency of the buyers and the place where the transactions oc­
cur. This relaxation will be the consequence of increasing political 
pressure by persons seeking to maximize the number of transac­
tions effected in the United States, most significantly persons asso­
ciated with the U.S. securities industry and the U.S. exchanges. 
This relaxation will occur even if, as seems likely, it diminishes U.S. 
welfare. A switch to a pure issuer nationality approach would avoid 
these pressures and hence this welfare diminishing relaxation. 
This Part analyzes how, without the switch to the issuer nation­
ality approach, the level of U.S. disclosure requirements is inversely 
related to the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. (at least in 
the absence of reaction by other countries) and how growing 
globalization will increase the sensitivity of this inverse relationship. 
Growing globalization will therefore increase political pressure to 
relax the requirements since, with this increased sensitivity, a given 
decrease in the level of required disclosure will lead to a larger im­
provement in U.S. volume. 
Securities globalization consists of two trends. First, investors 
everywhere will be at a diminishing information disadvantage con­
cerning issuers from other countries. Second, effecting share trans­
actions abroad will become increasingly inexpensive and easy. As a 
result of these trends, the market for securities of issuers of any 
significance will become an increasingly global one in the future. If 
the United States switches to a pure issuer nationality approach, as 
recommended here, this trend toward globalization will not result 
in any pressures to reduce the rigor of the U.S. mandatory disclo­
sure regime. If, however, the U.S. adheres to its current approach, 
with its emphasis on investor residency and transaction location, 
these same trends will increasingly have just that result. 
Why this disparity in result? When issuers choose whether or 
not to have their shares offered, sold, or traded in the United 
States, they may be sensitive, to one extent or another, to the level 
of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. The greater this sensitiv­
ity, the greater the number of issuers that, while unwilling to have 
their shares offered or traded in the United States under current 
after conducting a reasonable investigation ("due diligence"), it had reason to believe and 
did believe that the registration statement contained no materially false or misleading state­
ments. The liability system in the United Kingdom, for example, is not as far reaching. See 
SEC Internationalization Report, supra, at III-116. 
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U.S. disclosure standards, would be willing to do so if these stan­
dards were relaxed by some given amount. Thus greater issuer sen­
sitivity leads to a greater desire to have the U.S. standards relaxed 
by interests whose well being depends on the volume of transac­
tions effected in the United States. Globalization's effect on this 
sensitivity will depend on the approach the United States adopts to 
statutory reach. 
A. The Issuer Nationality Approach 
Under a pure issuer nationality approach, an issuer's choice of 
whether or not to have its shares offered or traded in the United 
States would have no impact on whether the U.S. regime would 
apply to it. Thus, with regard to this choice, issuers are completely 
insensitive to the required disclosure level of the U.S. regime. The 
regime would either apply or not, depending on factors entirely in­
dependent of this choice. Since the U.S. regime's required level of 
disclosure is irrelevant to issuers' choices as to where to have their 
shares offered and traded, it has no effect on the volume of transac­
tions effected in the United States. Globalization in no way 
changes this and so, as it intensifies, persons whose welfare depends 
on this volume will not put increased pressure on U.S. officials to 
lower U.S. disclosure requirements. 
The desensitizing effect of a switch to the issuer nationality ap­
proach will also be welfare enhancing in terms of issuer choices as 
to where to have their shares offered and traded. The choice of 
each issuer, rather than being guided by an effort to come under the 
regulatory regime it prefers, will instead depend solely on the eco­
nomic fundamentals of the situation: the efficiency with which dif­
ferent markets effect trades, the country or countries of residence 
of their most likely investors, and the extent to which such investors 
find markets in their own country or countries the cheapest and 
most convenient places to transact. 
B. The Investor Residency and Transaction Location Approaches 
1. General Considerations 
When, as now, factors relating to the residence of the buyers 
and where the transactions occur are taken into account in deter­
mining whether to apply the U.S. regime, the issuer will be sensitive 
to the level of U.S. disclosure standards. The issuer can often avoid 
being subject to the U.S. regime by not offering shares in the 
United States and by not promoting their secondary trading there. 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 769 
The efficacy of this strategy of avoidance arises in part because the 
U.S. explicitly uses the place where transactions in an issuers' 
shares are effected as a factor in determining whether or not to ap­
ply its regime.150 The strategy also helps an issuer avoid the U.S. 
regime because, without offerings or secondary trading in the 
United States, two other factors used by the United States in deter­
mining whether or not to apply its regime - the percentage of the 
issuer's shares held by U.S. residents and the absolute number of 
such U.S. holders151 - are likely to be lower as well. 
As discussed in Part IV, the world's issuers fall into two groups: 
a minority whose privately optimal level of disclosure is at or above 
the level required by the U.S. regime, and a substantial majority 
whose privately optimal level is below the U.S. requirements.152 
Whichever group they are in, most of the world's issuers of any 
significance would want to have their shares offered and traded in 
the United States absent the fact that such offering or trading would 
trigger imposition of the U.S. regime.153 United States markets 
provide better access to the huge investor pool of U.S. residents 
and superior execution.154 Both lead to a higher share price.155 
Under the current approach, however, the U.S. regime, with the 
highest level of required disclosure in the world, is in general im­
posed on issuers whose shares are sold or traded in the United 
States.156 The first group of issuers - those that prefer a regime at 
150. Location is an explicit factor not only when we try to implement the goal of market 
protection (where location represents the whole concern), see supra notes 25-35 and accom­
panying text, but also where we try to implement the goal of investor protection. See supra 
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Tue rationale here is presumably that the effecting of a 
significant number of transactions in an issuer's shares in the United States is an indicator 
that there are a significant number of U.S. resident investors in need of "protection." 
151. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. 
152. See infra section IV.B.2. 
153. See Romano, supra note 15, at 2419. 
154. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
155. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 225. A recent 
paper by two economists at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) suggests that a foreign 
issuer that lists on the NYSE will enjoy an 8% increase in share price. See KATHERINE SMITH 
& GEORGE SoFIANos, THE IMPACT OF AN NYSE LISTING ON THE GLOBAL TRADING OF 
NoN-U.S. STOCKS 9 (NYSE Working Paper 97-02, 1997). 
156. As discussed in Part I, compliance with the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure re­
quirements is necessary for any foreign issuer's shares to trade on a U.S. stock exchange. 
Through a grandfathering provision, a number of foreign issuers that were trading on 
NASDAQ prior to October 6, 1983 have been permitted to continue to do so by meeting a 
substitute, minimal disclosure requirement. Any foreign issuer wishing to commence NAS­
DAQ trading now, however, must undertake full compliance. Full compliance is not neces­
sary for a foreign issuer's shares to be traded in the United States in a forum other than an 
organized U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Such an issuer can commence having its shares 
traded among U.S. brokers on the basis of the "pink sheets" simply by meeting the same 
substitute minimal requirements imposed on the grandfathered NASDAQ issuers. Tue 
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least as strict as the existing U.S. regime - will be neither attracted 
nor discouraged by the current approach because they would wish 
to be in the U.S. market in any event. The second, majority group 
of issuers - those that prefer a regime less strict than the existing 
U.S. regime - will be discouraged by it. The focus of the rest of 
Part VI is on this second group since only with them is there, under 
the current U.S. approach to statutory reach, a relationship be­
tween the rigor of the U.S. regime and the volume of transactions 
effected in the United States. Their entrepreneurs or managers 
would find compliance a burden.151 
In deciding whether to have their shares offered or traded in the 
United States, the entrepreneurs or managers of this second group 
must compare this burden with the advantages of better access to 
U.S. investors and better execution. Those that find the advantages 
less than the burden of compliance will avoid the U.S. market. 
These issuers' avoidance of the United States represents for­
gone rents for U.S. persons whose welfare depends on the volume 
of transactions effected in the United States. In order to minimize 
the number of issuers avoiding the U.S. market, these persons can 
be expected to exert ongoing pressure on U.S. officials for lower 
U.S. disclosure requirements.158 Current disclosure standards are 
the product of a combination of this pressure and the purely domes­
tic forces that, but for the existence of foreign issuers and foreign 
markets, would by themselves set U.S. disclosure requirements. 
Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market tra­
ditionally has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United 
spreads associated with this kind of trading are considerably larger, however, and thus inves· 
tors purchasing these shares will experience a lower expected return and Jess liquidity. See, 
e.g., Iain Jenkins, 'Pink Sheets' Mix Risk With Rewards, lNTI..  HERALD TRin., Nov. 19·20, 
1994, at 19 (noting that the spread in the OTC market for ADRs can be as much as 10%). 
157. By definition, the entrepreneurs or managers of an issuer with a privately optimal 
level of disclosure below the U.S. regime's required level would find the U.S. regime a bur· 
den. See supra section IV.A.2. The burden that U.S. disclosure requirements impose on 
many foreign issuers has been noted by others. See, e.g., F ANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 
32-33, 39; James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropri­
ate?, 17 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. S58 (1994); Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements for Trad­
ing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES 
REGULATIONS 57 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1991) (noting that there 
had been no growth in the total number of foreign issuers listed on the U.S. exchanges and 
NASDAQ since the imposition of the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure regime on new 
NASDAQ issuers, despite the rapid growth in the trading of foreign securities); Greene et al., 
supra note 12; Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. 
Markets, 24 LAW & POLY. INn.. Bus. 1207; Romano, supra note 15, at 2419. 
158. A number of co=entators agree that the securities industry and the stock ex· 
changes will pressure U.S. officials to adopt disclosure rules that maximize volume. See, e.g., 
FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 5; Choi & Guzman, National Laws, supra note 9, at 
1874. 
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States is the residence of a large portion of their most likely poten­
tial investors. Hardly any U.S. issuers have chosen to do so.159 The 
converse of this proposition is that for many foreign issuers, avoid­
ing the U.S. market often does make sense given the burden of 
compliance. In fact, only about 700 out of about 28,900 foreign 
public issuers have chosen to comply with U.S. requirements.160 
The analysis below suggests that this picture is likely to change. 
The trends toward globalization will decrease the advantages to 
U.S. issuers who choose to have their shares sold or traded in the 
U.S. market and increase the advantages to foreign issuers making 
the same choice. Thus, if the U.S. disclosure requirements are kept 
the same, the shares of more foreign issuers and fewer domestic 
issuers will be sold and traded in the United States. The net effect 
of the trend toward globalization on the volume of transactions ef­
fected in the United States is ambiguous. We will see, however, 
that the effect on issuer sensitivity to the U.S. level of disclosure is 
unambiguously positive. This means that as the trend toward 
globalization progresses, a given relaxation of standards would lead 
to a greater and greater increase in the volume of transactions ef­
fected in the United States and in the resulting gain in the rents to 
persons whose welfare depends on this volume. Thus the political 
pressures to relax these standards will grow.161 
2. The Impact of the Global Diffusion of Financial Information 
The increasing global diffusion of financial information is going 
to diminish the information disadvantage that investors everywhere 
159. See supra note 45. 
160. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock 
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1995 was 36,572. See 
lNTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 23. Of these companies, 10,884 
were in the world's developed markets outside of the United States; 7,671 were U.S. compa­
nies. See id. As of September 1995, there were 602 SEC-registered and reporting foreign 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ. See JAMES L. COCHRANE ET AL., FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INvEsTORS: 
BREAKING DowN THE BARRIERS SEPARATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 10 (New York Stock 
Exchange Working Paper No. 95-04, 1995). One hundred registered and reporting foreign 
companies were trading over-the-counter. See id. at 10 n.8. Another 1,173 unregistered for­
eign companies were trading over-the-counter, exempt from the SEC's reporting require­
ments under 12g3-2(b). See id. at 10. The 242 foreign companies currently being traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange represent only about one-tenth of the overseas companies 
that could meet the Exchange's listing qualifications. See id. at 2. 
161. A number of academics and practitioners believe that the SEC will eventually lower 
its standards in order to keep stock exchange and investment bank business in foreign securi­
ties from moving abroad. See, e.g., FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 5; Bevis Longstreth, 
A Look at the SEC's Adaption to Global Market Pressures, 33 CoL. J. TRANSNATL. L. 319 
(1995). It is significant that Congress seems to be pressuring the SEC to react in just this 
fashion. See supra note 148. 
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face with regard to issuers from countries other than their own. In 
order to analyze the impact of this trend on the level of trading in 
the United States and on pressures to reduce the rigor of the U.S. 
regime, we need to separate it out from the impact of the other 
major component of the trend toward globalization - the reduc­
tion in the cost and difficulty of effecting orders abroad. To do this, 
assume for now that it is impossible to effect orders abroad: all 
initial purchases and subsequent secondary trades by U.S. residents 
occur in the United States. In such a world, a policy of U.S. inves­
tor protection and one of U.S. market protection are completely 
coextensive. An issuer, whether U.S. or foreign, will have to com­
ply with U.S. disclosure rules to have a significant number of U.S. 
resident investors. The larger the number of the world's issuers 
that choose to comply, the larger the total volume of transactions 
effected in the United States.162 
The following picture emerges, as demonstrated more rigor­
ously in the model in Appendix I. 
a. United States issuers. 
Today, with the current incomplete level of global diffusion of 
:financial information, almost all publicly traded U.S. issuers choose 
to comply with U.S. disclosure rules and have their securities sell 
and trade in the United States. They are less well known abroad, 
and thus their share price would suffer significantly if they relied 
exclusively on a foreign investor pool. The sacrifice that wo_uld be 
involved is sufficiently great that the burden of compliance with the 
U.S. regime is worthwhile. Relaxing U.S. standards to lower this 
burden of compliance cannot add to the volume of transactions ef­
fected in the United States by bringing U.S. issuers home, because 
almost all U.S. issuers are at home already. 
What will happen in the future as we move toward full global 
diffusion of :financial information? If current disclosure standards 
are maintained, the near universal compliance by publicly traded 
U.S. issuers is likely to cease. Exclusive reliance on foreign inves­
tors will entail less of a price disadvantage, and a significant number 
of U.S. issuers will find it worth the sacrifice of having no U.S. in­
vestors in order to be freed of the burden of complying with the 
162. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that if U.S. residents have made available 
to them the shares of a greater array of the world's issuers, they will both save more and 
invest a larger portion of their savings in equities. This seems plausible given the significant 
improvement in equity investing's tradeoff between risk and return that can be attained 
through international diversification. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 
1, at 2509-12, 2523-25. 
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U.S. regime. Their shares will not sell or trade in the U.S. and thus 
the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. will suffer. Unlike 
now, relaxation of U.S. disclosure standards would prevent some or 
all of this loss of issuers. 
b. Foreign issuers. 
Today, with the current incomplete global diffusion of :financial 
information, only a small percentage of foreign issuers comply with 
U.S. disclosure requirements. The others know that if they were to 
comply, the demand for their shares would be higher because then, 
in addition to their shares being sold and traded at home, they 
could also be sold and exchanged or NASDAQ traded in the 
United States.163 The resulting price advantage derived from access 
to U.S. investors is not, however, as great as it is for U.S. issuers 
because foreign issuers are less well known among U.S. investors. 
These noncompliers have calculated that this smaller price advan­
tage is not large enough to justify the burden of complying with the 
U.S. regime. However, the existence of some foreign issuers that 
do comply under current standards suggests the existence of others 
that do not, but are at the margin. If today the U.S: standards were 
relaxed, thereby reducing this burden, the number of foreign issuers 
complying would, unlike with U.S. issuers, increase. 
What will happen in the future as we move toward full global 
diffusion of information? The price advantage to foreign issuers of 
having access to U.S. investors will increase. If U.S. disclosure stan­
dards are maintained at current levels, an increasing number of for­
eign issuers will find that the price advantage of having U.S. 
investors has become sufficiently large to be worth the burden of 
compliance.164 If the standards were relaxed, the increase in the 
number of foreign issuers would be that much greater. This means 
that a lowering of U.S. standards, whether now or after further 
global diffusion of information, would increase the number of for­
eign issuers complying and hence the volume of transactions ef­
fected in the United States. 
163. Any issuer trading on a U.S. exchange must comply. Any issuer not currently trad­
ing on NASDAQ that wishes now to start such trading much comply also. See supra notes 
36-49 and accompanying text. 
164. These trends are already in place. In the period 1986-96, there has been a general 
increase in foreign issuer common stock listings on both the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ, particularly in the latter part of the period. See F ANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21, 
at 18-23. 
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c. Aggregate effects. 
If U.S. standards are maintained at current levels, a move to­
ward full global diffusion of financial information will decrease the 
number of U.S. issuer share transactions effected in the United 
States and increase the number of foreign issuer ones. The net ef­
fect is ambiguous. Relaxing U.S. disclosure requirements right now 
would result in a greater number of issuers choosing to access the 
U.S. market than do so under the current requirement. Relaxing 
U.S. disclosure requirements in the future, when financial informa­
tion becomes more globally diffused, would have a larger positive 
effect. Today it would only increase the number of foreign issuers 
choosing the U.S. market, whereas in the future it would increase 
the number of both foreign and U.S. issuers making that choice. 
Thus the future's greater global diffusion of information will in­
crease the pressure by the securities industry to lower U.S. stan­
dards because the gains to its members from such a lowering will be 
greater than they are today. 
3. Reductions in the Cost and Difficulty of Effecting Transactions 
Abroad 
a. Irrelevance of reductions in cost and difficulty under a 
perfectly implemented exclusive investor residency 
approach to statutory reach. 
Analyzing the impact of the reduction in the cost and difficulty 
of effecting orders abroad - the other component of the trend to­
ward globalization - requires being very specific in describing the 
U.S. approach to statutory reach and how it is implemented. If the 
United States were to adopt an exclusive investor residency ap­
proach to statutory reach and to implement it perfectly (i.e., did not 
rely on evidence concerning where transactions in an issuer's shares 
occur as proxy for the residency of the shares' buyers), a reduction 
in the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad would 
have no effect on the pressures for a lower U.S. standard because 
imposition of the U.S. regime would in no way depend on the loca­
tion of transactions in an issuer's shares. In that situation, only the 
increasingly global diffusion of information would have an effect on 
pressures to lower the U.S. standard and the analysis in the immedi­
ately preceding section would describe the whole story. Any issuer 
wanting to have a significant number of U.S. buyers or holders 
would have to comply with the U.S. regime regardless of whether 
or not it was selling its shares in the United States or promoting 
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their secondary trading there. Therefore it might as well do so since 
there would always be some loss of potential U.S. investors if the 
shares were not offered in the United States or traded there, even 
after the substantial reductions in the cost and difficulty of purchas­
ing securities abroad. As in the analysis above, an issuer's decision 
that it is worth incurring the burden of compliance to have access to 
the pool of U.S. investors is therefore tantamount to a decision to 
offer its shares in the United States and have them trade there. 
b. Effects of reductions in cost and difficulty under the current 
approach to statutory reach. 
In reality, however, the United States does not rely exclusively 
on the investor residency approach to statutory reach. Investor 
protection does not reflect the exclusive rationale guiding U.S. pol­
icy as to statutory reach; market protection concerns are involved as 
well.165 Even if investor protection were the exclusive rationale, 
perfect implementation of an approach based on such a goal is diffi­
cult because the residence of the parties to a share transaction is not 
easily monitored. Also, the investor residency approach, applied 
with sufficient rigor, would create problems with other countries. A 
country's issuers, while having a fairly direct and powerful ability to 
control the geographic location of trades in their shares, have less 
control over the residence of persons initially buying publicly of­
fered shares and little control over the residence of subsequent pur­
chasers. Thus they could easily become subject to the U.S. regime 
even though they took no steps to encourage U.S. investors beyond 
becoming a public company through primary share sales occurring 
in their own country. 
The U.S. approach, therefore, includes a component of transac­
tion location as well.166 This creates incentives for issuers to avoid 
the United States. As it becomes cheaper and easier for U.S. inves­
tors to effect transactions abroad, these incentives increase. Issuers 
are no longer foregoing as much of the U.S. pool of investors if 
their shares are only offered, or traded, abroad and so the sacrifice 
from only being public abroad is less. In a certain portion of cases, 
the fact that an issuer's shares are being sold or traded only abroad 
will tip the balance and the U.S. regime will not be applied. The 
lowering of the sacrifice associated with having shares sold or of­
fered only abroad will induce more issuers, both U.S. and foreign, 
165. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra Part I. There is also a component of issuer nationality in the current U.S. 
approach, but that does not add to these incentives. 
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to choose that route. That will reduce the volume of transactions 
effected on U.S. markets relative to what it would be absent the 
United States using place as a factor in determining whether to ap­
ply its regime. 
The ultimate question again concerns the political pressures on 
U.S. officials to relax the U.S. regime's required level of disclosure. 
To figure out how reductions in the cost and difficulty of effecting 
transactions abroad, when added to the further globalization of fi­
nancial information, will affect these pressures requires a compari­
son of the positions today and in the future of both U.S. and foreign 
issuers. 
i. U.S. issuers. Suppose first that the United States continues 
to maintain its current high level of required disclosure. We just 
saw that while almost all U.S. issuers today comply with the U.S. 
regime, this will change with further globalization of financial infor­
mation. Foreign demand for U.S. issuer shares will increase. With 
this increased demand, even if it were impossible for U.S. investors 
to effect transactions abroad, some U.S. issuers will find the sacri­
fice involved in avoiding the sales and trading of their shares in the 
United States sufficiently reduced to be worth enduring in order to 
avoid the burden of U.S. disclosure regulation.167 When we take 
account of the additional facts that in reality it is possible for U.S. 
investors to effect transactions abroad and that the cost and diffi­
culty of doing so will go down, we can expect even more U.S. issu­
ers to make this choice since doing so will not force them to give up 
completely access to the pool of U.S. investors, as we had assumed 
in the analysis above. 
Now suppose that the U.S. at some point lowers its level of re­
quired disclosure. Lowering the required level of disclosure today 
will still have no immediate effect, just as we determined in the 
analysis in the section above focused solely on global information 
diffusion. Again, almost all public U.S. issuers currently comply 
and so there are none to be attracted home by a relaxation of stan­
dards. Lowering the required level of disclosure in the future, how­
ever, which we determined in the prior analysis would increase the 
number of U.S. issuers staying home, would have an even bigger 
effect once we account for the reduction in the cost and difficulty of 
167. As long as the issuer incorporates abroad, focuses its public offerings abroad, and is 
not (and, through secondary trading, does not become) more than 50% beneficially owned 
by U.S. residents, the issuer would not need to supply any more information than that re­
quired of it by foreign authorities. See supra sections I.A.2.a; I.B.2. 
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effecting transactions abroad. With these reductions, less of a trans­
formation in an issuer's investor pool is needed to avoid having any 
transactions in its shares occurring in the United States and thus a 
greater percentage of U.S. issuers would be on the margin as to 
whether or not to make this choice. A given lowering of U.S. stan­
dards will persuade a larger number of U.S. issuers to stay home 
who would otherwise choose to be public only abroad. Thus adding 
to the analysis globalization's second component - the reduction 
in the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad - suggests 
that globalization will have an even greater effect on future U.S. 
issuer sensitivity to a lowering in U.S. standards. 
ii. Foreign issuers. We saw in the analysis in the section 
above focusing solely on global information diffusion that today 
some foreign issuers comply with the U.S. regime in order to have 
their shares offered and traded in the United States and more 
would do so if the U.S. disclosure requirements were lowered. The 
foreign issuers that choose to comply do so because they wish to 
eliminate the additional costs and difficulties that U.S. investors 
would otherwise experience effecting transactions in their shares. If 
there were further global diffusion of financial information but no 
easing of the cost and difficulty of effecting share transactions 
abroad, U.S. investor demand for foreign issuer shares would in­
crease. As we have seen, that would increase the price gain to for­
eign issuers from having their shares offered and traded in the 
United States. More foreign issuers would think it worthwhile to 
endure the burden of complying with the U.S. regime and the vol­
ume of transactions in foreign issuer shares would increase. On the 
other hand, with an easing of cost and difficulty of effecting share 
transactions abroad but no further global diffusion of information, 
fewer foreign issuers would comply with the U.S. requirements 
since, in theory at least, they could have access to an increasing 
number of U.S. investors without complying.16s 
Thus, with the United States maintaining its current required 
disclosure level, the size and direction of the combined effect of 
increasing globalization's two components on the volume of foreign 
issuer transactions appear to be ambiguous. Resolving that ambi­
guity requires looking at the different stages in the trend: the "in-
168. Professors Fanto and Karmel surveyed substantial foreign issuers that choose not to 
list in the United States. Many mentioned that they felt no pressing need for such a listing 
because U.S. investors, at least the institutional ones, have shown a willingness to make 
purchases on these issuers' home markets. See FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 37. 
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terim" stage, when global information diffusion has increased and 
effecting a transaction abroad is easier and cheaper than it is now 
but still significantly more difficult and expensive than doing so at 
home; and the "culmination" stage, when the differential in the 
ease and cost of effecting transactions has been greatly reduced and 
there is full global diffusion of financial information. 
In the interim stage, the effect of the decreased cost and diffi­
culty of effecting transactions abroad may be largely illusory. At 
this stage, U.S. investor demand for a foreign issuer's shares is re­
ally more potential than actual until the issuer attracts the interest 
of one or more U.S. analysts. The most likely candidate is an ana­
lyst associated with a firm making a market in, or that is a specialist 
for, the issuer's shares. No such firm is likely to exist unless the 
issuer's stock is offered or traded in the United States.169 Thus, the 
effect of the first component of the trend toward globalization -
the increasing diffusion of financial information - is likely to domi­
nate. The preceding section's analysis of that component in isola­
tion is thus a reasonable description of what will happen in the 
presence of both components of globalization. As analyzed above, 
there will be an increase in the number of foreign issuers whose 
shares are offered and traded in the United States even if U.S. dis­
closure standards are not lowered. And there is no strong reason to 
believe that foreign issuer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclo­
sure standards will change in either direction. 
As we approach the culmination of the trend, however, things 
will switch, with the second component predominating instead. 
When effecting a transaction abroad becomes almost as easy and 
cheap for a U.S. investor as effecting one at home, there is no rea­
son for foreign issuers to put up with the burden of higher U.S. 
disclosure requirements to the extent that the U.S. does not use a 
perfectly implemented investor residency approach to statutory 
reach. This will be true no matter how much global diffusion of 
information has added to U.S. investor demand for their shares. In 
such a world, the analyst attention necessary to turn potential de­
mand into actual demand is unlikely to continue to require trading 
on a U.S. market. Brokerage firms will become increasingly trans­
national. For most of the significant foreign issuers that choose to 
be traded only outside the United States, there will be at least one 
169. Professors Fanto and Karmel surveyed foreign issuers that obtained United States 
listings and found that numerous respondents listed attention from analysts as an important 
reason for the listing. See FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 31. 
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brokerage firm making a market or being a specialist in its shares 
that has an analyst trusted by U.S. investors. 
In discussing this culmination stage, we are assuming for the 
moment that U.S. disclosure standards remain unchanged and that 
transaction location continues to play its current role in determin­
ing application of the U.S. regime. Notwithstanding increases in 
U.S. investor demand for foreign issuer shares, the second compo­
nent of the globalization trend will ultimately decimate the secon­
dary U.S. trading of shares of foreign issuers that do not engage in 
primary offerings in the United States.17° Primary offerings in the 
United States would decline significantly also.171 Marginal reduc­
tions in the level of disclosure required by the United States would 
not help much, but a total elimination of the difference between the 
U.S. level and what is called for abroad would help a great deal. 
With a total elimination, the execution efficiency of U.S. markets 
and the residual cost and convenience advantages to U.S. investors 
from investing in shares offered or traded in U.S. markets would be 
sufficient to attract most significant foreign issuers to the United 
States. 
m. Aggregate Effects. In the interim stage, adding the reduc­
tion in the cost and difficulty of effecting transnational transactions 
to the increased global diffusion of financial information will en­
large U.S. issuer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclosure stan­
dards. It will not diminish foreign issuer sensitivity to such a 
relaxation. Thus the aggregate effect is that issuer sensitivity to- the 
U.S. level of required disclosure, and hence the sensitivity of the 
volume of transactions effected in the United States, will increase 
even more with globalization than was suggested by the analysis in 
the section above, which only considered knowledge diffusion. 
Along with this larger increase in sensitivity will come a larger in­
crease in political pressures to relax U.S. standards. 
170. A foreign issuer that engages in a primary offering in the United States must thereaf­
ter provide periodic disclosure under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Thus, as long as it 
is even slightly cheaper and more convenient for a U.S. investor to trade shares at home, any 
issuer that engages in such an offering might as well promote secondary trading of its shares 
in the United States. 
171. Suppose that a foreign issuer during this culmination stage engages in a primary 
offering only abroad. Investors in the markets where the shares are offered know that U.S. 
investors will have easy access to its shares once secondary trading develops in those markets. 
This means there is greater potential secondary market demand for the issuer's shares than 
would be the case today when U.S. investors do not have such easy access. The issuer's 
shares will therefore suffer less of a price penalty for being initially offered only abroad than 
would be the case today. 
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In the culmination stage, adding the reduction in the cost and 
difficulty of effecting transnational transactions to the increased 
global diffusion of financial information will again enlarge U.S. is­
suer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclosure standards. The 
effect on the sensitivity of foreign issuers at the culmination stage is 
trickier. Many might be almost entirely insensitive to a minor re­
duction in the U.S. standard but very sensitive to a major reduction 
that takes the U.S. level all the way down to the level of other coun­
tries. In the absence of a switch to the issuer nationality approach, 
the political pressure will involve a mix of demands for a major 
reduction in U.S. requirements and demands for a move, as far as 
practical, away from transaction location type tests for determining 
statutory reach, i.e., toward a pure investor residency approach. 
To the extent that the first element of the mix of demands suc­
ceeds, globalization will result in a radical reduction in U.S. disclo­
sure standards. To the extent that the second element succeeds, the 
analysis of the effects of globalization goes back to the analysis in 
the section above, which was devoted to the pure effects of global 
diffusion of information. Under a pure investor residency ap­
proach, transaction location will not influence whether the U.S. re­
gime is applied. Thus the reductions in the cost and difficulty of 
effecting transactions abroad will not matter. The residual cost and 
convenience advantages to U.S. investors from investing in shares 
traded in U.S. markets will be enough to attract to the United 
States any issuer that calculates that having U.S. investors is worth 
the burden of complying with the U.S. disclosure regime. Thus the 
effects of globalization are the same as if we were to assume that it 
is impossible for U.S. investors to effect orders abroad - the as­
sumption of the analysis in the section above concerning the impact 
of global diffusion of information alone. That discussion concluded 
that globalization would increase the sensitivity of issuers to the 
U.S. disclosure level. Thus if pressures to move to a pure investor 
residency approach succeed, the move will, combined with global­
ization, increase the pressures to lower the U.S. disclosure level, 
though not necessarily as radically as if the pressures to move to a 
pure investor residency approach fail. 
c. Effects of a switch from exchange based trading to 
electronic trading. 
Today the shares of most, though not all, issuers of any signifi­
cance are traded on a stock exchange such as the New York Stock 
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Exchange or the Tokyo Stock Exchange.172 It is possible, however, 
that in the next decade or so the shares of most or all such issuers 
will be traded not on stock exchanges but instead electronically via 
computer.113 The irrelevance of the place where a transaction is 
172. In the United States, for example, the market capitalization of the approximately 
2,675 issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $6.01 trillion in 1995. See NEW 
Yoruc STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BooK 42 (1996). This still dwarfs non-exchange based trad­
ing. At the end of 1994, the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange was 
roughly three and one half times the capitalization of all other equity markets in the United 
States including NASDAQ. See 1995 SEC ANN. REP. 154; NASDAQ FACT BooK 1 (1996). 
Non-exchange-based trading facilities, most notably the NASDAQ, are posing increasing 
competition, however. In 1995, the New York Stock Exchange held 50.2% of the annual 
dollar trading volume of U.S. equity markets ($3.08 trillion) while the NASDAQ captured 
39% of the U.S. market ($2.40 trillion). See NASDAQ FACT BooK, supra, at 8; NEW Yoruc 
STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK, supra, at 13. 
A stock exchange maintains a trading floor at a single physical location. Buyers and sell­
ers, wherever located, place orders through brokers that send them to the exchange floor 
representatives who in turn participate in some form or other of auction for the stock in 
question. See 5 Loms Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2506 (1990). On 
some exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange, members may make "upstairs" 
trades off the floor of the exchange if (1) the stock was listed on or after April 26, 1979, or (2) 
a member is executing a block trade (10,000 or more shares or a market value of $200,000 or 
more) as an agent for the buyer or seller, but not both. See id. at 2576 n.266; Rule 390, 
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'l[ 2390 (prohibiting members from trading listed stocks in over-the­
counter markets, i.e., off the exchange floor); Regulation 19c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (1996) 
(allowing members to trade listed stocks over the counter, provided the stock became listed 
after April 26, 1979); Regulation 19c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-1 (allowing off the board trading 
for a block positioner acting as an agent for either the buyer or the seller); Rule 127, N.Y.S.E. 
Guide (CCH) 'l[ 2127 (block trading). 
Thus, as a general matter each trade in an exchange listed stock trade has a physical place 
where execution occurs, and, in that sense, can be said to occur in a particular, identifiable 
nation. And while the issuer's stock may be listed on more than one exchange, typically the 
bulk of trading occurs at just one of them. In the case of a stock with a multiple listing, the 
exchange that starts with the largest volume of trading has the self-perpetuating advantage of 
continuing to be the most attractive place to trade because it offers the greatest liquidity. See 
MoRRis MENDELSON & JUNros W. PEAKE, ELEcrRONic EXECUTION SYSTEMS: MYTH vs. 
REALITY 1, 2 (University of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econs. Discussion Paper No. 93, 1990). This 
tendency for investors to confine their trades to the exchange with the largest volume is 
illustrated by the fact that where computer links have been established between two ex­
changes in the same time zone, for example between the American Stock Exchange and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, orders for stocks listed on both exchanges have tended to flow 
primarily in one direction, toward the "primary" exchange (the more established exchange 
for trading the issuer's stock). See William C. Freund, Electronic Trading and Linkages in 
International Equity Markets, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1989, at 11-12. Where the links 
have been between exchanges in different time zones, orders made during the hours that the 
primary exchange has been closed tend to be offset only against pre-existing quotations from 
the primary exchange. See id. 
173. It is a matter of debate whether this current exchange-based structure of secondary 
trading will continue into the foreseeable future or whether there will be a move to electronic 
trading. Exchange trading and computer trading are each institutions that centralize order 
flow. Computer trading has a number of advantages: easy investor access from anywhere 
through computers with real time displays of bids, offers and volume, low cost of operation, 
and ease of transaction reconstruction leading to more reliable clearance and settlement and 
more effective enforcement of regulations. A number of observers predict that the replace­
ment of exchange trading by computer trading is probable or at least possible. See 
MENDELSON & PEAKE, supra note 172; JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
THE WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS: ECONOMIC CAUSES AND REGULATORY CoNSE­
QUENCES - OR - BEWARE THE UBER-REGULATOR 19-20 (Stanford Law and Econimics 
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effected for the question of what country should regulate an issuer's 
disclosure would then become transparent. The computer might 
actually match purchase and sale orders (like the CATS program 
currently operated by the Toronto Stock Exchange and several 
others), or it might simply provide the bid and offer prices of mar­
ket makers and facilitate execution once a broker has chosen with 
which market maker to deal (as NASDAQ does domestically to­
day).174 Either way, though, it would be impossible to say there is 
any particular location where the transaction is effected.175 Such a 
development would absolutely require elimination of transaction 
location-type tests for determining statutory reach. If there is no 
switch to the issuer nationality approach, the only approach left is 
investor residency. The analysis would then follow that of the sec­
tion above that focuses solely on the global diffusion of financial 
information. In that discussion, we assumed that any issuer wishing 
access to a significant number of U.S. investors would need to regis­
ter under the U.S. regime. The conclusions there that globalization 
will increase the sensitivity of issuers to the U.S. disclosure level 
and hence increase pressure to lower U.S. requirements would 
therefore apply also to a world dominated by computer trading.176 
Working Paper, 1990); Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?" - Proprietary Elec­
tronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 833, 862 (1992). 
The key question is whether a computer trading system can provide liquidity comparable 
to one based on specialists operating on an exchange floor. See Freund, supra note 172, at 
12-14; Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Secur­
ities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. 
REv. 299, 318-19 (1991). There are real questions as to whether specialists in fact provide 
such liquidity, however, since their obligation to do so is vague and the capital at their dispo­
sal is small compared to the largest traders. See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock 
Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock 
Exchanges, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1007, 1026-34 (1990). Macey and Kanda point out that the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange essentially works without specialists who attempt to provide liquidity 
since the "satori" firms, the ones that most resemble specialists, act as pure conduits that 
match buy and sell orders and are not allowed to trade on their own account in the stocks 
assigned to them. See id. at 1043-44. Macey and Kanda speculate that the functions that the 
satori firms do provide could be largely done by computer. See id. at 1046. 
174. See MENDELSON & PEAKE, supra note 172, at 2-3; Solomon & Corso, supra note 173, 
at 309-22. 
175. This problem has been noted by others. See, e.g., Solomon & Corso, supra note 173, 
at 330. 
176. See supra section VI.B.2. In such a world, the fortunes of the U.S. securities industry 
would depend on the volume of shares purchased and traded by U.S. investors, which would 
increase if the shares of more foreign issuers were made available to them. See supra note 
162. 
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VII. How THE INCREASING PRESSURES UNDER THE lNvEsTOR 
REsIDENCY AND LOCATION OF TRADE APPROACHES TO LOWER 
THE LEVEL OF U.S. REQUIRED DISCLOSURE CAN LEAD TO 
SUBOPTIMAL REGULATION 
A. How Increased Pressure to Lower U.S. Disclosure Standards 
May Succeed Even If It Lowers National Welfare 
We have just seen how, if the United States fails to switch to the 
issuer nationality approach to statutory reach, further globalization 
will create stronger political pressures to relax U.S. disclosure stan­
dards. That conclusion is only a cause for concern, however, if 
there is reason to believe that the pressures will succeed and the 
result will be a level of required disclosure that lowers U.S. eco­
nomic welfare. What follows is a story of how this might well hap­
pen even if the U.S. political system functions in a way that 
attempts to maximize the interests of its residents. 
1. The Quest for Rents and the Adoption of an Inefficiently Low 
Required Disclosure Level 
The starting point to this story is to differentiate between two 
different concepts of what is the optimal level of required disclo­
sure. The first concept, "substantive optimality," is the level at 
which the marginal social costs of disclosure just equal its marginal 
social benefits in terms of efficient allocation of capital and reduc­
tion in the agency costs of management. The second concept, "total 
optimality," adds to this the effect of the level chosen on the rents 
of persons whose welfare depends on the volume of transactions 
effected in the United States, such as those associated with the se­
curities industry or the stock exchanges. 
In an entirely domestic economy, the two concepts are identical 
since the level of required disclosure should have no.effect on the 
volume of transactions effected. The introduction of transnational 
securities transactions, however, permits a divergence. As we have 
seen, with our current approach to statutory reach, a relaxation of 
the level of required disclosure would increase the volume of trans­
actions effected in the United States and the size of this potential 
increase will grow as globalization proceeds.177 It is perfectly possi­
ble that the resulting welfare gains to those whose welfare depends 
on volume would exceed the resulting losses to entrepreneurs and 
labor from the decrease in the economy's efficiency. In that event, 
177. See supra sections IV.B; VI.B.2.c; VI.B.3.b. 
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the totally optimal level of required disclosure would be lower than 
the substantively optimal one. This lower, totally optimal level will 
be the one adopted by a political system that attempts to maximize 
the interests of its citizens but continues to operate under the con­
straint of the current approach to statutory reach. 
Operating under this constraint is unfortunate. A switch to the 
issuer nationality approach would permit retention of the substan­
tively optimal level of required disclosure, thereby maximizing the 
welfare of entrepreneurs and labor, while still permitting persons 
whose welfare depends on volume to maximize their rents. 
2. The Race to the Bottom 
The problems with failing to switch do not end here, however. 
We need to take account of likely foreign reaction to the relaxation 
of U.S. standards. When we do, we see a perfect example of a "race 
to the bottom" scenario in which the United States will ultimately 
end up with a substantively suboptimally low required level of dis­
closure and no greater rents for its financial industry than before 
the race started. 
The scenario involves the classic "prisoner's dilemma" from 
game theory. The countries would maximize their joint welfare by 
respectively adopting their substantively optimal levels of required 
disclosure. The problem is that for each, the dominant position in 
the game is to adopt a lower level. Each is better off adopting the 
lower level whatever the other country does. The result is an equi­
librium in which both are worse off. 
The scenario, more formally set out in Appendix II, posits two 
countries, A and B, each initially having an entirely domestic econ­
omy with no transnational securities transactions possible. Each 
chooses the level of required disclosure that is substantively optimal 
for it. Then transnational securities transactions become practical. 
Country A lowers its disclosure level, seeing that by doing so, a 
larger volume of transactions will be effected within its borders and 
that the resulting increase in rents exceeds the welfare declines 
from having a substantively suboptimal disclosure level. Country 
B, as a result, faces a welfare decline because of the loss to Country 
A of transactions that would otherwise have been effected within 
B's borders. Country B then lowers its disclosure level, seeing that 
by doing so it can recapture the lost transactions and that the rents 
from the recaptured transactions exceed the welfare decline from it 
also switching to a substantively suboptimal disclosure level. Each 
country has now suffered the welfare loss from having a substan-
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tively suboptimal disclosure level and in the end does not receive 
any compensating increase in rents. The result would be the same if 
B moved first. The result is an equilibrium because for each coun­
try the lower level of required disclosure is the dominant strategy: 
it is better off choosing the lower level whatever the other country 
chooses. 
B. The Appropriateness of Assuming Current U.S. Disclosure 
Standards Are Optimal and the Question of Regulatory 
Competition 
The discussion in Part VI shows that maintaining the current 
U.S. approach to statutory reach will result in increasing political 
pressure to relax the U.S. disclosure regime as the market for secur­
ities globalizes further. The same would be true of other countries 
using this approach. The current approach permits an issuer to in­
fluence which disclosure regime will govern it through its choice of 
where its shares are going to be offered and traded. The United 
States and each other country wishes to maximize the volume of 
transactions effected in its own market, thereby increasing the rents 
earned by its residents. It would thus endeavor, everything else be­
ing equal, to set its level of required disclosure to attract as many 
issuers as possible. The rewards for doing so will intensify as 
globalization proceeds. Such an endeavor is inherently competitive 
since a gain in transaction volume by one country can only come 
from a loss by another. Switching to the issuer nationality approach 
would stop this competition. 
I concluded in Parts III and IV that the issuer nationality ap­
proach is superior to the current U.S. approach to statutory reach 
because it selects more discriminatingly which among the world's 
issuers have disclosure practices that affect primarily the welfare of 
U.S. residents and which primarily the welfare of residents of other 
countries. U.S. officials have greater expertise than foreign officials 
about the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of the disclosure 
behavior of the issuers so selected. They are also politically respon­
sible to the people most affected by these issuers' disclosure behav­
ior. Thus, for these issuers, the level of disclosure selected by U.S. 
officials is likely to be closer to what is optimal than the level se­
lected by officials of any other country. 
This preliminary conclusion, however, is based on the simplify­
ing assumption that the choice of approach to the reach of the U.S. 
regime would have no effect on the level of disclosure that U.S. 
officials select. As discussed in these last two Parts, this assumption 
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is not entirely accurate. Retaining the current approach will lead to 
intensifying regulatory competition, whereas a switch to the issuer 
nationality approach will terminate such competition. Thus, com­
ing to a final conclusion about the best approach to statutory reach 
requires us to address the potential effect of regulatory competition 
on the overall analysis.11s 
The race to the bottom model presented above suggests that the 
effect of regulatory competition on U.S. welfare is bad, thus rein­
forcing the conclusion in Parts III and IV. The model shows that 
globalization's increasing pressure to lower U.S. disclosure stan­
dards can result in a level below what is substantively optimal. The 
model is premised, however, on the U.S. political system acting to 
maximize the interests of its residents. Accordingly, we would ex­
pect that the system, prior to significant influences from trans­
border transactions, would choose a level of required disclosure for 
entirely domestic issuyrs that is an unbiased estimate of what is op­
timal in terms of U.S. economic welfare. This premise suggests that 
the current level is substantively optimal since it was largely estab­
lished in such an era. I argue below that this is a reasonable prem­
ise for a study of this type. I also argue that even if this premise 
turns out to be incorrect, the likely reasons for its inaccuracy do not 
mean that we should revise the preliminary conclusion that a switch 
to the issuer nationality approach would increase U.S. economic 
welfare. 
178. Professors Choi and Guzman, for example, extol the benefits that competition 
among securities regimes could bring. They state, "competitive pressures between regimes 
[lead] to beneficial results as countries compete for both issuers and investors." Choi & 
Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 223. Such pressures, in their view, 
"restrain[ ]  the ability of regulators to pursue their own bureaucratic goals or cater to specific 
industry interests." Id. at 227. 
Romano is similarly enthusiastic, stating that "[a]s a competitive legal market supplants a 
monopolist federal agency in the fashioning of regulation, it would produce rules more 
aligned with the preferences of investors, whose decisions drive the capital market." 
Romano, supra note 15, at 2362. She takes as her model state competition for corporate 
charters, which she characterizes as "a responsive legal regime that has tended to maximize 
share value." Id. at 2362; see also ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENWS OF AMERICAN CoRPO· 
RATE LAW {1993). 
The proposition that state competition for corporate charters enhances U.S. economic 
welfare is in fact a controversial one and has been the subject of one of corporate law's most 
intense debates in the last 20 years. See Fox, Empowering Issuers, supra note 15, at 15-26 for 
a discussion of this controversy. 
Moreover, even if Romano is correct that state competition for corporate charters is 
share-value maximizing, Romano overstates her case when she says that "there is no reason 
to expect state competition to operate differently for securities law than corporate law." Ro. 
MANO, supra, at 2585. Unlike a firm's decision to include certain corporate governance terms 
through its choice of where to incorporate, a firm's decision to commit to a higher level of 
disclosure, through a securities regime choice, has positive externalities. See supra section 
IV.A.2. This can have a crucial effect on the workings of regulatory competition. See 
Bebchuk, supra note 112, at 1490-91. 
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1. A Preliminary Consideration · 
One consideration should be noted at the outset. If regulatory 
competition is desirable, the reason is because, without it, the U.S. 
would require too much disclosure, not too little. With the current 
U.S. approach to statutory reach, if the United States lowers its dis­
closure requirements, more issuers are likely to promote the sale 
and trading of their shares there. This flows from the fact, as estab­
lished in Part IV, that issuers with privately optimal disclosure 
levels below U.S. requirements - the substantial majority - will 
be deterred from the U.S. market, but issuers with privately optimal 
levels at or above the U.S. requirements will not be attracted by the 
strictness of the U.S. regime. They will be there already. Thus the 
engine of regulatory competition under the current U.S. approach 
- the desire to maximize the number of transactions effected in the 
United States - creates pressure to lower the country's required 
level of disclosure. 
2. The Starting Presumption: For Regulating Each State's 
Entirely Domestic Activities, Its Rules Are Superior to 
Those of Any Other State 
Where, as here, the issue under study is how to regulate a given 
kind of behavior with transborder effects, it is conventional to pre­
sume that countries act in their own best interests when regulating 
entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors.179 This conclu­
sion seems a reasonable starting presumption in the construction of 
a positive theory of such behavior and its regulation. Everything 
else being equal, a simpler model is preferred to a more compli­
cated one. A model on the international plane must in any event 
take account of interactions that one on the domestic plane does 
not, and so there is a greater premium for parsimony in the descrip­
tion of what goes on within each state. Thus the government of 
each country is assumed to act in the country's own best interest 
rather than in accord with some more complicated theory of gov-
179. This, for example, is a fundamental assumption behind the governmental interest 
method for identifying "true conflicts" of law. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the 
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990). 
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ernmental behavior180 such as public choice theory.181 Under this 
assumption, as just discussed, the current level of U.S. required dis­
closure is optimal. Given this, it would be a mistake for the United 
States to maintain the current approach to statutory reach as 
globalization proceeds. If it does so, as demonstrated in Part VI, 
the political pressures to lower U.S. standards will increase. As 
shown in the first section of Part VII, these pressures can succeed 
even though the government tries to act in the country's best inter­
ests. The resulting level of welfare is lower than what would prevail 
under the issuer nationality approach. Moreover, when the reac­
tions of other countries are taken into account, a race to the bottom 
develops, leaving the United States even worse off. 
What, though, would be the implications of incorporating the 
more complicated public choice theory of governmental behavior 
into the analysis? Public choice theory suggests that concentrated 
interest group action will cause a country to regulate more than is in 
its national interest. Public choice theory, applied within a purely 
domestic context, has in fact been used by some commentators to 
suggest that mandated disclosure represents overregulation at the 
behest of the securities industry.182 As a result, the required level 
of disclosure is, in their view, suboptimally high. If these commen­
tators are correct, regulatory competition might be a useful counter 
force. Such a conclusion would cut against my preliminary conclu-
180. Economists can appreciate this point by considering the following analogy. Here we 
are constructing a theory of statutory reach with respect to transborder interactions and 
make the assumption that nations regulate entirely domestic interactions of the same kind in 
a welfare maximizing way. We do this to help prevent the model from becoming overly 
complicated, notwithstanding the existence of public choice theory, a respectable, albeit con­
troversial, theory of domestic regulation that suggests otherwise. Economists do the same 
kind of thing. In constructing the orthodox theory of industrial organization, for example, 
they assume that firms - the component parts of each industry - act to maximize share 
value, see, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID N. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
EcoNoMic PERFORMANCE 38-39 & n. 43 (3d ed. 1990) (collecting studies), notwithstanding 
the existence of respectable, albeit controversial, theories of the firm that they do not. For 
examples of theories of the firm not based upon profit maximization, see WILLIAM J. 
BAUMOL, BusINESs BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GRoWIH 45-52 (rev. ed. 1967); 0LJVER E. Wn.­
LIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR (1964); Robin Marris, A Model of 
the "Managerial" Enterprise, 77 Q. J. OF EcoN. 185 {1963); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of 
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 253 (1959). 
181. For examples of public choice theory, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCIC, THE CALCULUS OF CoNSENT: LoGJCAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DE­
MOCRACY {1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOV­
ERNMENT (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & 
MGMT. Sa. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). 
182. See SusAN M. PHJLLIPs & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE Pusuc INTER­
EST 22-23 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest 
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 922 (1994). 
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sion in Parts ill and IV that a switch to the issuer nationality ap­
proach would increase U.S. welfare, since the issuer nationality 
approach stifles regulatory competition. A desire to promote regu­
latory competition would suggest instead that we maintain the cur­
rent approach to statutory reach or even adopt something more 
radical, such as a pure transaction location approach183 or an ap­
proach giving issuers the right to choose the disclosure regime by 
which they are governed irrespective of the issuer's nationality, the 
residence of its investors, or where its shares are offered or 
traded.184 
Advocates of approaches intended to promote regulatory com­
petition must, however, establish two things to overcome the con­
ventional and reasonable presumption that states act in their own 
best interests. First, they need to show that within a purely domes­
tic context, concentrated interest group action in fact results in too 
high a level of mandated disclosure. Second, assuming that it does, 
they need to show that regulatory competition at the international 
level would be a helpful antidote to the problem. Neither will be 
easy to show. 
3. The Public Choice Critique in the Purely Domestic Context 
Several factors cast doubt on the story that within a purely do­
mestic context concentrated interest group actions result in too high 
a level of mandated disclosure. To start, there is debate about the 
effectiveness of public choice theory in explaining regulation gener­
ally. There is hardly a consensus that most political action consists 
of self-interested rent seeking.185 Moreover, even if one believes 
that public choice theory has considerable explanatory value gener­
ally, the story may err when applied to securities disclosure. The 
story does not correctly identify all of the interests of the securities 
industry. Some members may well desire a high level of mandatory 
disclosure in order to reduce their costs of collecting information. 
Others, however, may prefer a low level. For example, if only a low 
level is required, more firms would be willing to be public compa­
nies, thereby resulting in more fee-generating initial public offerings 
and secondary trades. The story also omits consideration of con-
183. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 221-23. 
184. See id. at 231-35; Romano, supra note 15. 
185. For critical reactions to public choice theory, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility 
Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179 
(1996); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social 
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985). 
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centrated interest groups outside of the securities industry, such as 
the managements of established public corporations, whose inter­
ests are likely to favor low levels of required disclosure.186 Finally, 
it does not account for the possibility that the interests for more 
disclosure attributed to persons in the securities industry may ser­
endipitously coincide with correction of important market failures 
in issuer disclosure due to the public goods nature of information 
and agency problems between the managements of established issu­
ers and their stockholders.187 The actual beneficiaries of such a cor­
rection would, under public choice theory, be too diffuse to be 
politically effective. 
4. Even If the Public Choice Critique Is Valid in the Purely 
Domestic Context, Regulatory Competition Is Not 
Necessarily a Helpful Antidote 
Assume now that the public choice theorists' story is correct: 
within a purely domestic context, the forces they identify result in 
too high a level of required disclosure. That does not necessarily 
imply that promoting regulatory competition is a helpful antidote to 
the problem. Promoting competition means giving issuers some de­
gree of freedom to choose the regime they prefer, i.e., maintaining 
the current approach to regulatory reach or something more radi­
cal. Issuer entrepreneurs and managers are the ones who will 
choose.188 Authorities in each country will thus try to have a re­
quired level of disclosure that is attractive to the entrepreneurs or 
managers of as many issuers as possible. Most U.S. issuers would 
therefore likely have the option of binding themselves to provide 
something close to their respective privately optimal levels of dis­
closure regulation.189 
186. See supra sections IV.A.2.a; IV.A.2.b.ii. 
187. See supra section IV.A.2. See also Coffee, supra note 10; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 112, at 684-85. 
188. See supra section IV.A.1. 
189. The exact pattern of national regimes that would develop with regulatory competi­
tion is difficult to predict because the possible reactions of each country to the moves of each 
other country are complex. The final pattern could be a situation in which each country tries 
to satisfy the preferences of the entrepreneurs or managers of a different niche group of 
issuers, or it could be a situation in which each country converges on the same single level 
that would attract the maximum number of issuers. See Choi & Guzman, National Laws, 
supra note 9, at 1869-82. Whichever occurs, entrepreneurs and managers drive the process, 
and, as we have seen, would prefer to bind their firms to a level of disclosure below the level 
that would maximize social welfare. See supra section IV.A.2. Thus the typical U.S. issuer 
will end up disclosing at a suboptimally low level. 
It is useful to consider an example of the pattern of national regimes that might develop 
in a plausible world of the future if the recommended switch to an exclusive issuer nationality 
approach to statutory reach is not undertaken. Assume that it is still modestly more expen-
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Whether it is desirable to give U.S. issuers this option depends 
on a comparison of two ways in which society can choose the level 
at which each issuer discloses. One way - the way of regulatory 
competition - is to rely on the decisions of issuer entrepreneurs 
and managers, decisions based on their calculations of the benefits 
and costs privately experienced by them. The other - the way of 
the issuer nationality approach - is to rely on the decisions of the 
U.S. government, which represents the persons who primarily expe­
rience the actual benefits and costs of U.S. issuers' disclosures. In 
making this comparison, concern should be with how close the level 
chosen is to each issuer's socially optimal level, i.e., where the social 
marginal costs of the issuer's disclosure equals the social marginal 
benefits of its disclosure. 
As we saw in Part IV, the entrepreneur and manager calcula­
tions of private benefit and cost are not likely to correspond closely 
to the social benefits and costs: private costs of disclosure are likely 
to be larger than social costs and private benefits less than social 
benefits.190 Thus their calculations will be biased: they will want to 
sive and inconvenient for investors to place orders abroad. It is thus still more advantageous 
than not, everything else being equal, for an issuer to have its shares offered and traded in the 
United States, where there is a huge pool of potential investors. Suppose, in such a world, 
the United States lowered its level to just above the level of the next major capitalist country 
- the United Kingdom. As long as the United Kingdom does not raise its level to one above 
the reduced U.S. level, the United States would lose no old issuers, see supra section IV.B.2, 
and it would pick up a substantial number of new ones - those that find the old strict U.S. 
level of disclosure tQo burdensome to be worth better access to U.S. investors but not the 
substantially less strict new U.S. level. It is very unlikely that the United Kingdom would in 
fact raise its standards above the reduced U.S. level. Doing so would prompt issuers with 
privately optimal disclosure levels above the new lowered U.S. level to register in the United 
Kingdom, but that would not add much to U.K. trading volume since such an issuer could 
also register without additional burden in the United States, which is a much larger market. 
It is much more likely that the United Kingdom, if it responds at all, would lower its required 
level too. This would pick up issuers with privately optimal disclosure levels below the low­
ered U.S. level that find better access to U.S. investors worth the U.S. disclosure burden if 
the next less strict regime of a country with an important market is only slightly less strict 
than the U.S. regime, but would not find such better access worth the U.S. disclosure burden 
if the next less strict regime is significantly less strict. If the U.K. did lower its level, the U.S. 
could further lower its level, again gaining more issuers. They might ratchet down together in 
this fashion. How far this would go would depend on the required level of the third most 
demanding country with a major market and its reactions, and so on, as well as the overall 
distribution of privately optimal disclosure levels among the world's issuers. 
At the bottom there will probably be some small country, with little in the way of domes­
tic issuers, offering a disclosure regime that requires essentially no disclosure. In other 
words, some country in its disclosure laws is likely to become the equivalent of Luxembourg 
in its banking laws. In fact, Luxembourg itself is already reputed to provide only a "nods and 
winks" review of offers and sales of new issues of securities listed on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Regulatory Harmony in the European Commu­
nities: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. lNrL. L. 19, 41 {1990). How many 
issuers have privately optimal disclosure levels that low, however, is questionable and so we 
would not expect a major jurisidction to descend to this level. 
190. See supra section IV.A.2. 
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choose a regime requiring them to disclose less than is socially opti­
mal. The public choice story is that the government has biases run­
ning in the opposite direction. One should not favor regulatory 
competition over the issuer nationality approach, however, unless 
one believes that the level chosen by the government is even more 
biased than the level required by the regimes chosen by legally un­
constrained private entrepreneurs and managers. Few legal com­
mentators (including those with a law and economics orientation) 
appear to hold the belief that issuer entrepreneurs and managers 
should be free to choose their own disclosure levels.191 
5. Public Choice Arguments for Not Promoting 
Regulatory Competition 
Adding a public choice component to the analysis of what ap­
proach to statutory reach is best may actually add to the overall 
strength of my conclusion that there should be a shift to an exclu­
sive issuer nationality approach. As we have seen, with the regula­
tory competition prompted by the current approach, persons who 
receive rents dependent on the volume of transactions effected in 
the United States would, as globalization proceeds, forgo increasing 
amounts in rent if U.S. disclosure standards are not lowered. We 
have already seen how this can cause a government to lower stan­
dards when the gain in rents exceeds the welfare loss from having a 
substantively suboptimal level of required disclosure. Public choice 
theory suggests that the relaxation may occur even if these foregone 
rents from the United States not lowering its level are less than the 
welfare losses from the United States lowering its level - with U.S. 
issuers consequently disclosing at a less than optimal level in re­
source allocation terms. This is because the gainers are concen-
191. See supra note 112. Easterbrook and Fischel for example, conclude that the U.S. 
mandatory disclosure regime ought to be retained after explicitly considering public choice 
theory. See Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 112, at 684-85. Addressing a somewhat analo­
gous problem within our domestic federal system of corporate and securities law-making, 
Lucian Bebchuk has argued that placing the regulation of corporate disclosure under the 
authority of state corporate law rather than federal securities law would, because of regula­
tory competition, result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure. See Bebchuk, supra note 
112, at 1490-91. 
Jonathan Macey, on the other hand, finds "[a]s markets have become more efficient, soci­
ety's need to devote resources to support a statutory regime of mandatory disclosure 
designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any information that was supplied by 
the force of law now is supplied by the marketplace." Macey, supra note 182, at 928. The 
efficiency with which markets impound the information that issuers choose to release, how­
ever, is a different issue from the question of whether issuers will choose to release as much 
information as is socially optimal. Roberta Romano proposes a system by which issuers 
choose by which country's disclosure regime they wish to be bound. See Romano, supra note 
15. A critique of her proposal is found supra in section IV.A.2. 
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trated and more capable of political action than the losers, who are 
many but diffuse, and who each get just a little less because of effi­
ciency losses from the way capital is utilized in the United States. 
There is thus no necessary inconsistency between a belief in public 
choice theory and the conclusion that in the context of a globalizing 
securities market, regulatory competition will result in each country 
having too low a level of mandated disclosure. 
6. Regulatory Competition and Differences Among U.S. Issuers 
in Their Socially Optimal Disclosure Levels192 
Allowing a U.S. issuer to choose its disclosure regime has an­
other positive feature, not considered so far. This is its potential to 
accommodate differences among U.S. issuers in their socially opti­
mal levels of disclosure. The potential accommodation would work 
as follows. First, the regulatory competition arising from issuer 
choice may lead to a differentiation in disclosure regimes across 
countries. Each issuer then may select the regime requiring the 
level of disclosure closest to its particular social optimum. This po­
tential customizing of required disclosure is the reason that Profes­
sors Choi and Guzman support a transaction location approach to 
statutory reach.193 
This potentially positive feature of the transaction location ap­
proach is, however, overwhelmed by its problems. To start, it is not 
at all clear that the regulatory competition arising from the transac­
tion location approach would lead to a differentiated set of regimes. 
It might instead lead to all countries' standards converging toward 
the single level designed to attract the most issuers worldwide.194 If 
this happens, U.S. issuers will move from a standard designed for 
the average U.S. issuer to one designed for the average issuer 
worldwide. This movement is in the opposite direction from the 
customizing of disclosure requirements that Choi and Guzman 
hope the transaction location approach will bring. 
192. I discuss the matters considered in this subsection more extensively in Fox, 
Empowering Issuers, supra note 15, at 51-63. 
193. See Choi & Guzman, National Laws, supra note 9, at 1865-83. 
194. Choi and Guzman acknowledge that such a convergence equilibrium is quite possi­
ble, particularly in a world in which countries possess natural advantages in retaining domes­
tic issuers. See id. at 1879-81. The United States will still have such natural advantage, at 
least residually, for the foreseeable future, although, as discussed in Part VI, it will be weak­
ening over time. As long as financial information is not fully globalized, U.S. investors will 
exhibit some bias toward investing in U.S. issuers. And as long as there is also some cost and 
convenience advantage to U.S. investors in investing in shares offered and traded in the 
United States, many U.S. issuers will make their shares available in U.S. markets so as not to 
put obstacles in the way of their largest, most natural group of investors. 
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The second problem is that the persons choosing each issuer's 
disclosure regime will be its entrepreneurs or managers. As dis­
cussed at numerous points above, they have a bias toward choosing 
a level of required disclosure lower than the issuer's socially opti­
mal disclosure level.195 Thus, even if a differentiated set of regimes 
is available and some country offers a required disclosure level just 
equal to the issuer's social optimum, the entrepreneurs or managers 
will instead prefer the regime of some other country with a lower 
required level of disclosure. 
Two observations are in order with respect to this second prob­
lem. One, discussed in Part IV, is that the difference between an 
issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure and its socially optimal 
one is likely to be substantial.196 The other, discussed in Part V, is 
that there are important differences among issuers worldwide in 
terms of their socially optimal levels of disclosure that are signifi­
cantly related to the nationalities of the issuers involved. These two 
observations combine to suggest that the transaction location ap­
proach's bias for underdisclosure will outweigh its capacity to ac­
commodate individual differences among U.S. issuers, which 
typically are not great relative to differences between U.S. issuers 
and issuers from other countries. Thus, compared to the issuer na­
tionality approach, the transaction location approach is likely to 
lead to a greater, not smaller, average deviation between each U.S. 
issuer's required level of disclosure and its socially optimal one.197 
The third problem is that the transaction location approach 
would apply the U.S. regime to foreign issuers whose shares are 
offered or traded in the United States. The application of the U.S. 
regime to such foreign issuers would be harmful to U.S. interests, as 
discussed in Parts III and IV.198 For the foreseeable future, there 
will continue to be at least a residual cost and convenience advan­
tage to U.S. investors from investing in shares offered and traded in 
the United States. This continued cost and convenience advantage 
means that some foreign issuers will register under the U.S. regime 
195. See supra section IV.A.2. 
196. See supra section IV.A.2. 
197. Moreover, if the need to customize is important, the U.S. disclosure regime itself 
could attempt to acco=odate differences among U.S. issuers in their socially optimal disclo­
sure levels. It does so to some extent already in the primary offering disclosure area. Many 
offerings are granted exemptions based on the size of the offering, the number of investors or 
the wealth and sophistication of the investors. Many of these exemptions require some kind 
of disclosure, but at a lower level than what is required with conventional Section 5 registra­
tion. Small issuers can also use the simplified procedures and lower disclosure requirements 
under Regulation A. 
198. See supra sections III.B.2; III.B.3; and IV.B. 
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even though, for most, it requires more disclosure of them than is 
socially optimal, thereby creating foreign relations problems for the 
United States. All other foreign issuers of any significance will stay 
out of the United States solely because of the desire to avoid such 
registration. Their doing so will require U.S. investors either to in­
cur extra cost and inconvenience or forgo an important range of 
investment opportunities. It will also reduce the incomes of U.S. 
residents whose rents depend on the volume of transactions ef­
fected in the United States.199 
7. Summary 
A switch to the issuer nationality approach has clear advantages. 
Compared to officials of the country where the sales or trades in a 
U.S. issuer's shares occur or the country where its investors reside, 
U.S. authorities have greater expertise concerning the resource al­
location and risk reduction effects of the issuer's disclosure and 
greater political incentives to choose the right level. Moreover, 
U.S. officials receive more direct negative feedback if the level they 
choose is wrong. The only way to justify retention of the current 
U.S. approach to statutory reach - or a move to an approach giv­
ing issuers even more freedom choosing their regimes - is to show 
that the regulatory competition engendered thereby has benefits 
and that the benefits overwhelm the clear advantages of the issuer 
nationality approach. The case for such a showing is not persuasive. 
The primary argument for permitting U.S. issuers to choose 
their disclosure regimes is based on the claim that the current U.S. 
domestic disclosure regime requires more disclosure than is good 
for us, a tendency that regulatory competition will counteract. This 
claim runs contrary to the conventional and reasonable starting pre­
sumption in studies concerning the regulation of behavior with 
transnational effects that countries' domestic regulations represent 
their own best interests. Equally important, a number of factors 
cast doubt on the proposition that in the particular area of disclo­
sure, the United States tends to overregulate. 
The conclusion that the United States is the better regulator of 
U.S. issuers would not change, however, even if, for the sake of 
argument, I were to incorporate public choice theory into the analy-
199. The investor residency approach to statutory reach permits a more limited degree of 
issuer choice also, and to that extent creates the same problems in terms of the U.S. regime's 
potential application to foreign issuers. The system recommended by Professor Romano -
whereby each issuer could choose its disclosure regime regardless of its nationality, who its 
investors were, or where transactions in its shares occurred - would not lead to the kind of 
problems discussed in this paragraph of the text. See Romano, supra note 15. 
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sis and accept the claim that the U.S. domestic disclosure regime 
requires too much disclosure for the typical U.S. issuer. Public 
choice theory suggests that regulatory competition creates its own 
imperfection: regulators giving special weight to the increasing 
political pressure from members of the securities industry con­
cerned with the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. market. 
Thus, to be successful, the argument for issuer choice needs a polit­
ical theory akin to second best theory in welfare economics. The 
political theory would need to show that this second imperfection 
created by regulatory competition is optimal given the assumed im­
perfection that domestic disclosure standards are currently too 
high. Unless a proponent of regulatory competition can provide 
such a theory, there is as much reason to believe these competition­
induced political pressures will represent an overdose, as an appro­
priate antidote, to the assumed problem of too much disclosure reg­
ulation. Moreover, even if the current U.S. regime requires more 
disclosure than is socially optimal for the typical U.S. issuer and, as 
globalization proceeds, the regulatory competition from permitting 
issuers choice did result in just the correct readjustment downward 
in the U.S. requirements, an approach based on issuer choice will 
also result in many U.S. issuers choosing some other regime. Given 
the preferences of the persons making these choices, these issuers 
will generally choose regimes requiring a lower than socially opti­
mal level of disclosure. 
A second argument for permitting issuer choice is that doing so 
can better accommodate differences among U.S. issuers' socially 
optimal levels of disclosure. There is no assurance, however, that 
permitting choice \vill lead to a set of regimes corresponding to 
these differing issuer needs. Each of the world's major jurisdictions 
may, in an effort to appeal to the broadest segment of the market, 
in the end require approximately the same level of disclosure as all 
the others. If this happens, the resulting uniform requirements will 
be ones less suited to the needs of individual U.S. issuers than the 
current U.S. regime. Even if issuer choice does lead to an appropri­
ately differentiated set of regimes, the preferences of the persons 
making the issuers' choices again means that there \vill be a bias for 
issuers to disclose at a socially suboptimal level. This bias is likely 
to outweigh the customizing benefits of permitting issuer choice. 
Finally, assuming that issuer choice is the result of an approach to 
statutory reach based on transaction location or investor residency, 
the consequent application of the U.S. regime to foreign issuers will 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 797 
reduce the volume of transactions effected in the United States and 
damage U.S. foreign relations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The case is strong for the United States to switch to the issuer 
nationality approach for determining the reach of the U.S. 
mandatory disclosure rules. Such a switch assures that the U.S. re­
gime will be applied to all the world's issuers whose disclosure be­
havior primarily affects U.S. welfare and not to ones whose 
disclosure behavior primarily affects only the welfare of persons in 
other countries. A switch to issuer nationality also reduces the risk 
that political pressures accompanying increasing globalization will 
succeed in relaxing U.S. standards below the level that maximizes 
U.S. welfare. 
On its face, a proposal not to impose the U.S. regime on foreign 
issuers whose shares are offered or traded in the United States 
seems radical, notwithstanding its merits. That does not mean its 
chances of adoption are poor. The same forces that would tirelessly 
work to reduce U.S. disclosure standards if the U.S. retains its cur­
rent approach to statutory reach could easily change course and 
support the proposal set out here. There are already signs of this in 
the New York Stock Exchange call to allow exchange trading in the 
United States of the shares of prominent foreign issuers based on 
international accounting standards rather than U.S. generally ac­
cepted accounting practices.200 Applying the issuer nationality ap­
proach to secondary trading of these better known issuers would be 
an opening wedge that would make the approach feel less radical 
over time and permit analysis of the merits of extending it further. 
It is also important to keep time frames in mind. While trends 
toward globalization of the market for securities make my proposal 
far more likely to be adopted than might appear to be the case at 
first glance, a nationally based system of disclosure regulation em­
ploying the issuer nationality approach to statutory reach is proba­
bly only workable into the medium-term future. Contrary to the 
assertions of purveyors of what some call "globaloney," little of the 
world's production today is being undertaken by issuers with no 
clear national center of gravity.201 But the day will come, perhaps a 
few decades off, when some significant portion will be. At that 
200. See supra note 148. 
201. See supra note 40. Tue European Community can, to the extent necessary, be 
counted as a "nation" for purposes of this statement since the implications are the same. 
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time, the arguments against a uniform international regime to regu­
late the disclosure of at least this special class of issuers will lose 
much of their force, particularly if an international institution with 
greater political legitimacy and expertise than we find today can be 
developed to promulgate its rules and provide administration. The 
problem for U.S. policymakers right now, however, is how to fash­
ion a practical approach to statutory reach that meets our needs 
into the medium-term future. Issuer nationality is the solution. 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 799 
APPENDIX I 
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION ON LEVEL OF TRADING IN Two COUNTRIES, ONE 
WITH STRICT DISCLOSURE STANDARDS AND ONE WITH LENIENT 
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS 
The model presented below posits two countries, A; which has 
more lenient disclosure standards and a larger pool of investors, 
and B, which has stricter standards and a smaller pool. Thus, B is 
like the United States, and A like the rest of the world. Each coun­
try applies its rules in accordance with the goal of investor protec­
tion. Complying with B's stricter standards implies that A's 
standards are met as well. The model is intended to help analyze 
two issues that arise when the investor residency is the approach to 
statutory reach adopted by country B. First, assuming that B's stan­
dards remain unchanged, what would be the impact of the full 
global diffusion of financial information on the level of share trad­
ing in each country? Second, what would the impact of full global 
diffusion of information be on issuer sensitivity, i.e., the power of a 
given reduction in B's required level of disclosure to increase the 
level of transactions effected in B? 
The model is structured in terms of two representative issuers, X 
from B and Y from A. If everything that could be publicly known 
about X and Y were known about them in each country, a share of 
one would, in each possible future state of nature, be seen as pro­
ducing a return just equal the return of the other. There are two 
pools of investors, those from A and those from B. Each pool of 
investors will have a downward sloping demand curve for each se­
curity, reflecting the security's variance-covariance characteristics 
and investors' heterogeneous expectations (as a result, at least in 
part, from less than full diffusion of information within each pool). 
Since A's pool is larger than B's, the downward slopes of its de­
mand curves are shallower than those of B's. As long as there is 
not full global diffusion of financial information - i.e., as long as 
less is known about an issuer among the pool of investors abroad 
than among investors in its home pool - the foreign investors im­
pose an ignorance discount in forming their demand for the issuer's 
shares.202 Q is the total number of shares of an issuer that will be 
202. This description of the demand function of foreign investors for an issuer's shares 
corresponds to the fact that investors display a home country bias in their choice of shares 
and that this bias is generally attributed to differences between the information investors 
possess concerning home country issuers and the information they possess concerning foreign 
issuers. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Domestic Saving and International Capital Movements in 
the Long Run and the Short Run, 21 EuR. EcoN. REv. 129, 130-31, 148 n.27 (1983) (finding 
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outstanding and it is proportional to the size of the firm. We as­
sume nothing about the distribution of firm sizes in each economy. 
We do assume for the moment that the extra burden of meeting B's 
stricter disclosure standards, C,203 is proportional to the firm's size 
and would be identical if X and Y were the same size, i.e., if Cx is 
the total cost of compliance for X and Cy for Y, for each issuer, Cx 
(i) would equal Cy if the issuers were the same size, and (ii) varies 
proportionally with Q so that CxlQx is constant and equals Cy!Qy 
for the other firm. 
Neither issuer can have any investors resident in B unless it 
complies with B's disclosure requirements. Each can control 
whether it has any such investors. Each is going to be a public com­
pany in any event and so its choice as to whether or not to comply 
with B's standards depends on whether the price advantages of hav­
ing investors in B as well as in A are greater than the costs of com­
pliance with B's standards. 
Definition of Demand Functions 
Ax0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were only 
available to investors in A 
Bx0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were only 
available to investors in B 
ABx0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were 
available to investors in both A and B 
Ay0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were only 
available to investors in A 
By0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were only 
available to investors in B 
ABy0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were 
available to investors in both A and B 
substantial imperfections in the international capital market and attributing them in part to 
investors having a higher subjective variance on foreign returns due to less information); 
Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Savings and lntemational Capital Flows, 90 
EcoN. J. 314, 316, 321 (1980) (finding a high correlation between marginal increases in do­
mestic savings and in domestic investment and attributing these in part to investors' greater 
uncertainty concerning foreign issuers due to less information); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Interest 
Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World, 10 J. MONETARY EcoN. 335, 357 (1983) 
(explaining home bias as the result of the local nature of information but noting the lack of 
models that even begin to explain the relationship). I discuss this subject in more detail in 
Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at sections I.B.l and I.D. 
203. C is net of any reputational benefit that the issuer receives from complying with the 
U.S. regime and thus is equivalent to the term "burden" in Parts VI and VII. I assume that 
for X and Y compliance is, on a net basis, in fact a burden for these issuers. See supra note 
_152-57 and accompanying text. 
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Ax1(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of X if they were only available to investors in A 
Bxi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of X if they were only available to investors in B 
ABxi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of X if they were available to investors in both A and B 
Ayi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of Y if they were only available to investors in A 
Byi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of Y if they were only available to investors in B 
AByi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information 
for shares of Y if they were available to investors in both A and B 
Demand Curve Assumptions and Specifications 
Note: All the demand curves for Issuer X shares are depicted in Dia­
gram I - X and all the demand curves for Issuer Y shares are de­
picted in Diagram I - Y. 
(i) Axo(Q) = d - fQ (Q ;::: 0) 
Bxo(Q) = e - gQ (Q ;::: 0) 
Ayo(Q) = e - fQ (Q ;::: 0) 
Byo(Q) = d - gQ (Q ;::: 0) 
These are standard straight line demand functions where price de­
clines with quantity offered, e, d, f, and g being all greater than 0. 
e > d and g > f even though in each possible future state of nature 
shares of x and y will yield identical returns. e > d reflects the fact 
that currently, with less full global distribution of information, for 
all Q's, the foreign country's issuer is discounted by (e - ti). g > f 
reflects the fact that A represents a larger pool of investors than 
does B. Therefore each price would be the reservation price for 
more investors in A than in B even if evaluations of the issuers were 
distributed through the two populations in the same proportions.204 
In the example depicted in Diagrams I-X and 1-Y, e = $10.60, d = 
$10.50, f = .0025 and g = .0050. Thus the discount is $.10. 
(ii) Bxo(Q) = Bx1(Q) and Ay0(Q) = Ay1(Q), i.e., full global diffu­
sion of financial information concerning an issuer does not change 
the evaluation of, or demand for, the issuer's shares in its home 
country. 
(iii) Axi(Q) = e - fQ 
Byi(Q) = e - gQ 
204. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 225. 
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With full global diffusion of financial information, investors in the 
country different from the issuer's home country learn what inves­
tors in the issuer's country already know about the issuer. Since the 
issuers' shares have the same prospects, evaluations of the issuers 
are distributed in the same proportions through the pools of inves­
tors in the issuer's home country and the one abroad, but A has a 
larger pool of investors than B and so the slope of the demand 
curve is shallower. 
Derivation of ABxo(Q), ABx1(Q), AByo(Q) and AByz(Q) 
ABx0 
(1) Axo(Q) = p = d - fQ (Q ;::: 0) 
Let Qx00 = Quantity of X shares currently demanded in A at price 
P. 
(2) QXoa = (1/f)(d - P) 
= 0  
(3) Bx0(Q) = P = e - gQ 
P � d  
P > d  
(Q ;::: 0) 
Let Qx0b = Quantity of X shares currently demanded in B at price 
P. 
= (llg)(e - P) 
= 0  
p �  e 
P >  e 
Let Qxoab = Qxoa + Qx0b = Quantity of X shares currently 
demanded at price P in A and B together if they are available to 
both pools of investors. 
, 
Therefore, 
= Qxob = (1/g)(e - P) 
= (llf)(d - P) + (Jig) (e - P) 
= (llfg)[(gd + fe) - (g + f)P] 
P = ABx0(Q) = e - gQ 
P = ABx0(Q) = (gd + fe)!(g + f) - Q(gf/(g + f)) 
d < P � e  
P � d  
0 < Q � (e - d)/g 
Q > (e - d)lg 
In the example depicted in Diagram I-X, (e - d)/g = 20. If X has 
fewer than 20 shares outstanding, the demand for them in B alone 
would put the price above $10.50 and hence no shares would be 
demanded by investors in A, who put a discount on shares from B 
(reflected by Ax0 starting at $10.50, $.10 below Bx0). Thus in this 
range, ABx0 tracks Bx0• If X has more than 20 shares outstanding, 
the demand for them if they were sold in B alone would put the 
price below $10.50 and hence there would be a demand by residents 
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of A. Tb.us in this range, ABx0 represents the horizontal aggrega­
tion Bx0 and Ax0 and has a shallower slope than either one alone. 
ABx1 
(1) Axz(Q) = P = e - fQ (Q � 0) 
Let Qx1a = Quantity of X shares that would be demanded in A at 
price P after full global diffusion of financial information. 
(2) Qxza = (1/f)(e - P) P � e 
= 0  P > e 
(3) Bx1(Q) = P = e - gQ (Q � 0) 
Let Qxzb = Quantity of X shares demanded in B at price P after full 
global diffusion of financial information. 
= (1/g)(e - P) 
= 0 
p �  e 
P > e 
Let Qxzab = Qx1a + Qxzb = Quantity of X shares demanded at price 
P in A and B together after full global diffusion of financial infor­
mation if they are available to both pools of investors. 
Therefore, 
= (1/f)(e - P) + (1/g) (e - P) 
= [(f + g)/fg] [e - P] 
P = ABxz(Q) = e - Q[gf/(f + g)] 
p �  e 
In the example depicted in Diagram I-X, after full diffusion, inves­
tors in A no longer put a discount on shares from B and so Ax1 
starts at $10.60 just as Bx1 does. Tb.us, whatever number of shares 
X has outstanding, ABx1 represents the horizontal aggregation Bx1 
and Axz. and, over the full range of Q, it has a shallower slope than 
either one alone. 
AByo 
(1) Ayo(Q)= P = e - fQ (Q � 0) 
Let Qy0a = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded in A at price 
P. 
(2) QYoa = (l!f)(e - P) 
= 0 
(3) Byo(Q) = P = d - gQ 
p �  e 
P > e 
(Q � 0) 
Let Qy0b = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded in B at price 
P. 
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= (llg)(d - P) 
= 0  
P � d  
P > d 
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Let QYoab = QYoa + Qy0b = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded 





= QYoa = (llf)(e - P) 
= (llf)(e - P) + (Jig) (d - P) 
= (llfg)[(ge + fd) - (g + f)P] 
P = ABy0(Q) = e - fQ 
P = AByo(Q) = (ge+fd)!(g+f) - (fg!(g+f))Q 
d < P �  e 
P � d  
0 < Q � (e - d)lf 
Q > (e - d)lf 
In the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, (e - d)lf = 40. If Y has 
fewer than 40 shares outstanding, the demand for them in A alone 
would put the price above $10.50 and hence no shares would be 
demanded by investors in B, who put a discount on shares from A 
(reflected by By0 starting at $10.50, $.10 below Ay0). Thus in this 
range, ABy0 tracks Ay0• If X has more than 40 shares outstanding, 
the demand for them if they were sold in A alone would put the 
price below $10.50 and hence there would be a demand for them by 
residents of B if they are available there as well. Thus in this range, 
ABy0 represents the horizontal aggregation By0 and Ay0 and has a 
shallower slope than either one alone. 
ABy1 
(1) Ay1(Q)= P = e - fQ (Q � 0) 
Let Qy10 = Quantity of Y shares that would be demanded in A at 
price P after full global diffusion of financial information. 
(2) QY1a = (llf)(e - P) P � e 
= 0 P > e 
(3) By1(Q) = P = e - gQ (Q ?:.0) 
Let Qy1b = Quantity of Y shares demanded in B at price P after full 
global diffusion of financial information. 
Qy1b = (Jlg)(e - P) P � e 
= 0 P >  e 
Let Qy1ab = QY1a + Qy1b = Quantity of Y shares demanded at price P 
in A and B together after full global diffusion of financial informa­
tion if they are available to both pools of investors. 
QY1ab = (llf)(e - P) + (Jig) (e - P) p �  e 
December 1998] Statutory Reach 805 
= [(f + g)/fg] [e - P] 
Therefore, 
P = ABy1(Q) = e - Q[gf/(f + g)] 
In the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, after full diffusion, inves­
tors in B no longer put a discount on shares from A and so By1 
starts at $10.60 just as Ay1 does. Thus, whatever number of shares 
Y has outstanding, ABy1 represents the horizontal aggregation By1 
and Ayi. and, over the full range of Q, it has a shallower slope than 
either one alone. 
A. Proof that if regulation remains unchanged, full global 
diffusion of financial information will reduce the number of B's 
issuers that choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements. 
If regulations in both B and A remain unchanged after full 
global diffusion of financial information, then, for any given 
number, Q, of shares that X, the representative B issuer, will have 
outstanding, the per share extra cost of complying with B's stricter 
regime, C(Q)IQ, will be unchanged. Before full diffusion, X will 
comply with B's disclosure requirements if ABx0(Q) - Axo(Q) > 
C(Q)/Q, i.e., if the cost of compliance, which permits access to in­
vestors in B, is less than the price damage from relying solely on in 
investors in A. Similarly, after full diffusion, X will comply if 
ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q) > C(Q)/Q. For any given Q, full diffusion 
reduces the gain from complying, and hence, at constant cost, the 
likelihood that the issuer chooses to do so if [ABxo(Q) - Ax0(Q)] -
[ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] > 0, i.e., if the price damage from relying only 
on investors in A goes down. As shown below, this is so for all 
values of Q. 
Q � (e - d)/g 
[ABx0(Q) - Ax0(Q) ] - [ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] = 
[(e - gQ) - (d - fQ) ] - [(e - (gf/(f + g)) Q - (e - fQ)] = 
(e - d) - (g - gfl(f + g))Q = 
(e - d) - Qg(l - f/(f + g)) 
Thus, in this range of Q, the reduction in the gain from compliance, 
is a declining function of Q. It is positive at Q = 0 since e > d. If it 
is also positive at the end point of this range of Q, i.e., at Q = (e -
d)lg, it is positive throughout the range. At Q = (e - d)lg, its value 
is 
(e - d) - [(e - d)lg][g (l - f/(f + g))] 
(e - d)[ 1 - (1 - f/(f + g))] = 
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(e - d)fjl(f +'g)] >0 
since f >  0, g > 0 and e > d. Thus, in this range of Q, diffusion will 
result in a reduction of the value of compliance. 
Q > (e - d)/g 
[ABxo(Q) - Axo(Q]] - [ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] = 
[(fe + gd)l(f + g) - Q(gfl(f + g)) - (d - fQ)] -
[(e - Q(gfl(f + g)) - (e - fQ)] = 
(fe + gd)l(f + g) - d = 
(fe + gd)l(f + g) - d(f + g)l(f + g) = 
(fe - fd)l(f + g) > 0 
since e > d > 0, f > 0 , and g > 0. 
Thus full global diffusion of knowledge will result in a reduction 
in the benefit from compliance for all values of Q. With the burden 
of compliance constant, fewer B issuers will comply with B's stricter 
disclosure requirements. This can again be seen in the example de­
picted in Diagram I-X, where (e - d)/g = 20. First consider the situ­
ation if X has 20 or fewer shares outstanding. The pre-diffusion 
price damage from relying on investors from A alone (the differ­
ence between Ax0 and ABx0) starts at $.10 and declines up to the 
point that X has 20 shares outstanding. There, the price damage is 
$.05. The after-diffusion price damage from relying on investors 
from A alone (the difference between Ax1 and ABx1) starts at 0 and 
increases in proportion to the number of shares X has outstanding 
so that at the point that X has 20 shares outstanding the price dam­
age is .0166. Thus over this whole range, the post-diffusion price 
damage from relying solely on investors from A is less than the pre­
diffusion price damage, starting at a difference of $.05 and ending at 
a difference of $.033. The difference in price damage before and 
after diffusion remains at $.033 for any number of X shares out­
standing in excess of 20. Thus, whatever the burden of compliance, 
there is a smaller range of issuers from B that will find it worthwhile 
after diffusion than before. 
B. Proof that if regulation remains unchanged, fell global 
diffusion of financial information will increase the number of A's 
issuers that choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements. 
If regulations in both B and A remain unchanged after full 
global diffusion of financial information, then, for any given 
number, Q, of shares that Y, the representative A issuer, will have 
outstanding, the per share extra cost of complying with B's stricter 
regime, C(Q)/Q, will be unchanged. Before full diffusion, Y will 
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comply with B's disclosure requirements if AByo(Q) - Ay0(Q) > 
C(Q)/Q, i.e. if the cost of compliance, which permits access to in­
vestors in B, is less than the price damage from relying solely on 
investors in A. Similarly, after full diffusion, Y will comply if 
AByi(Q) - Ay1(Q) > C(Q)/Q. For any given Q, full diffusion in­
creases the gain from complying, and hence, at constant cost, the 
likelihood that the issuer chooses to do so if [AByo(Q) - Ay0(Q)] -
[AByi(Q) - Ayi(Q)] < 0. As shown below, this is so for all values of 
Q. 
Q ::;; (e - d)/f 
[AByo(Q) - Ayo(Q)] - [ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q)] = 
AByo(Q) - ABy1(Q) = 
[e - fQ] - [e - Q(gfl(g + f))] = 
Qf[(g/(g + f)) - 1] < 0 
since f > 0 and g > 0 and so [(g/(g + f)) - 1] < 0. 
Thus, in this range of Q, global diffusion results in an increase in the 
gain from compliance, which increase is a positive function of Q. 
Q > (e - d)/f 
[AByo(Q) - Ayo(Q)] - [ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q)] = 
AByo(Q) - ABy1(Q) = 
[(ge + fd)l(j + g) - Q(gfl(j + g))] - [e - Q(gfl(j + g))] = 
(ge + fd)l(f + g) - e = 
(ge + fd)l(f + g) - e(f + g)l(j + g) = 
(fd - fe)!(f + g) < 0 
since e > d > 0, f > 0, and g > 0. 
Thus, for all values of Q, global diffusion results in an increase 
in the gain from compliance. With the burden of compliance con­
stant, more A issuers will comply with B's requirements. This can 
again be seen in the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, where ( e -
d)lf = 40. First consider the situation if Y has 40 or fewer shares 
outstanding. The pre-diffusion price damage from relying on inves­
tors from A alone (the difference between Ay0 and ABy0) is 0. The 
after-diffusion price damage from relying on investors from A alone 
(the difference between Ay1 and ABy1) starts at 0 and increases in 
proportion to the number of shares Y has outstanding so that at the 
point that Y has 40 shares outstanding the price damage is $.033. 
Thus over this whole range, the post-diffusion price damage from 
relying solely on investors from A is greater than the pre-diffusion 
price damage, growing from a difference of 0 to a difference of 
$.033. The difference in price damage befor� and after diffusion 
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remains at $.033 for any number of Y shares outstanding in excess 
of 40. Thus, whatever the burden of compliance, there is a larger 
range of issuers from A that will find it worthwhile after diffusion 
than before. 
C. For smaller B issuers, the decrease in the gain from 
compliance after full global diffusion of financial information will 
exceed the increase in gain for comparable smaller A issuers. For 
comparable larger B and A issuers, the respective decrease and 
increase will be identical in size. With regulation unchanged, 
diffusion's effect, however, on the aggregate number of issuers 
registered and trading volume in B is indeterminate. 
Full global diffusion of financial information will result in a 
larger reduction in the gain from compliance with B's disclosure 
regulations by a B issuer with a given Q than an increase in the gain 
from such compliance by a comparable A issuer if the "gain change 
difference expression" set out below is positive, i.e., if 
[(ABx0(Q) - Axo(Q)) - (ABx1(Q) - Axi(Q))] + [(AByo(Q) -
Ayo(Q)) - (ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q))] = 
[(ABxo(Q) - Ax0(Q)) - (ABx1(Q) - Axi(Q)] + [ABy1 (Q) -
AByo(Q)] > 0. 
For 0 < Q ::;; ( e - d)/g, the gain change difference expression equals: 
(e - d) - g(l - (fl(f + g))Q - f(l - (gl(g + f))Q 
This starts positive when Q = 0 since e > d. At Q=(e - d)lg, the 
expression then equals 
(e - d) - [g(l - (fl(f + g))](e - d)lg - [f(l - (gl(g + f))](e - d)I 
g =  
(e - d) - [(1 - (f/(f + g))](e - d) - [f (fl(g + f))](e - d) lg = 
(e - d)[l - 1 + (f/(f + g) - (f/g)(fl (f + g))] = 
(e - d)(fl(f + g)) (1 - fig) >0 
since e > d > 0 and g > f > 0. Thus, over this range of Q, the full 
diffusion's decrease in gain from compliance with B's disclosure 
regulations by B issuers exceeds its increase in the gain from com­
pliance by A issuers. 
For ( e - d)/g ::;; Q ::;; ( e - d)/f, the gain change difference expression 
equals: 
f(e - d)l(f + g) - (f(l - (gl(g + f)))Q = 
(fl(f + g))(e - d) - (fl(f + g))fQ = 
(fl(f + g))[(e - d) - fQ] 
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When Q = (e - d)!g, the value of the expression above is 
(f!(f + g))[(e - d) - f(e - d)!g] = 
(f!(f + g))(e - d) (1 - fig) 
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and is thus the same as when Q < (e - d)!g and, as shown in the 
preceding paragraph, is positive. . 
When Q = ( e - d)lf, the value of the expression above equals 
(fl(f + g))[(e - d) - f(e - d)!fl = 
(f!(f + g))[(e - d) - (e - d)] = 0 
Since, over this range of Q, the value of the expression is a linear 
declining function of Q that is positive at the beginning point and 0 
at the end point, the decrease in gain from compliance with B's 
disclosure regulations by B issuers with full diffusion exceeds the 
increase in the gain from compliance by A issuers with full diffusion 
up until the point that Q reaches (e - d)!f 
For Q > (e - d)/f, the gain change difference expression equals: 
(fe - fd)!(f + g) - (fe - fd)!(f + g) = 0 
So, over the rest of the range of Q, the value of the expression is 0, 
and thus full diffusion's decrease in gain for B issuers from compli­
ance with B's disclosure regulations just equals its increase in the 
gain for A issuers from compliance. 
We have proved that for smaller B issuers, the decrease in the 
gain from compliance after full global diffusion of financial infor­
mation will exceed the increase in gain for comparable smaller A 
issuers and that for larger issuers there is no difference. However, 
with regulation unchanged, full diffusion's impact on the number of 
transactions effected in B is still indeterminate since we have made 
no assumption about the distribution of issuers by size in each 
country. This is true even if the burden of compliance per share 
were the same for ·an issuers in A and B and the distribution of 
issuers by size were the same for both countries. The B issuers that 
complied before diffusion and not after will each have fewer shares 
outstanding than the A issuers that did not comply before and do 
after. The reduction in the number of B issuers may (or may not) 
be greater than the increase in A issuers, but even if it is, it may not 
be great enough to make up for the difference in the size of the 
issuers. 
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D. Demonstration that the sensitivity of issuers to changes in 
B's required level of disclosure increases with fell global diffusion 
of financial information. 
As will be shown below, the sensitivity of the number of issuers 
complying with B's regime to changes in the burden of compliance 
is connected to the relationship between Q and the price gain from 
compliance. 
· 
a. Relationship between Q and the price gain from compliance. 
For issuers under the circumstances indicated below and in the 
ranges of Q indicated, the price gain from compliance increases 
with Q. 
Before diffusion, B issuers with Q > ( e - d)/g. Gx0 is the price 
gain from compliance. 
Gx0(Q) = ABxo(Q) - Ax0(Q) 
= [(fe + gd)!(f + g) - Q(gf/(f + g))] - [d - fQ] Q >(e - d) lg 
dGxJdQ = f[l - (g!(g + f))] > 0 Q>(e - d)/g 
since g > 0 and f >  0 and so (g!(g + f)) < 1 
Before diffusion, A issuers with Q > (e - d)/f. Gy0 is the price 
gain from compliance with B's disclosure requirements. 
Gyo(Q) = ABy0(Q) - Ayo(Q) 
= [(ge + fd)!(g + f) - (fg!(g + f))Q] - [e - fQ] Q > (e - d)/f 
= [(ge + fd)!(g + f) - e] - ff(g!(g + f)) - f]Q 
dGyJdQ = f [1 - (g!(g + f))] > 0 Q> (e - d)/f 
After diffusion, all B issuers. Gx1 is the price gain from compli­
ance with B's disclosure requirements. 
Gx1 (Q) = ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q) 
= [(e - (gf/(f + g)) Q] - [e - fQ] 
dGxifdQ = f [1 - (g!(g + f))] > 0 
After diffusion, all A issuers. Gy 1 is the price gain from 
compliance. 
Gy1(Q) = ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q) 
= [(e - (gf!(f + g)) Q] - [e - fQ] 
dGyi/dQ = j[l - (g!(g + f))] > 0 
As for the remaining possible cases, the price gain from compli­
ance is either inversely related, or unrelated, to Q. 
Before diffusion, B issuers with Q :::; ( e - d)/g. 
Gxo(Q) = ABx0(Q) - Axo(Q) 
= [e - gQ] - [d - fQ] Q :::; (e - d) lg 
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dGxJdQ = (f - g) < 0 Q ::;; (e - d)lg 
since g > f> 0. Gx0, however, is positive throughout this range. At 
Q = 0, Gx0 = (e - d) > 0. At Q = (e - d)/g 
Gxo(Q) = (e - d) - (g - f)[(e - d)!g] 
= (e - d)[l - ((g - f)lg)] > 0 
since g > f > 0 and (g - f)/g < 1. 
Before diffusion, A issuers with Q ::;; ( e - d)/f. 
Gyo(Q) = AByo(Q) - Ayo(Q) 
= (e - fQ) - (e - fQ) = 0 
Thus, for Y issuers in this range, there is no price gain from 
compliance. 
b. Sensitivity of the extent of compliance to the lowering of the 
cost of compliance. 
Set C equal to an issuer's extra burden in complying with B's 
disclosure regulations and c = C/Q, the extra burden of compliance 
on a per share basis. The question that we want to investigate is the 
difference between how, before full global diffusion of financial in­
formation, a lowering of C affects the range of issuers that would 
choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements, and how, ,after 
such diffusion, a lowering of C would affect this range. I will as­
sume in the text that C is proportional to Q, i.e., that for any given 
level of required disclosure, an issuer's c will be constant over the 
full range of Q, and conclude that diffusion will increase the sensi­
tivity of issuers to a lowering of the burden of compliance. In the 
margin, I will show that the propositions necessary to reach this 
conclusion hold as well with the assumption that C is constant over 
the full range of Q. Since reality is probably somewhere in be­
tween, with larger issuers having larger compliance burdens than 
smaller ones but not proportionately larger ones, the conclusion 
should hold in the real world as well. 
Before diffusion, B issuers. Before diffusion, the size of the 
price gain to B issuers from complying with B's disclosure regula­
tions starts, when Q = 0, at (e - d). It declines to (e - d)(f/(f + g)), 
at Q = (e - d)/g. From that point on, it increases as Q increases. 
Thus, before diffusion, any B issuer that wanted to be publicly 
traded would, regardless of its Q, want to comply with B's disclo­
sure requirements assuming that c was less than (e - d)(f!(f + g)), 
the minimum price gain. Empirically, this would appear to be the 
case today with the United States as country B, since essentially all 
public U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. requirements, i.e., practi-
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cally none are public bnly abroad. Thus, before diffusion, a lower­
ing of compliance burdens (and hence each issuer's c) has no effect 
on the number of B issuers complying and hence no effect on the 
number of B issuer share transactions effected in B.2os 
After diffusion, B issuers. After diffusion, the size of the price 
gain to X from complying with B's disclosure requirements is 0 at Q 
= 0 and increases linearly with Q. Thus, for any given c that an 
issuer may have, there is some minimum Qm at which the price gain 
is sufficiently large to make compliance worthwhile. Qm can be de­
termined by solving the following equation: 
e - [gf/(f + g)]Qm - C = e - fQm 
Qm = [(f + g)/fj]c 
dQmldc = (f + g)lff > 0 
Diffusion, with the burdens of compliance unchanged, will result in 
B issuers with Q's less than their Qm's not complying with B's dis­
closure requirements. A lowering of the burdens of compliance 
lowers c and hence Qm, and will increase the number of B issuers 
complying and hence the number of B issuer share transactions ef­
fected in B. 206 
Before diffusion, A issuers. Before diffusion, the size of the 
price gain to Y issuers, from complying with B's disclosure regula­
tions starts, when Q = 0, at 0. It remains at 0 up to the point where 
Q = ( e - d)/f, and, from that point on, increases as Q increases. 
205. If C were constant, this proposition would be true as long as (i) the value of C/Q at 
Q = ( e - d)/g (the point of minimum per share price gain and the point beyond which the gain 
increases while c decreases) is less than that minimum price gain, i.e., (e - d)(f/{f + g)), and 
(ii) there are no public issuers with Q's so small that they are less than [{d - e) + ((e - d)2 -4{f 
- g)(C))'h]/2{f- g). The second condition involves the level of Q below which c, which equals 
C/Q and hence is inversely related to Q, climbs to the point that exceeds the gain. At this 
point, the per share price gain equals c, i.e., 
(e - d) - (g - f) Q = C/Q 
(f- g)Q2 + (e - d)Q - C = 0 
an equation that can be solved for Q using the quadratic formula. Again, if the assumption 
of constant C is correct, these conditions appear to be currently met with the United States as 
country B since essentially all public U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. requirements. Effec­
tively this is saying that for any U.S. firm so small that its burden of compliance with U.S. 
disclosure laws outweighs its price gain from going public at home, it is too unknown abroad 
for that to be an alternative. 
206. The same is true if, at any given level of disclosure requirements, C remains constant 
with changes in Q. Any B issuer with a Q greater than a minimum Qm will find compliance 
worthwhile since the per share price gain will start at 0 and be increasing with Q and the per 
share cost of compliance will be decreasing with Q. Qm can be determined as follows. 
e - fgfl(f + g)]Qm - C/Qm = e - !Qm] 
Qm2 = [(/ + g)/ffJ C 
Qm = [(f + g)lff]112C112 
dQ,,/dC = {1h)[(f + g)!ff]112C112 > O 
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Thus, for any given c, there is some minimum Qm, greater than Q= 
( e - d)lf, at which the price gain is sufficiently large to make compli­
ance worthwhile. Qm can be determined by solving the following 
equation: 
(ge + fd)!(g + f) - lfg!(f + g)]Qm - C = e - fQm] 
Qm = (e - d)/f + [(f + g)!fj]c. 
dQm!dc = (f + g)/ff 
Thus, even before diffusion, a lowering of c lowers Qm and will in­
crease the number of A issuers complying with B's disclosure regu­
lations and hence the number of A issuer share transactions 
effected in B.201 
After diffusion, A issuers. After diffusion, the size of the price 
gain to Y from complying with B's disclosure requirements is 0 at Q 
= 0 and increases linearly with Q. Thus, for any given c, there is 
again some minimum Q = Qm > 0 at which the price gain is suffi­
ciently large to make compliance worthwhile. Qm can be deter­
mined by solving the following equation: 
e - [gf/(f + g)]Qm - C = e - fQm 
Qm = [(f + g)!ff]c 
dQmldc = (f + g)lff> 0 
Diffusion, with c unchanged, will lower Qm by ( e - d)/f. This will 
increase the number of A issuers complying with B's disclosure reg­
ulations and hence the number of A issuer share transactions ef­
fected in B. A lowering of disclosure requirements and hence of c 
would further lower Qm and would further increase the number of 
A issuers complying and hence the number of A issuer share trans­
actions effected in B.2os 
Aggregate impact of diffusion on sensitivity. Before diffusion, 
all publicly traded B issuers will comply with B's more onerous dis-
207. The same is true if, for an given level of required disclosure, C is constant across Q. 
Again there would be a Qm that can be determined as follows. 
(ge + fd)/(g + f) - lfg/(f + g)]Qm - C!Qm = e - fQm 
Qm = (e - d)/f + [(f + g)/fj](C!Qm)· 
Qm2 = [(e - d)/f]Qm + [(f + g)ffj] C = 0 
Qm2 - [(e - d)!f]Qm - [(f + g)!fj]C = 0 
Using the quadratic formula, 
Qm = (1h)[(e - d)!f] + (1h)[((e - d)lf)2 + 4((f + g)!ff)qm 
dQddC = (1h)(1h)[((e - d)!f)2 + 4((f + g)/ff)q-'h(4)((f+g)/ft) 
dQddC = [((e - d)lf)2 + 4((f + g)tff)q-'b((f + g)!ff) > 0 
208. The same is true if, at any given level of disclosure requirements, C remains constant 
with changes in Q. The analysis is the same as where C remains constant after diffusion in 
the case of B issuers, see supra note 206. 
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closure requirements (assuming, as would appear to be the case 
with the United States as country B, that each B issuer's c < (e -
d)(f!(f + g))). Thus Qm for all B issuers is effectively 0. Lowering 
the cost of compliance cannot increase the number of B issuers 
complying and hence the number of B issuer share transactions ef­
fected in B because none are sold and traded exclusively abroad 
now. On the other hand, before diffusion, A issuers will have posi­
tive Qm's. Only some - those with Q's greater than Qm - will 
comply. The rest - those with Q's less than their Qm will not com­
ply. Lowering the burden of compliance would lower the Qm for 
some issuers to a level below their Q's and thus induce them to 
comply. This would increase the number of A issuer share transac­
tions effected in B. 
Diffusion will result in B issuers having positive, rather than 0, 
Qm. Thus after diffusion, with no change in the cost of compliance, 
many B issuers wishing to be publicly traded - those with Q's 
lower than Qm - would choose not to comply. As with A issuers 
even before diffusion, lowering the burden compliance would lower 
Qm, in some cases to a level below their Q's thereby inducing some 
B issuers to comply after all and increasing the number of transac­
tions effected in B. Diffusion will result in A issuers continuing to 
have a positive, but lower, Qm. With no change in the cost of com­
pliance, the number of A issuers complying with B's requirements 
will increase. A lowering of the cost will increase the number more. 
In aggregate, before diffusion, lowering the burden of compliance 
will attract additional members of one group - A issuers - to 
comply. After diffusion, a burden lowering will attract additional 
members of two groups - A issuers and B issuers - to comply. 
The post-diffusion potential for attracting additional B issuers 
means that lowering the burden of compliance will have a larger 
positive impact on the number of transactions effected in B than 
before, since there is no reason to believe that the additional A is­
suer share transactions induced by a given cost lowering would be 
less after diffusion than before. The marginal impact of the lower­
ing on Qm will for A issuers be the same before and after diffusion, 
i.e., for A issuers dQmldc equals (f + g)/ffboth before and after dif­
fusion. While the A issuers attracted by a post-diffusion lowering 
would be smaller, they would probably be more numerous. 
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APPENDIX II 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA MODEL OF DISCLOSURE 
STANDARDS RA.CE TO THE BOTTOM 
Imagine two identical countries, A and B. 
I. INITIAL CONDITIONS 
815 
Initially no transnational securities transactions are possible. 
Each country chooses the level of disclosure that is substantively 
optimal, i.e., the marginal social cost just equals the marginal social 
benefit in terms of improved allocation of capital and agency cost 
ryduction. In each, there is one manufacturing industry, widgets 
(W), which produces 100 units (W's) per year and one service indus­
try, securities exchange services, which produces 10 units (SE's) per 
year. In terms of pricing, lW = lSE. The economy is competitive 
and the production functions for W and SE meet the ordinary as­
sumptions of concavity and constant returns to scale. The inputs 
for producing widgets.are labor (L) and capital (K). The inputs for 
producing securities exchange services are labor and brokers (Br). 
L, K, and Br and entrepreneurism are supplied locally. Because the 
countries are identical, each factor initially earns the same return in 
both countries. 
II. TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BECOME 
POSSIBLE: A LOWERS ITS LEVEL OF REQUIRED 
D1scLOSURE AND B DoEs NoT 
It is now possible to effect transactions in one country in the 
shares of an issuer of the other country and to have shareholders in 
one country of an issuer of the other. As demonstrated above,2°9 if 
the countries adhere to a mix of investor and market protection, the 
lowering by one of its required disclosure level can increase the vol­
ume of transactions effected within its borders and the more global­
ization proceeds, the greater is this gain in volume. Suppose A 
lowers its level, and B does not. 
A. Effects in A 
1. Reduced efficiency in manufacturing. The lowering of the 
required level of disclosure reduces it below what is substantively 
optimal. As a result, the manufacturing sector is not as efficient 
209. See supra Part IV. 
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and so the same level of input would produce less output. Use as 
an example, a decline of 4W. Assume that capital, which is now 
supplied globally, earns a global rate of return that is essentially the 
same as its expected return in each country before the requirements 
were lowered (i.e., it is insignificantly affected by the decline in effi­
ciency) so that the impact of the loss in efficiency is absorbed en­
tirely by entrepreneurs and labor in A.210 
2. Increased demand for stock exchange services. Issuers in B 
take steps to facilitate the effecting of transactions in their shares in 
A and so demand for A's stock exchange services increases. L is 
moved out of widgets and into securities exchange services to in­
crease production of these services. Purchasers of this increased 
production are residents of B. Use as an example, a movement of 
labor sufficient to reduce W by another 9 (so that total W produc­
tion = 87.5211) and to increase SE by 8 (so that the total SE produc­
tion = 18). The greater reduction in W than increase in SE reflects 
the fixed supply of Br and the declining marginal productivity of 
labor in securities exchange services (the SE mppl being initially 
equal to the W mppl). 
3. Increased price for SE and rents for Br. The supply of Br is 
fixed and so the increased demand for SE produced in A will raise 
the price and raise the return on Br. Use as an example a doubling 
of the price of SE in terms of W so that one SE is now priced at two 
w. 
4. A's welfare increases. As long as the increased rents are 
greater than the loss in efficiency in manufacturing, the lowering of 
disclosure requirements has increased A's welfare. In the example, 
total production is 87.SW and 18SE. 9SE will be exported in return 
for 18W. Thus the suppliers of L, Br, and entrepreneurship are now 
able to consume 105.SW (i.e., 87.SW + 18W) plus 9SE less payments 
to capital, compared with 100W plus lOSE less somewhat larger 
payments to capital (reflecting the initially somewhat larger widget 
industry) before the lowering of requirements. Suppliers of K resi-
210. To illustrate reasonably simply the problem's game theory aspects, it is being 
modeled as a two·country example. With just two countries of equal size, a significant de­
cline in the efficiency of the manufacturing sector of one would have a palpable effect on the 
returns to the two nation global pool of capital. However, where A represents a much 
smaller portion of world GDP, the assumption of insignificant effect would be reasonably 
accurate. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
211. The efficiency loss on this somewhat smaller scale of operations would be about 3.5, 
not 4. 
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dent in A will do as well as before since they have as much to sup­
ply and they can sell it globally at the same price as before. There is 
a clear welfare gain compared to (J): the increase 5.SW dominates 
the decrease of 1SE even priced by the new price ratio and even 
ignoring the reduction in payments that now have to be made to the 
widget industry suppliers of K. 
B. Effects in B 
1. Unchanged efficiency in manufacturing. Since B's required 
level of disclosure is not reduced, efficiency in its manufacturing 
sector stays the same as before. The same level of input would pro­
duce the same level of output. Thus entrepreneurs and labor in B 
will not suffer any reduction in returns because of a loss of 
efficiency. 
2. Decreased demand for stock exchange services. Issuers in B 
take steps to facilitate the effecting of transactions in their shares in 
A and so demand for B's stock exchange services decreases. L is 
moved out of securities exchange services and into widgets to in­
crease widget production. Purchasers of this increased production 
are residents of A who take them in return for the securities ex­
change services they are exporting. Use as an example, a move­
ment of labor sufficient to increase W by 9 (so that total W 
production = 109) and decreases SE by 10 (so that the total SE 
production = 0). 
3. Elimination of rents for Br. The supply of Br is fixed and 
so the disappearance of demand for SE produced in B will elimi­
nate any return on Br in B. 
4. B's welfare decreases. The elimination of the rents for Br 
results in an overall decrease in the welfare of B residents. In the 
example, total production is l09W and no SE. 9 SE will be im­
ported in return for 18W. Thus the suppliers of L, Br, and entre­
preneurship are now able to consume 91 W and 9SE less payments 
to capital, compared initially with lOOW and lOSE less somewhat 
smaller payments to capital (reflecting the smaller widget industry 
in B under the initial conditions) before A lowers its requirements. 
Suppliers of K resident in B will do as well as before since they have 
just as much capital to supply and they can sell it globally at the 
same price as before. There is a clear welfare loss compared to (I): 
there is a loss in how much can be consumed of both W and SE 
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even before accounting for the somewhat larger payments that now 
have to be made to K suppliers due to the enlarged widget industry. 
III. A AND B BOTH LOWER THEIR REQUIRED LEVELS OF 
DISCLOSURE 
A. Effects in A 
1. Reduced efficiency in manufacturing. The same as in (II) 
(i.e., in the example, a reduction of 4 W given the same level of 
inputs). 
2. Demand for stock exchange services. Like in (I) but unlike 
(II), A is not comparatively more attractive than B and so demand 
for A's stock exchange services would be essentially the same as in 
(I) (assume a very low income elasticity of demand for SE). Thus L 
in the widget industry is the same as initially in (I). In the example, 
total W production = 96 and SE = 10. 
3. Price for SE and rents for Br. Same as in (I). 
4. A's welfare decreases. There is a decrease in welfare not 
only compared to (II) but also compared to (I). Compared to (I) 
there is a decrease in efficiency in manufacturing and no increase in 
rents to Br. In the example, total production would now be 96W 
and lOSE. Exports of SE and hence imports of W will cease. Thus 
the suppliers of L, Br, and entrepreneurship are now able to con­
sume 96W plus lOSE less somewhat smaller payments to capital. 
Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, the reduced 
payments to capital will be less than the decline in W. Suppliers of 
K resident in A will do as well as before since they have as much to 
supply and they can sell it globally at the same price as before. 
There is thus a clear welfare loss compared to (I): the decrease of 
4W dominates the decrease in the payments that now have to be 
made to suppliers of K to the widget industry. 
B. Effects in B 
1. Reduced efficiency in manufacturing. Same as with A in 
(III) since B's required level of disclosure is now also reduced. 
2. Demand for stock exchange services. Compared to (II), de­
mand for stock exchange services produced in B has increased. 
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Like in (I) but unlike in (II), A is not comparatively more attractive 
than B and so demand for B's stock exchange services would be 
essentially the same as in (I) (assume a very low income elasticity of 
demand for SE). Thus L in the widget industry is the same as ini­
tially in (I). In the example, total W production = 96 and SE = 10. 
3. Rents for Br. Same as in (I). 
4. B's welfare increases compared to (II) and decreases com­
pared to (I). There is an increase in welfare compared to (II) but a 
decrease compared to (I). Compared to (II) there is a decrease in 
efficiency in manufacturing but an increase in rents. In the exam­
ple, total production would now be 96W and lOL. Imports of SE 
and hence exports of W will cease. Thus the suppliers of L, Br, and 
entrepreneurship are now able to consume 96W plus lOSE less 
somewhat smaller payments to capital. Suppliers of K resident in B 
will do as well as before since they have as much and they can sell it 
globally at the same price as before. There is thus a clear welfare 
gain compared to (II): there is an increase of 4W and an increase in 
SE and a decrease in the payments that now have to be made to K 
suppliers to the widget industry. The comparison between (III) and 
(I) is the same as for A. 
IV. PRISONER'S DILEMMA FEATURES 
If B moved first, the analysis above would be exactly the same, 
but with the countries exchanging places. Absent cooperation, one 
of them is bound to move because reducing the strictness of its dis­
closure system will leave it better off, whatever the other party 
does. Thus such a reduction is the dominant strategy for each of 
them and a reduced disclosure level for both, despite its inferiority 
from a welfare point of view, is the dominant equilibrium. 
We can construct a payoff matrix as follows. In the scenario de­
scribed above, with A moving first, the welfare positions of A can 
be assigned ordinal utilities of 3, 4 and 2 respectively for stages (I), 
(II), and (III). In the scenario with B moving first, the welfare posi­
tions of A can be assigned as 3, 1 and 2 respectively for the 
equivalent stages: B's ordinal utility rankings in these two scenarios 
are just the reverse. In the scenario described above, with A mov­
ing first, the welfare positions of B can be assigned ordinal utilities 
of 3, 1, and 2 respectively for stages (I), (II), and (III). In the scena­
rio with B moving first, the welfare positions of B can be assigned 
as 3, 4, and 2 respectively for the equivalent stages. 
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